A study about the use of the term “legal facts”

Abstract

The article describes, referring to characteristic examples, the use of term “legal facts.” Referring  to a study of the Brazilian scholar Thiago Reis, the article explains why, in the beginning of  Savigny’s career the term “legal facts” had importance as a manner to summarize the hitherto  separated forms of possession, and how the term continued to be central to Savigny’s thinking,  now turning into a central point of reference for legal science which was thought as being  independent from philosophy and religion. Reis’ study furthermore allows to describe how the term  was used thereafter in Germany, namely mostly to defend the achievements of legal science  against new approaches and losing sophistication. When, using presentations made at a seminar  that was held in 2015 in Almaty, the article further describes the use of the term “legal facts,” it  argues that the higher reliance on the term throughout the CIS as compared to Germany may be  linked to the lesser degree of detail knowledge about the historical contexts in which the term has  been used, but also the lower degree of certainty about the benefit of the rules in the context of  which the term “legal facts” is used. In other words, the same ambiguity typical for the use of the  term in Germany exists throughout the CIS, and the term seems to lead to the expectation that  there is an objective rule for the issue to be dealt with, it being unclear where the basis for such  rule is.