

# THE END OF PATIENCE; DEVIATION FROM THE CLASSICAL CONTEXT AND JANUSIAN CONSTRUCTION OF CHINA'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY (TEHRAN-RIYADH DUALITY)

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## Abstract

After 2011, more countries got involved in the Middle East and North Africa, and they made more agreements to work together. China has had certain plans and goals for its actions both inside and outside the country in the past 20 years. In this situation, the way Beijing deals with countries in the Middle East, like Iran and Saudi Arabia, shows that Beijing is practical and likes to work with many different countries. In this study, the authors looked at how China's actions in the Middle East, particularly in relation to Tehran and Riyadh, could affect their foreign policy. They focused on China's "Belt and Road" plan and other partnerships. The study found that China has big goals for the next twenty years and their actions in the Middle East will be important, regardless of any competition within the country. Actors and following programs like B&R. The research shows that China's leaders are taking careful diplomatic steps, and this is happening at the same time as the United States is becoming less influential in the Middle East. Conversely, the relationships with Tehran and Riyadh are influenced by Janusi's approach focusing on practical interests of the country, which also indirectly challenges Washington's unilateral actions. In this case, Beijing's plan is based on working with many countries and through trade and partnerships. In recent years (especially after 2017), it has also grown to include other important areas. "Is" means that something exists or is happening. Actually, by working together with Middle Eastern countries and considering their interests, China has become more appealing without getting into any competitions.

**Keywords:** foreign policy, China, Middle East, United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia

## Introduction

Global dynamics and changes at the local, domestic and international levels and the creation of new patterns, orientations and methods (Aydinely & Singh, 2002), the emergence of new powers in most regions and playing the roles of independent and not aligned with the international powers (unlike the traditional order) (Zhou, 2019)), this strengthens the potential claim that the international system in 2022 is more similar to a bipolar and to some extent multipolar system than a unipolar one. Unresolved maritime disputes between China and the United States (Fravel, 2011), China's pre-eminence in security and even strategic relations in front of the United States, numerous evidences indicating the rise of China's soft power (cf. Longyi, et al, 2012 & Li, 2009 are undoubtedly significant evidences for the new transformations of the international system. This growing confrontation between Washington and Beijing is, according to Mearsheimer, "the tragedy of the great powers" (Mearsheimer, 2021). It is not inevitable (Kurtz-Phelan, 2021).

With the change in the priorities of international actors and the increasing dynamics of regional and international developments, the foreign policy of countries, especially the revisionist powers, will be continuously transformed and changed. Developments such as Moscow's clear opposition to the West after the attack on Ukraine and the weakening of the unity and cohesion of the non-united Europe, the existence of many evidences of the alignment of Beijing and Moscow in the Middle East issues, undeniable signs of the trend towards nationalism and obstruction in hopes. Globalism shows that the world is changing, at least at the theoretical level, and in a sense it should be said: "It is no longer possible to base on the assumptions and propositions of the Cold War period and even two decades after that. Assessing and investigating international issues. (Rosenau & Singh, 2002). The



need to create and innovate new policies and use contradictory tools is actually caused by complex developments that show that no power will ignore its interests. Zahra Ghasemi Koktabeh et al. (2023) conducted a study entitled In the line of fire: a systematic review and meta-analysis of burnout among nurses, in which the quality of benefit due to non-burnout was discussed (Zahra Ghasemi Koktabeh et al., 2023). Hakime Dost Mohammadlou et al. (2023) conducted a study titled knowledge sharing as a moderator between organizational learning and error management culture in university employees, which showed the issue of management quality (Hakime Dost Mohammadlou et al., 2023). Jamal Valipour et al. (2023) conducted a study entitled Designing a credit risk management model in the network of agencies of after-sales service companies, using the financial components of after-sales services and innovative meta-algorithms. They dealt with risk management in their study. (Jamal Valipour et al., 2023).

In spite of Covid-19 affecting the world economy, China's exports were highest in June 2022, even though imports had decreased. Arab News in 2022. Actually, there have been many changes in the world, and for the first time since the Soviet Union fell, the United States' position as a global leader was challenged. Text: (Finin, 2020: 167). Simple: (Finin, 2020: page 167). This article shows big changes in the way countries interact with each other. In October 2021, Xi Jinping talked about China's stronger support for the United Nations and working well with other countries. He said China follows the UN's rules and does its part in working together with other countries. He was a member of the Security Council for a long time. This country is doing a great job in following the 2030 plan to help the environment and has reduced global poverty by more than 70%. So, it has helped a lot with improving human rights in China and around the world. The government office in China that handles relationships with other countries, 2021.

China's comeback in areas other than South East Asia is more appreciated than in this region. The Chinese government wants to make a free trade zone with South Korea, Australia, and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. They are working hard to finish the negotiations and make it start working. Clearly, the leaders of China know about the issues in East Asia and the difficulties of working together with nearby countries. They want to work with other countries in Asia and make their cooperation bigger than just East Asia. A big plan to work together with China's economy could help all the countries in the region and make their cooperation stronger. (Wang, 2016: 205-206). Wang wrote this information on pages 205-206 in 2016. China has always been important for security in Asia, even before it became more powerful. In Buzan's 2003 work. China is becoming a powerful leader in the world, especially in areas like the Belt and Road Initiative. This is because they have made smart changes to their system and are being careful not to make the same mistakes as other countries. We can see the benefits of this in places like Arctic ports, the Indo-Pacific, and other areas. (Brands, H & Gaddis, 2021). jamal valipour in 2024 year had paper via investigating the relationship between the quality of management's expected profit and equity(jamal valipour ,2024). In 2022, Dehghani and Sharifi conducted a study titled Compact Development Policy and Urban Resilience: A Critical Review(Dehghani&Sharifi, 2022). In 2023, Dehghani et al conducted a study entitled Density and Urban Resilience, Cross-Section Analysis in an Iranian Metropolis Context(Dehghani et al,2023). ). In 2024, Ganji et al conducted a study entitled Evaluation of intercity road passenger transportation using a novel double-frontier game-regret-cross-efficiency(Ganji et al,2024)

China being in the Middle East is not like the United States being there, and the way China does things is a key part of its policy in the region. China's Middle East policy involves doing business with many countries and using different ways to communicate and make agreements with them. It also involves working together with other countries and deciding which problems are most important. China's plan for the Middle East is to make decisions about the safety of its people and to avoid causing problems. Their goal is to understand and reduce any potential dangers and costs. China wants to set rules and have more influence in the Middle East. They want to create new ways for countries to be friends and for there to be better order in the region and around the world. China's main focus is achieving two goals: connecting different actors and balancing against other countries, like the United States and Russia.



In this study, the writers looked at how a big country acts in the Middle East. They focused on things like the B&R and Tehran-Riyadh projects. They also talked about how China is trying to make the United States less important in places like the Middle East. Please rewrite this passage in simpler language. The idea of new regionalism and logical multilateralism is a good plan for Chinese leaders to grow projects like the Belt and Road Initiative and build stronger partnerships in this difficult region.

