International Criminal Responsibility After Katanga: Old Challenges, New Solutions

Abstract

On March 7, 2014, the International Criminal Court delivered its most recent judgment convicting Mr. Katanga as an accessory of crime against humanity in the form of murder and four counts of war crimes within the meaning of Art. 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute. This decision along with its previous final decisions in the Lubanga and Ngudjolo cases has raised similar concerns about individual criminal responsibility regarding, inter alia, application of control over a crime doctrine as evidenced from the dissenting / separate opinions to them. This doctrine has already firmly settled within the ICC jurisprudence and yet some judges doubt if its application is justified, especially given the peculiarities of national origin irrelevant in the realm of the Rome Statute. The other raised concern is a potential application of the legality principle, since both Ngudjolo and Katanga judgments have investigated the same situations and come to the completely different results.

While the Rome Statute contains the most complete provision determining the modes of individual responsibility, Art. 25 thus appears to be far from being out of debates. To dispel some of them, this article analyzes practical application of Art. 25(3)(a) and (d) by the ICC and different approaches in this regard as well as general grounds for raising question on the necessity for individual criminal responsibility.