INDIA AND THE QUAD: OPPORTUNE GEOPOLITICS OR INCONSEQUENTIAL COOPERATION?

Abstract

The tragic death of Shinzo Abe and the inception of the Maiden West Asian QUAD, the recent rollout of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), and the 'Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific' and the QUAD’s recent announcement of an extension of 50 Billion USD to bridge infrastructural lacunae and debt obligations in the Indo-Pacific have all pummelled the diplomatic alliance under the limelight and back into the microscopic scrutiny of scholars, political thinkers and strategists. Having displayed exceptional collaborative results in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, the QUAD is seen reorganising itself, with more structure, a concrete goal, defined ambitions and convergent interests.
The alliance, growing in determination, resources and effectiveness has been criticised by being equated to an Asian NATO by a disgruntled China, whose Belt and Road Initiative is being systematically undone and countered by the QUAD and their strategic policies, be it Indo-Pacific monitoring or a competitive module of vaccine diplomacy. However, despite diligent and extensive contribution in the QUAD’s undertakings, India has been termed ‘the weakest link’ in the QUAD.
The purpose of this paper is to understand and analyse whether the QUAD is the future or past of regional geopolitics—whether it has the will, resources, and strength to spearhead international action and cooperation in the pursuit of its agendas—and where the balance of interest lies in India's membership in the QUAD.