### **1- Theoretical foundations; Cautious limitation of the American order (regionalism and multilateralism)**

In the new century, contrary to the bipolar order in material and ideological dimensions, it has ended and the extensive military confrontations do not have much theoretical support and justification. (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 158). The collapse of the bipolar system has reduced the Chinese's fear of strategic cooperation [led by the United States] to contain them. (Rahm, 2000: 90). In fact, with the end of the era of the bipolar system, despite the superior position of the United States in the international system (especially from the 1990s to 2008), some experts believe in the possibility of creating a multipolar system of the international system.

After the international financial crisis of 2008, the evidence of the decline of the relative power of the United States, especially in the economic dimension, was evident and intensified in 2012 (Layne, 2012), and from this point forward, competitors such as China and Russia became bolder and more active. They became more loyal. Thompson et al. (2021) believe that with numerous changes at the level of the international system, the fields and foci of competition have changed, and with the change in the position of actors, the most probable hypothesis is the increase in the process of multilateralism and The tendency of the system is towards multipolarization. Geopolitical changes with environmental transformations and unexpected threats from pervasive epidemics (coronavirus) are pushing activists towards new patterns of security and cooperation. (Thompson, et al, 2021).

The policy of growing powers such as China in regions such as the Middle East, Central Asia and even Eastern Europe is not based on the foundations and components of the classical order, but based on the new components of regionalism and multilateralism in a step-by-step manner. And it makes sense.

Now this question is raised, what are the advantages and benefits of regionalism for activists, especially at the level of regional and extra-regional power? Mearsheimer believes that in today's world, gaining global leadership and hegemony has somehow become impossible for most of the actors, and the extent of their restrictions and capabilities leads them to leadership and regional politics. (Mearsheimer, 2010: 388). Also, regionalism creates more mechanisms for establishing agreement, alliance and cooperation (Soderbaum, 2005: 224), and finally, playing in regions is not only associated with lower costs, but also limitations and challenges. compared to the international game, the players have more initiative and innovation, and there is a kind of fit between the local norms of the players and regional issues.

On the other hand, regionalism, not only for the local actors of the regions, but also for most of the extra-regional and international actors, creates grounds for achieving more goals and benefits. The foreign policy of international and extra-regional actors in each of the regions is theorized based on three principles, which are: new initiatives and diversification in the field of cooperation development (such as Chiang Mai's initiatives in the financial support of the Union of Nations Southeast Asia + 3 (A. 3. An + 3) His presence and finally, creating a balance between his interests and those of other actors.

Beeson & Xu (2016) in "Leadership with Chinese characteristics: How to consider the role of soft power?", believe that contrary to the increasing attention to China's international empowerment, complex international issues indicate the fact that China - as An actor in current international affairs - it is still a new and untested actor, and acceptance of China's capacity for global leadership and competition with the United States does not fit well with the facts. Accordingly, by examining China's position (and its rise) in the international system in a historical context, they



have investigated the nature of leadership and how China's leadership differs from the United States, and the analysis of the effectiveness and differentiation of soft power with Chinese characteristics has led to this conclusion. They have found that despite the efforts of Chinese leaders to play an international role, their capabilities and ability to act for global leadership have been limited by many problems, especially the domestic capacity and readiness of the neighbors of this country to accept China's leadership.

The great rise and hopes of China can be compared to the United States, especially in the economic index, which according to the statistics in many indicators, China is a significant growth, and based on that, China can be considered a worthy competitor in this field.

**Table No. 1: Economic indicators of China and the United States in 2017**

2017				Year
The United States	China	China	Indicator Country	
19.39 trillion dollars	23.16 trillion dollars		GDP	
2.3 percent	6.9 percent		GDP growth rate	
\$59,500	\$16,700		GDP per capita	
4.160 million people	806.7 million people		work force	
4.4 percent	3.9 percent		unemployment rate	
1.15 percent	3.3 percent		Population below the poverty line	
1.576 trillion dollars	2.157 trillion dollars		Export	
Canada - Mexico	America - Hong Kong		Main importing countries	
2.352 trillion dollars	1.731 trillion dollars		Importation	
Mexico-China	South Korea-Japan		Main exporting countries	
117.3 billion dollars	187.3 trillion dollars		The amount of foreign currency and gold reserves abroad	
17.91 trillion dollars	1.607 trillion dollars		The amount of foreign debt	
1/2 percent	1.6 percent		Inflation rate	

Source: CIA-World Fact Book, 2018

The perspective of the world's emerging powers shows China's very significant position in comparison with other actors. Examining the possibility of international leadership of this country based on the components of positioning theory, such as willingness, capacity and acceptance at the global and regional level, shows its possibilities and potentials. Although, the global acceptance of this country is at a limited level, but compared to other prominent actors, it has more possibility to change the international system. In the following tables, China's global and regional perspectives are compared to other international and regional actors (BRICS members, who, along with the European Union, are the potential and possible manifestations of future powers):

**Table No. 2: Global perspectives on the leadership of BRICS members**

South Africa	china	India	Russia	Brazil	European Union	
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Yes, creating	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes (but not prominently)	Desire



limited	Yes	limited	Yes	Limited to infrastructural, commercial and defense sectors	Yes	Capacity
Yes, in several specific organizations such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations, but lacks credibility as a global leader	Limited, because it does not have many followers and is competing with other BRICS members in their areas of influence	Yes, but it does not have much color and leadership	It started from a high position (membership in the Security Council), but it faces a decrease in the international scene	Yes, in specific organizations such as IBSA, BRICS, World Trade Organization and FAO	Yes (multidimensional ability, diverse facilities, lack of consensus and collective agreement in some policies and strategies)	The reception
<b>Regional perspectives</b>						
South Africa	china	India	Russia	Brazil	European Union	
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes, but internally limited	Yes (in some areas)	Desire
Limited due to internal problems	Yes	Yes, but in South Asia	creating; Competition with China	It has an average capacity and shows itself in a special way in infrastructure projects	Yes (but in some areas)	Capacity
limited	It is limited and in competition with Japan and America	limited	Down	limited	Yes	The reception

Sources: (Quiliconi & Kingah, 2016: 247). and authors' additions

If the regional perspective is taken into consideration in areas such as the Middle East, China's relatively favorable situation can be seen well, especially in the diversity of actors with diverse relationships and fields of cooperation:

South Africa	China	India	Russia	Brazil	European Union	
No	Yes	No (but interested)	Yes (with limitations and features)	No	not so much	Desire
Down	Yes (in competition and some)	Limited (but with potential)	Competing with China, America and the	Limited and fragile	medium	Capacity



	possible threats and possibilities)	capacity) and growing	European Union			
limited	suitable for growing (there are many considerations)	Limited growing	Average down	Down	Relatively suitable	<b>The reception</b>
limited	Much	Down to growing	medium	limited	medium	<b>Variety of actors</b>
limited	commercial-economic and military (down and growing)	Commercial-economic	commercial-economic and military	Economic	commercial-economic, medium military)	<b>Communication field</b>

**Source: authors' findings**

The diplomatic tool that China has adopted to facilitate the breaking down of barriers is the use of cooperative diplomacy rather than alliance. In an alliance, the stronger party fears being caught up in the conflicts of the weaker party, while the weaker party fears abandonment. Strategic partnerships eliminate these fears by reducing commitments. Both sides agree to cooperate in areas of common interest while managing areas of potential competition, and by working on common interests, they are goal-oriented rather than threat-oriented. (Fulton, 2019:3). The table below shows the types of partnerships and China's priorities:

