THE IMPERATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION OF BANGLADESH: A LEGAL ANALYSIS

Abstract

This article examines John Austin's imperative theory of law, which portrays law as a command from a sovereign that is reinforced by sanctions and applies this concept to the constitutional transition in Bangladesh. It addresses how Austin’s legal positivism distinguishes legal validity from moral judgment, emphasizing authority and enforcement over ethical considerations. The analysis rigorously evaluates Bangladesh’s constitutional modification through the lens of command theory, illustrating how sovereign power has often superseded democratic principles and individual rights. Some revisions conform to utilitarian principles or express widespread acceptance, while others exhibit authoritarian imposition apart from ethical considerations. The study finds that while Austin's theory offers a coherent structural account of legal authority, it insufficiently addresses the ethical foundations necessary for constitutional legitimacy. In Bangladesh, the Constitution frequently functions more as a tool of sovereign authority than as a guardian of rights, highlighting the conflict between legal positivism and democratic constitutionalism.