**Table No. 4: Hierarchy of China's participation in the regions and the international system**

Priorities	Participation	No
Full follow-up of cooperation and development in regional and international affairs	Comprehensive strategic partnership	1
More coordination in regional and international affairs, including military	Strategic partnership	2
Maintaining the correct momentum of high-level exchanges, increasing contacts at different levels and increasing mutual understanding on topics of common interest	Comprehensive cooperative partnership	3
Developing cooperation on bilateral issues based on mutual respect and interests	Cooperative partnership	4
Strengthening cooperation on bilateral issues such as trade	Friendly cooperative partnership	5

Source: Fulton, 2019:3

Looking at the facts, we need to wait and see if China will become a global leader without being too controlling. We need to test some important issues within China and with other countries to know for sure. Some problems in our homes include issues with who has power and the rules for making decisions. There is also a lack of freedom in politics and the economy, which are controlled by the government. These situations will become more apparent after China takes on a bigger role in global issues. Certainly, as China's economy grows and the people have more freedom and better lives, its political power on the world stage will increase. So, because of the strict political situation and China's limited influence and focus on money, it can't be a reliable example or source of trust. Participate and show that China is a strong country that can be proven through experiments. China can't be a real world power until its inside is balanced and developed like its outside. thought to be normal or traditional.






## 2. Beijing and the start of working together with many countries; B & R plan.

It looks like new buildings and ideas are always connected to old traditions, and the Chinese want to connect ancient ways with modern advancements. The "Silk Road" is important for this.

The BRI architecture developed over time and has become more ambitious. In 2015, China's government made a plan called Visions and Actions to build the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. It was made by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the National Reform and Development Commission. The Chinese government and its state-owned companies will focus on five things when working with other countries: working together politically, connecting facilities, making trade easier, combining finances, and connecting people. (Fulton, 2019: 2) should be written in simpler words. The big "Belt and Road" plan, which will cost about 1 trillion dollars, was suggested by President Xi Jinping in 2013. It's meant to make trade and communication better. It will create a big network of trains and shipping routes between China and 65 other countries in Asia, North Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Although it took some time to get going, Stanley's research shows that this project has been picking up speed in 2018. According to the information, China will invest more money in the Belt and Road countries because their economy is getting better. The Chinese government is also helping by making new policies to support this. The investment will go up by 14% every year for two years, from 2018 to 2020, even though there are many difficulties. China did well in this area, and the amount of money they invest could go up to 1. 23 trillion dollars by 2027. Stanley wrote it in 2018.

Picture No. 1: B&R plan and China's communication routes with these countries



Source: Stanley, 2018

These roads go between 65 countries and are an important part of the world economy. These countries make up 30% of the total global GDP, 40% of the global GDP growth, and 44% of the world's population. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank thinks that B&R countries need \$21 trillion more to pay for their infrastructure than they have. Providing money and investing in this plan can help meet the needs of the B&R countries and make the Chinese economy stronger. It can bring economic success to these countries and create good opportunities for China. Stanley wrote this in 2018. China wants to increase trade with countries along the route to \$900 billion. A Chinese official named Zhang Gaoli said that the corridors will go through China, Mongolia, and Russia, as well as the New Eurasian Land Bridge, Central and Western Asia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. According to Yini in 2015.

China's unclear intentions towards other parties show that they have big goals they want to achieve in the end.

In May 2015, trade with countries in Asia's trade and infrastructure networks along the Belt and Road increased by 20. 4% in the Guangxi Zhuang region, according to customs data. Exports went up by 22. 3 percent to 40. 74 billion yuan, and imports went up by 14 percent to 11. 11 The numbers



show that trade between the area and the countries along the Economic Belt and the Belt and Road Initiative was \$8.36 billion between January and April 2015. The trade with 47 countries on the land route went up by 26.8% to 535. The trade with 32 countries on the sea route increased by 22.1% to 5067. Private companies were a big part of these deals, making up 80.6% of the total amount. The article was published by China Daily in 2015.

However, Chinese construction and infrastructure contractors require a 20% deposit in advance payment. But because the value of the dollar has gone up and the cost of goods has gone down in recent years, it has been difficult to finance these projects in countries involved in the Belt and Road initiative. But, this problem might change in the future. The prices of things and money in different countries are going up. This is important because it means that B&R countries might have to pay less for big and costly building projects. China updated its rules for investing in other countries, which helped it to invest more in the B&R countries in the latter part of 2017. In 2015 and 2016, the Chinese government prioritized investing in non-infrastructure sectors like hospitality. However, they started to control investments they considered "irrational" and focused more on investing in countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative. Xing believes that good things happened in 2018 that make us think China can increase its investment in B&R countries to 1.3 trillion dollars by 2027, up from 1.2 Stanley (2018)

### **3- Janusian construction of Beijing's Middle Eastern foreign policy**

The lack of democratic game rules and the existence of authoritarian governments and monarchies in some countries, lack of political stability, ideological rivalries, uncertainty and trust, high degree of vulnerability (Hurrell, 2006: 18) and conflicting identities lead to the lack of The issues have been logically analyzed. For example, the ideological and identity enmity between Iran and Israel cannot be found in other regions, and Iran's policy in regions such as Shamat (Syria) and the Palestinian issue cannot be evaluated based on the criteria of profit and cost. Iran's interests in many countries can be explained and analyzed based on values, norms and ideas. Iran - at least in the declaration dimension - has not been looking for financial benefits and achieving commercial and economic benefits, and has paid a lot of money for this aim and goal. Accordingly, the examination of the results of China's foreign policy in the Middle East on Iran's interests has a complex and multifaceted nature.

China is working with countries in the Middle East and Central Asia to create a military alliance called Shanghai. They want to create a balance of power with multiple strong military forces. (Eisman and colleagues, 2007). In recent times, the way China and Middle East activists have connected has changed a lot. In the past, China had a peaceful and non-aggressive policy, then became friendlier in the 1970s, and now is focusing on economic relations from the 1980s until now. Since 2008, the country has been acting independently in the global economy, refusing to pay certain fees and openly supporting other countries.

Many countries in East and Southeast Asia are similar. The countries in the Middle East have some common interests and economic needs with China, but they are not ready to fully commit to China. They are worried about the uncertain relationship between the United States and China, and they fear that the US may punish them in the future for doing business with China. China does a lot of trade with countries from the Persian Gulf, especially in oil. They trade most with Saudi Arabia, more than with Iran. When Iran and China both say the United States has too much power, Iran is the eighth biggest importer of oil.

The bad relationship between the Arabs and Iran, and China needing to buy things from Arab countries near the Persian Gulf, has made it hard for Iran and China to become good friends. China wants to keep its good relationship with Arab countries that sell oil. At the same time, China needs more and more energy, so it has to be careful in its relations with both Iran and the Gulf Arab countries. Fars needs to watch. (Hunter, 2010:119) (Hunter, 2010, page 119). However, in reality, when the conditions and agreements are the same, China has shown more interest in getting Arab players than Iran. China behaves the way it does because of two important reasons. The United States is very sensitive to Iran and the Arab countries are nearby. They might be replaced by other



countries. Iran is facing isolation, sanctions, and pressure. They will have to rely on China for help and economic opportunities. Arab countries want to keep China away from Iran.

Table No. 5: China's participation in MENA

Signed year	Level	States	No
2014	Comprehensive strategic partnership	Algeria	1
2017	Strategic partnership	Djibouti	2
2014	Comprehensive strategic partnership	Egypt	3
2016	Comprehensive strategic partnership	Iran	4
2015	Strategic partnership	Iraq	5
2015	Strategic partnership	Jordan	6
2018	Strategic partnership	Kuwait	7
2016	Strategic partnership	Morocco	8
2018	Strategic partnership	Oman	9
2014	Strategic partnership	Diameter	10
2016	Comprehensive strategic partnership	Arabia	11
2010	Strategic partnership	Türkiye	12
2018	Comprehensive strategic partnership	Emirates	13


Source: Fulton, 2019:4

Therefore, the relations that a decade ago had only a cautious and purely economic nature, have gradually covered multiple layers of security and politics. In other words, the priority of economic issues has led to extreme political differences without return. In this regard, Russia Elium network quoted Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov as saying: "China has political participation in the Middle East to protect its economic interests." (Alhas, 07/15/2018).

One of China's cautious goals in the Middle East is to play a role in the Persian Gulf region. In this regard, Xi Jinping stated: China is ready to cooperate with Saudi Arabia to promote peace and stability in the Middle East region, press for the early conclusion of the China Free Trade Area Agreement with the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and jointly establish a Sino-Arab community. with a common future in the new era. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China, 2022). The importance of these relations is that the Chinese have several balls [opportunities, privileges and superiority] in the Middle East, and considering the amount of trade and joint investments, it seems unlikely that China would like to To cancel several decades of diplomatic interaction and a significant amount of trade and investment with these countries. (Fulton, 2020).

The duality and Janusian construction of China's foreign policy towards Middle Eastern countries can be seen in many cases, and its obvious examples can be seen in similar agreements with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and other actors in the region. Also, the sale of many weapons and military knowledge to Iran and the UAE is a point of gravity in Beijing's pragmatic intentions in this region, based on which the UAE forces go to war with the Houthis, who are considered allies of Iran, alongside the Saudi ally. to be (Refer to: Karasik, 2016:3). Relations between China and the UAE have increased more than ever during the current decade, and the comprehensive strategic partnership between them (see: Gulf Today, 2018) was the beginning of relations that have continued in 2021 and 2022. . Also, China's relations with Iran's enemies such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel are not hidden from anyone. China supports the Assad regime in Syria, but takes the side of Saudi Arabia in Yemen. Until now, China has tried to manage the balance in relations by not directly interfering in regional confrontations. Standing away and being an observer in many confrontations, rather than inducing the image of a supporter, it shows a country that is empty most of the time. (Burton, 2020).

In recent years, China and Israel have been working together more closely in areas like selling weapons, trading goods, sharing energy resources, having political ties, and building strong cultural connections. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) says that there are over 200 companies in Israel that make weapons, and some of them are owned by Israel. Israel uses a lot



of weapons and has a strong military, but there are too many arms companies for its needs. Israel sells 75% of its weapons to countries like China, the United States, India, Turkey, and some African countries. Israel has been selling more weapons in the last 30 years to make more money. In 2009, they made \$7.5 billion from these sales. We don't know the exact number of weapons China has bought from Israel. There is no exact number for how many weapons China buys from Israel because both countries want to be careful about working together. This is because the US doesn't want China and Israel to work together on military things. (Alimat (2014): 188-190.)

Many people see China in a bad way because of its strict rules in East Asia. China has tried to show off its successes with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and building stronger connections with Aceh. This makes China look good, but it hasn't really worked out well. China's leaders need to do a better job of keeping track of their security, military, and intelligence policies in the Middle East. This is important because, even though it's not a top priority for them right now, they are still facing challenges in this area. The United States has strong opinions and reactions towards Arab actors. Additionally, there is worry about how it will lower the amount of business between countries. Secondly, China is not very good at this and they have too many rules that limit what is possible. So, China is working to improve its relationships with sensitive areas like the Middle East by focusing on economic issues rather than security and military issues. They are looking at their abilities and resources and taking into account global conditions and needs as they make these improvements. The direction is forward. Another reason China doesn't want to get too involved with Iran's security and military is because they're worried about how the United States might react. This is an important example of why they're being cautious, along with opposition from countries like Israel and Saudi Arabia. However, China also has relationships with countries that are friends with the United States, like Israel and Saudi Arabia, to some degree. This helps to support America's allies against countries like Iran.

### **1-3- Tehran-Beijing relations; The middle of caution and logic**

Because according to Morgan Stanley, China's total investment in the Belt and Road Initiative will reach 1.2 to 1.3 billion dollars in 2027, and in May 2017, Ning Jizhe, Vice Chairman of the China National Development and Reform Commission (CNDRC), announced that Beijing's investments in B&R for five years (2017-2022) are projected to be between \$600 billion and \$800 billion. Therefore, it is hard to believe that China will spend almost two-thirds of its planned budget in Iran. (Scita, 2019). Although the Chinese still do not have the most advanced technologies of Western companies in some cases, Chinese energy companies have become important developers of oil and natural gas fields in Iran - the second largest gas producer (after Russia). According to Iran's Ministry of Oil, in August [2019], China has "re-participated" in three key energy projects: First, South Pars gas field, which is the world's largest gas field and shared with Qatar. Second, the Yadavaran oil field on the border with Iraq; And finally, the development of the Jask oil terminal, which is located in the east of the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, there is no doubt that China has benefited economically from the lack of western energy companies in Iran due to American pressure. (Vatanka, 2019).

In parallel with efforts to bring Iran's oil sales to zero (BBC Farsi, 2019), whispers and potentials to actualize strategic cooperation with China grew stronger. With the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and renewed consensus to deal with Iran, especially in stopping the purchase of oil and accompanying most of the countries with the aforementioned policy, it led Iran to a great solution. The trips of Larijani - as the representative of the leader of Iran - and then Javad Zarif - as the former foreign minister - intensified the whispers of Tehran's frustration with the West, especially the United States. Before Zarif's trip to China, he wrote an article for the prominent Chinese newspaper Global Times to consolidate what he called "strategic partnership". According to Zarif, China and Iran are "necessary strategic partners on many fronts". Although Zarif did not mention the suppression of Muslims by the Chinese government, and even in the following years, he believed that relations with China were not an "agreement" but a "proposal" and a "forward plan" that "needs dialogues" more than. However, some sense of fear of China's reaction was evident in Zarif's words. His request for "a strong foundation of economic relations that benefit both sides",



was actually a look at the widespread concerns in Iran, who believe that the existing economic relations have been skewed in favor of China.. (Vatanka, 2019).

In March 2021, Iran and China made a 25-year agreement to work together on energy. This is a really big deal and has caused a lot of debate. It has unclear and almost bossy shapes. The agreement happened when the US government left the JCPOA and started to isolate and embargo Iran again. There was also a lot of tension and competition between China and the United States, especially in business and money. United was made. It is believed that the Iranian government did not want this agreement at the time, and it is part of their strategy and policy for leading the country. Some Iranian politicians have documents that show a policy was given to the governments at that time. The governments have been talking to the Chinese government without Iran's involvement. Some people say that China wants full control over some islands in the Persian Gulf that belong to Iran. This has caused a lot of public anger because it goes against Iran's independence. So, China may need to change its plans for the islands.

Based on the opinions of Iranian and Chinese officials and other evidences and documents, it can be said that the agreement has a phased, multi-level, multiple process related to all political, economic, military, industrial and even social and cultural fields. Based on the memorandum, the parties should reach specific contracts and agreements in each of the sectors, and to implement them, they should involve related ministries, organizations and institutions, and specialized working groups. Be active in order to finalize the implementation phase. Although the main and detailed provisions of this agreement have not yet been announced, but based on the available information (statements, words and positions of the relevant leaders and officials, etc.), some of the provisions and matters related to it can be seen in the table below. :

**Table No. 6: Basic generalities related to the 25-year Tehran-Beijing cooperation agreement**

<b>Stages of development</b>
Creation date: January 23, 2014 Presentation date: September 2018 Approval date: June 22, 2019 Effective date: March 27, 1400 Agreement time March 2021 Effective time January 14, 2022
<b>Contents and main elements</b>
<b>Energy and economy, politics, military and defense, virtual space</b> Sharing information and training together for military and security purposes, and practicing defense activities together. Chinese companies are helping to build storage tanks for oil, gas, and petrochemical industries. They are also involved in projects related to energy, automotive, shipbuilding, natural resources, mines, iron, steel, water and sewage, electricity, gas, communications, information, tourism, science and education, and technology. They are using their expertise in filtering and internet technology to improve telecommunications and national internet services. Strengthening and modernizing Iran's air and sea resources and working with China on projects for building and developing infrastructure in all areas. Iran has given China many benefits and allowed them to be involved in the Persian Gulf, Oman Sea, and Makran region. Iran and China will work together on new projects in the eastern and southeastern areas. They will also work together in Iran's free trade zones to help these areas grow. This cooperation is based on mutual interests and military, strategic, and economic similarities with other regions and countries. Most likely to work together and trade in aerospace products like jets and new technologies.
<b>Part of the criticism</b>
- Conducting transactions in the Chinese yuan unit indicates part of the anti-Western nature of this agreement. - Some consider it as a violation of Article 77 of the Iranian Constitution

- Hidden dimensions such as China's position in the southern islands, the position of other countries in Iran's economic future
  - Some of China's political demands from Iran, the reasons for focusing on the energy sector and why the presence of a foreign country in the social and political issues of another country
  - The silence of some of its dimensions and the non-disclosure of the text of the document
  - The possibility of China's bad faith in the coming years, considering the history of this country in abandoning some of its commitments in Iran's nuclear program.
  - The instrumental and utilitarian nature of China's political economy, making Iran dependent on China due to Iran's economic hardship and conducting transactions in Chinese currency (or the "loan and trap" policy)<sup>1</sup>
  - Not being an expert on some issues and refraining from citing statistical and precise examples
  - China's priority in the implementation of projects and the possibility of seizing Iran's resources and raw materials
  - Threats to the cyber security of citizens, problems in the governance of governments over cyber space and encouraging the emergency response team, bringing internet devices and suppressing the Chinese to Iran (from the Internet to the intranet)
  - The existence of numerous evidences of "special discount" in the sale of Iranian oil to China

Sources: Hunter, 2020, Iftikhari, 2020, Petroleum Economist, 2019, BBC Farsi 2020 and 2021, Islamic Republic of Iran Information Base, 2016, Sadeghi, 2020, Radio Payam Israel, 2020, F.R.I, 2020, Euronews Farsi , 2020, Vatanka, 2019.

There are two very different opinions about the agreement. Some people think Iran is betraying its own country by making deals with China, while others think it's a good way for Iran to avoid conflict with the West. "Write this text in easy words. "

Mohammad Hossein Malaek <sup>2</sup> thinks that people who don't like the agreement don't understand politics well and are unhappy with the government. Also, China is not seen as Iran's ally in dealing with America. China should do something nice for Iran, because Iran is dealing with America and causing problems in West Asia. (Euronews Farsi, 2020)

Ahmad Naqibzadeh also believes that the critics of the extensive and long-term cooperation between Iran and China are "pro-Western" and in defense of this cooperation, he says: "When the West closes all the doors to Iran, it should wait for the Islamic Republic to go to Russia or China will turn. Finally, governments are free to conclude and cancel contracts within the scope of national interests. I don't think that the Islamic Republic, which is so sensitive to its independence and national sovereignty, will place itself under China. If a contract is signed, I think Iran's interests will be taken into account. Making noise in this matter, in my opinion, comes from the West or the supporters of the West." (Euronews Farsi, 2020).

However, the opponents of the agreement pay attention to other issues. The Petroleum Economist report is one of the most important sources in the context of the aforementioned agreement. In this report, it is stated that the parties have expanded the agreement they signed in 2016 called "China-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" and added non-public clauses to it. The text of this report indicates that Iran will give special concessions to China in the agreement, and Iran is going to give big concessions to China, including big discounts in oil and gas and the ability to delay payments for up to two years. (Petroleum Economist, 2019). Shirin Hunter believes that the agreement between Iran and China can change the regional balance in the Middle East and strengthening and stabilizing China's position in Iran will strengthen Beijing's regional position and weaken America's strategic superiority in the Persian Gulf. Also, in this agreement, Iran is likely to provide its military facilities in Persian Gulf ports to China, and a maximum of 5,000 Chinese security personnel will be present to protect Chinese projects, which is contrary to Iran's political independence. (Hunter, 2020).

<sup>1</sup> -Such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan and the necessity of these countries to pay debt and long-term rent of some of their sensitive ports to China

<sup>2</sup> -Iran's ambassador to China in the first government of Mohammad Khatami



The report of R. F. With a Janusian look between humiliation and honor, Ai has interpreted this agreement mainly as a new view of the famous "Turkmenchai" treaty. (F.R.I, 2020). Also, most western sources believe that in the long run this agreement will lead to Tehran's regret. (VOA, 2020). Chilani believes that some countries that are overwhelmed by their debts to China are forced to sell projects to China or hand over their management to Chinese state-owned companies in exchange for their debt or their shares in it. Even in countries with high economic risk, China wants to own the majority of projects. For example, China made a deal with Nepal in exchange for paying off its debt to China so that a Chinese state-owned company could acquire 75% of a Chinese-built dam. In addition, China sometimes asks countries to award contracts for new projects in exchange for repaying loans. For example, China canceled \$90 million in Cambodian debt just to secure major new contracts. (Shafi'i, 2020).

Ali Afshari criticized the long-term cooperation document between Iran and China, saying that the defenders of the document rely on the Iranian government in some way. He also said that it's not right for one country to give all its projects to another country. Creating a monopoly means that one company has complete control over a certain market. This can cause other companies and consumers to become reliant on that one company for their products or services. Why do they have auctions. To make people compete and give them a chance to choose and control things. This agreement gives China a lot of advantages and is not fair for the other party. This agreement gives Iran's resources to another country in a way that isn't fair. This makes Iran rely too much on that country, which is not good for our country. So, it goes against our national interests. Euronews in Farsi language in the year 2020. People who don't want China in the Middle East think that if China and Iran work together, China will gain power in the whole Middle East. In this situation, they are talking about the words of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon, who wants Lebanon to work with and be friends with China. In a speech marking the anniversary of the war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, the leader of Hezbollah talked about how Lebanon should work with China and asked for Chinese companies to invest in Lebanon. He also said: "We should not worry about how America will react. " It's time to go back to the East. (Euronews Farsi B, 2020. Euronews in Farsi B, 2020.)

China has a policy towards Iran that is influenced by its relationship with the United States and its Arab allies. This also depends on the outcome of trade negotiations and how China can use its influence in this situation. (Beaumont, 2019) After the United States put sanctions back on in November 2018, the amount of trading between China and Iran went down a lot. In the last three months of 2018, China's sales to Iran went down by 70%, from 1. 2 billion dollars in October to only 400 million dollars in December. In May 2019, Iran sold less crude oil to other countries. Scita, 2019 Either way, since the trade talks between China and the US didn't work out, the amount of Iranian oil being brought into China has gone up. This shows how other countries are seen in China's foreign policy.

Even though Iranians have been careful not to criticize China for its relations with Saudi Arabia, the way they interact in the future might change how much they trust and understand each other. The way people were talking to each other had a big impact and caused some "breakups". For instance, even though China is helping Saudi Arabia build and make powerful missiles and they are calling each other important partners, Abbaszadeh, who speaks for Iran's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said, "We are not trying to make a lot of weapons. Having a big military in the Middle East is not good for the region. " We don't oppose any country's authority and progress in the region, but we don't think it's right for a country to use its power against its neighbors. China and Saudi Arabia are good friends. China has relationships with both Iran and Saudi Arabia, but we don't get involved in their relationship with each other. We respect China's choices. In the end, he changes how he talks depending on what is best for his country. December 1400's financial update. However, Iran is trying to prove that it is not concerned about the security and military ties between China and its regional rivals, especially in the nuclear area. It has responded to this without mentioning China by name. As Iran's representative in international organizations, Gharib Abadi asked for more information about Saudi Arabia's secret nuclear program. He submitted a





report to the members of the agency and has concerns about Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions, like some American critics. (Strobel and colleagues, 2020) This action will cause a big competition to build more nuclear weapons and make the Middle East very unstable. (Mazzetti and others, 2020).

### **3-2- Saudi Arabia; Transition from economic relations to sensitive strategic**

After the end of the Cold War, the relations between China and Saudi Arabia can be evaluated in four specific periods. First, July 1990, which led to the consolidation of diplomatic relations, although under the shadow of Washington. Second, their strategic cooperation in 2008. Third, the joint efforts in 2016 and finally, the bilateral agreements of 2019 onwards, when the cooperation was largely removed from the shadow of the West.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the Saudis' efforts were generally clandestine with China and Pakistan. Nevertheless, the United States gradually accompanied some Saudi policies under some considerations, and in 2007, the Bush administration did not oppose the purchase of DF-21 missiles through China. After this period and with the intense plan of Iran's nuclear and missile program, the Saudi efforts in this field were more than anything due to the competition with Iran and examples such as the exploitation of seven strategic projects (including nuclear facilities) e) In the city of King Abdulaziz, it was part of this policy. Bin Salman's famous statement at the beginning of 2018, which stated: "If Iran builds a nuclear bomb, we will follow it as soon as possible" (Sanger & Broad, 2018) above all, the nature of Saudi relations with China specifies

The reference of the leaders of China and Saudi Arabia in 2016 shows the common attitude of both of them on multilateralism and the multipolar world. In this regard, it is stated that they have agreed on the strategic and global nature of relations, the continuous development of multi-polarization and economic globalization. Also, they wanted to deepen strategic cooperation and mutual strategic trust. (Arab News, 2016). The position of Saudi Arabia in China's multilateralism and long-term economic goals is undeniable, and the Chinese have somehow aligned their goals with the Saudis' 2030 vision document. According to Jin Ping, China will continue to promote synergy between the Belt and Road Initiative and Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 and create a model of high-level cooperation between the two countries in fields such as energy, economy and trade, as well as high technology. China supports the "Middle East Green Initiative" of the Saudis and welcomes their participation in the global development plan. China and Saudi Arabia should strengthen their solidarity, implement real multilateralism and protect the international order based on the basic rules and norms based on the goals and principles of the United Nations. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China, 2022).

China's policy in the Middle East, especially in relation to regional competitors, is based on understanding the rulers' attitudes and their experiences in the previous decades. Expanding joint agreements and collaborations at the same time is a clear example of this strategic action.

China has been making deals with countries in the Middle East and North Africa to work together. These partnerships did not make China compete with other countries in the region. For instance, in January 2016, during his first visit to the Middle East as president, Xi first visited Saudi Arabia and signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Then he went to Tehran and promoted Iran to the same level. Since 2019, China has made agreements with five countries in the Middle East and North Africa for a close relationship, and with eight other countries for working together on important issues. (Fulton, 2019:3) This citation can be found on page 3 of the source authored by Fulton in 2019. China wants to build trust with Arab countries in the Persian Gulf by secretly making missile and nuclear deals, so they will rely on China instead of the United States. The US State Department said that they regularly warn their partners about the risks of China's involvement in civilian nuclear activities, although they do not usually comment on intelligence findings. We want all partners to work with trustworthy suppliers who follow the rules about not spreading nuclear weapons. The newest reports say that American intelligence agencies found that if China and Saudi Arabia work together on nuclear projects, Saudi Arabia might be able to make nuclear weapons. (Mazzetti and colleagues, 2020). The Wall Street Journal has said that China and Saudi Arabia might be working together on nuclear power. They mentioned a yellow cake facility in



a faraway place called Al-Ala in Saudi Arabia. It's in the northwest part of the country. (Strobel and colleagues, 2020).


The friendship between China and Saudi Arabia grew quickly in the 2010s, and China became more important for Saudi Arabia's missile and nuclear program than the United States and other Western countries. The United States asked Saudi Arabia to make some changes inside their country and not to expand their military programs, especially when it comes to nuclear weapons. They wanted these changes to happen gradually and have set some conditions for it. However, due to regional and global events, especially those in 2011, Saudi Arabia attempted to strengthen its military and nuclear capabilities. This made American officials worry, especially during the times of Trump and Biden. They said the Saudis were too friendly with China and not following some policies. In another way to look at it, Saudi Arabia thinks China is important because the Chinese don't really care about certain important issues regarding security in the region and the world. Also, unlike America, China may not have strong opinions about the future of the political system and the possible policies of Bin-Salman. Obtaining uranium that is made stronger, linking the nuclear program with the military program, not caring about the gold standard (like the United Arab Emirates), and increasing the number of nuclear weapons in the Middle East are not good decisions. After the nuclear deal, China and Saudi Arabia have worked together more on military and security. In November 2019, they did a training at the King Faisal military base in Jeddah port for three weeks. It was called "Blue Sword 2019" and involved the navy. "Al-Akhbariya Al-Ain reported on November 17, 2019. " The goal of the exercise was to work together on maritime issues and fight against terrorism and piracy. But the media in Arab countries mostly focused on its opposition to Iran. After Iran did exercises by itself and with Russia and China, Saudi Arabia started doing exercises with Arab and Chinese groups. The Wall Street Journal said that China and Saudi Arabia might be working together on nuclear stuff, and they have a yellow cake prep facility in a faraway place in Saudi Arabia. (Strobel et al, 2020).

The US government said in a statement that they are concerned about Arab countries having military and weapons deals with China. China's army gives a warning. We want our partners to only work with trustworthy suppliers who follow rules about not spreading dangerous weapons. The new information says that American spy groups think that China and Saudi Arabia working together on nuclear stuff could help Saudi Arabia make nuclear weapons. (Mazzetti and et al, 2020).

#### **4- Economy and energy of the Middle East; China's complementary multilateral policies with the B&R plan**

Part of China's financing has been through the construction of ports and industrial parks in countries such as Egypt, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Djibouti (outside of which Beijing has deployed only one military base). It has connected the facilities in critical and vital [strategic] points of the Middle East (Persian Gulf, Oman Sea, Red Sea, Bab Al-Mandab Strait and Suez Canal) to the world; Because the success of the B&R initiative depends on maintaining the aforementioned centers. (Cook & Green, 2021). China's dominance over the main arteries of international energy has created a vital opportunity for ambitious goals, which can be seen in the image below:

**Image number 2: China's dominance over the main international energy arteries and the pivotal role of the MENA region**



Source: Cook & Green, 2021

The Middle East is the central catalyst of China's ambition. In 2015, at the Asia-Europe Meeting in Chongqing, the BRI Economic Corridor Framework was announced with six China-centric corridors across Eurasia and the Indian Ocean region. The China and West Central Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC) is one of the most central axes of the framework, which directly introduces MENA (passing through Central Asia and then Iran and Turkey) as the end point. Although the BRI has since encompassed more than these six main corridors, it is the only economic corridor that crosses MENA. (Fulton, 2019: 2). China's Middle East policy is in line with the B&R plan, which connects China with 65 countries that include Asia, North Africa and Europe. It includes 11 countries in Southeast Asia, 14 countries in Central and Western Asia, 16 countries in the Middle East and Africa, and 24 countries in Europe. (Stanley, 2018).

China's geo-economic strategy in the Middle East is based on foreign trade and concentrated industrial policy. This trade and industrial policy, geopolitics and geoeconomics for export, combines the foundations of industrial capacity, which has become a geo-industrial policy and a parallel trade strategy. Practical coordination under the macro policy umbrella is in line with the central international capacity, and each of China's regions is responsible for transferring China's industrial capacity to the Middle East economies through specialized international capacity cooperation funds. (Kenderdine, 2018: 557). China's goal in the Middle East is, first of all, access to energy sources and raw materials and to expand relations with actors in this region. (Eisman, et al, 2007). Oil is the backbone of the economy and political structures of the Middle East. In addition to being the world's largest net exporter, the region holds nearly half of the world's proven oil reserves and more than a third of its gas reserves. This region is still one of the most expensive regions in the world: strong population growth, government support and subsidies, and electricity demand are the main drivers. (Oxford Energy Forum, 2021: 52). Apart from the oil issue, China's policies are a combination of diplomacy, new investments and market diversification to supply the growing domestic demand for fossil fuels. Investing in renewable energy will certainly remove part of China's dependence on hydrocarbons. (Cook & Green, 2021).

From 1990 to 2017, China's exports to other countries as a percentage of its total economic output stayed about the same. But China is definitely a big part of the market for the Middle East countries, and is one of the top exporters to those countries, except for Syria and Oman (for which we don't have data).

**Table No. 7: The amount of China's exports to the countries of the world (percentage of GDP)<sup>1</sup>**

2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2000	1990
19.8	19.7	21.3	23.5	24.5	25.4	26.5	26.3	24.5	32.5	20.90	13.6

Source: World Bank, 2018

**Table No. 8: Order and share of China and other countries in the market of Middle East actors**

<sup>1</sup>-Gross Domestic Product (GDP)



Oman	Emirates	Bahrain	Syria	Israel	Türkiye	Lebanon	Qatar	Yemen	Iran	Kuwait	Jordan	Saudi Arabia	Iraq	The countries
*	5.8	8.8	9.5	9.5	10	10.2	10.9	12.1	12.7	13.5	13.6	15.4	25.7	China's share
*	94.2	91.2	90.5	90.5	90	89.8	89.1	87.9	87.3	86.5	86.4	84.6	74.3	Share of other countries

Source: CIA-World Fact Book, 2018

Beijing's bilateral and multilateral policy is to find avenues and opportunities for investment and trade in the Middle East and the desire to increase stability in the region (Alterman & Garver, 2008:193-195). The issue becomes important when according to statistics, China is among the most influential countries among exporters to these countries. A significant share in a country like Iraq has actually emerged in the vacuum and lack of the role of the United States, and as stated in the previous table, despite all the propaganda and space-building, China's share in Saudi Arabia is more than Iran, and Beijing's considerations towards Arab actors and The United States is visible.

**Table No. 9: China's rank among exporters to Middle East countries**

Oman	Emirates	Bahrain	Syria	Israel	Türkiye	Lebanon	Qatar	Yemen	Iran	Kuwait	Jordan	Saudi Arabia	Iraq	The countries
*	1	1	3	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	China rank

Source: CIA-World Fact Book, 2018

On the other hand, the comparison of China's imports from Middle East countries shows its increase in all countries of this region. This problem shows the growing dependence of the economy of this region on the eastern power.

**Table No. 10: The amount of Chinese oil imports from Middle East countries between 2016 and 2017<sup>1</sup>**

2016	2017	Exporters
15.568	20.499	Arabia
9.356	11.903	Iran
10.660	13.787	Iraq
4.829	7/070	Kuwait
11.147	12.164	Oman
3.861	4/098	Emirates
2.863	4.755	Diameter
0.142	0.633	Yemen
58.426	74.999	Total

Source: Trade Map, 2018

Due to territorial disputes and other concerns, the UAE and other member states (GCC) in the 2000s, both jointly and individually, started actions to balance Iran through economic partnerships with China (Karasik, 2016:3). . China and the Persian Gulf partners have established extensive economic cooperation, which includes joint investments in the field of oil, highway and railway projects, construction projects, and strategic security coordination in relation to security threats. For example, according to the Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC), in December 2011, about 2,300 Chinese companies were registered in Dubai, and large Chinese banks such as the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) (the largest Chinese bank) have opened their various branches. . (Varij Kazemi & Chen, 2014: 41). The bilateral trade relations of these partners reached a figure of 159 billion dollars in 2014 and they have tried to increase the bilateral trade relations to 600 billion dollars by 2020 due to the approval of the China-GCC Free Trade Agreement. Found[. (Olimat, 2016:30). Between 1990 and 2009, China's oil imports from the Middle East increased tenfold. Between 2019 and 2020, the countries of the Persian Gulf accounted for

<sup>1</sup> -Figures are in billions of dollars





approximately 40% of China's oil imports, and in the meantime, the Saudis became China's largest supplier of crude oil by providing 16% of it. In the country of Iraq - where the US has spent billions of dollars to change the regime - it is among the five main suppliers of Chinese oil. (Cook & Green, 2021).

So, business opportunities in the Middle East, like in the Arab world, are influenced by China getting involved in the markets there. China wants to expand and diversify its trade relations in the Middle East. Since 2015, China has expanded its economic connections in the Middle East, especially with Arab countries in the Persian Gulf, beyond just energy. China has a connection with countries in the Middle East based on money and trade. China wants to make more money and have strong connections with other countries. They also want to reduce political competition and avoid getting upset. China has three plans to keep working towards their goal. First, growing and adding variety to different types of businesses and trade. Next, we want to create trust and make Middle East countries rely on China's economy. We also want to make sure China continues to be a major player in the region's economy after 2019.

### **Conclusion**

The developments of the 21st century are happening so fast and beyond imagination that it is easy to assess their nature. The evidence in different regions of the world indicates the relative end of Washington's unilateralist order and the cautious and sometimes bold revision of emerging powers in particular. In their complex policies, the emerging powers want more than anything to limit the Western order and revise it in favor of the multipolar order, and the Middle East region is the center of competition between these powers. In this regard, in the aforementioned research, China's Middle East policy was evaluated and analyzed. The results show that Beijing's policies have been formed based on Janusian construction and based on two policies of regionalism and multilateralism, and economic and security-military policies with competing players in this region in connection with ambitious initiatives. Because it is B&R.

With the United States taking a step back from the Middle East, some countries in the region are trying to maintain a balance of power with each other and with other countries like Russia and China. They are trying to make sure no one becomes too powerful politically, economically, or militarily. This action is meant to decide which friendships and rivalries are most important. Some small Arab countries in the Persian Gulf want to be more important in the region. They support working together with other countries to reduce dangers, become stronger economically, and have a better reputation in the region. Some ways that Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are competing with China in the economy are: getting more foreign investment, building new businesses, and selling more goods to other countries. Particularly in industries that don't focus on energy. The growth and progress of these situations could slowly lead to the formation of a network and a series of complicated business and economic connections. This could ultimately impact the future decisions of Middle Eastern countries and could help China achieve its goals.

China has different relationships with countries in the Middle East. The most important factor is the different types of friendship and conflict between them, and how they also have conflicting relationships with the United States. China has been trying to form stronger relationships with Iran and some Arab countries, even though there is tension between them. This problem has made it difficult for China to have a clear position in the Middle East. Some people in the Middle East don't trust China and want to stop their countries from having good relationships with them because they think it will hurt their country. In this situation, Iran's leaders have not strongly reacted to China's relationships with countries that compete against Iran, like Israel and Saudi Arabia, and have kind of overlooked it. Therefore, this space has given China the best chance to be involved in the Middle East like never before.

Analyzing China's policies shows the country's efforts to achieve a goal with two continuous complementary methods. China's goal is to replace and indirectly and covertly persuade the Arab countries to reduce relations with the United States. In this context, China is continuing its relations in two fields: commercial-economic and military-security, and is somehow seeking to normalize relations. Therefore, although in the commercial-economic field, due to the lack of





deepening of relations with Iran, under the pressure of actors such as Saudi Arabia, China has the upper hand and a kind of encouraging support among Iran's competitors, but in the field of military and security, the situation is different. On the one hand, he is worried about creating a sensitive atmosphere on the part of Washington, and on the other hand, it is not possible to deepen and expand the relations according to its nature. But China is trying to somehow instill in them the idea that it can be a reliable partner instead of America, and here it is China that is encouraging and persuading them in a way.

The presence of China in the Middle East and the expansion of relations with its numerous actors does not represent a replacement with the United States, but rather indicates a new era of international interactions and relations, which adds to the scope of its complexities. China's relations and policies in the Middle East are based on three complementary principles. which indicates a "utilitarian" and "low-cost" nature. First, "not creating sensitivity" especially for the United States, according to which it is trying to be less inclined towards asymmetrical and costly military relations and interactions. Expanding economic and commercial relations with most actors, especially with the strategic allies of the United States and Keeping a level of relations with Iran and Syria is part of this policy. Second, maintaining international authority and low cost management and behavioral independence and not entering into troublesome issues. In this regard, since supporting the Assad family requires less money and is less sensitive due to the existence of Iran and Russia, it is trying to display its international authority in opposition to the United States, but in the Yemen crisis, in line with The United States and Saudi Arabia are placed; Because with the absence of Russia and the major role of Iran (unlike Syria), it requires some possible and time-consuming costs. On the other hand, due to the expanding economic relations with Saudi Arabia and the sensitivity of the Saudis to this crisis (unlike Syria), they are not willing to create a confrontation. Third, taking advantage of opportunities and using enmity between actors. For example, at the same time as expanding economic and commercial contracts with Yaran, it also expands economic relations with Arab actors in the Persian Gulf, but in order to achieve better positions and create some support and attract more financial resources from Arab countries, relations It does not deepen and diversify itself with Iran. The sum of the mentioned factors indicates China's utilitarian, commercial and instrumentalist policy, and actors such as America do not consider it as a serious supporter, but considering its potential and growing power (especially in economic matters), they are ready to It is not towards its competitors.

The relationship between China and Tehran and Riyadh is very important in the Middle East. This problem mostly comes from the competition and fighting between Iran and other Middle Eastern countries for control in the region. Iran plays two roles in the economic relations between Middle East countries and China. Middle Eastern countries working together to improve connections between China and Iran have helped to make their relationships with China stronger. However, the way Iran is fighting with other countries, including the United States, has made China try to keep good relationships with everyone involved. Due to the fighting and anger between Iran and some countries nearby, China wants to benefit from this situation, just like Russia does.

On the other hand, the rivalry has caused a race to align with China, and China doesn't want to get involved in the rivalry but also doesn't want it to stop. In reality, China's interests often depend on being enemies with other countries. When this happens less, China starts to like the United States more and its own interests get weaker. China is not getting involved in this fight and is trying to solve it with the help of many other countries. They are being very careful and are not taking sides. So, China is trying to keep good relationships with different groups and stop from getting weaker. However, for three reasons, in a situation where the same and similar conditions and concessions emerge between Iran and the Middle East actors, China tends more towards the satisfaction of Iran's competitors. First, Iran has fewer options and more restrictions. Second, there is less sensitivity towards Iran's competitors, and third, in the commercial and economic field, all of Iran's rich competitors have greater capabilities, capacity and opportunities, and are willing to create some advantages in order to reduce China's relations with Iran. special features (such as reduction and absence of commercial and customs duties, support for companies and commercial enterprises,

creation of extensive conditions and facilities, cheap sales and even forgiveness in some goods and energy such as oil) and ignoring profits and benefits are significant. In a situation where China has to compete with many competitors to achieve some of these interests at a lower level in other regions and unions.

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