

THE NEW COLD WAR AND THE THREATING OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

FOUDI MOSTAFA KAMEL¹, AGARI SALEM²

Faculty of law and political sciences, EL OUED university¹

Faculty of law and political sciences, TAMNGHEST university²

Abstract: The international arena has been marred by numerous crises that have resulted in a failure to achieve international peace and security, raising doubts about the ability of the Security Council to effectively address and confront these issues. Crises in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine have heightened concerns and fears among major powers, leading to a complication of the decision-making process within the Security Council.

This research highlights the Security Council's weak handling of the issues at hand, making the divisions among international powers a prominent characteristic. This has impacted the Council's effectiveness, resulting in a state of international polarization. It has also sparked an international debate about a "new Cold War" on the horizon, where increased competition among major powers has rendered international law ineffective and undermined the liberal approach in international relations. The liberal approach asserts that international institutions play a pivotal role in avoiding wars and promoting international stability

Keywords: international peace and security; security council; new cold war

INTRODUCTION

1. The world is currently experiencing the utmost challenges in achieving international security, which raises doubts about the Security Council's ability to effectively¹ address and confront these crises. Since 2011, the crises in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine have caused concern and fears among major powers' relations, leading to a complicated decision-making process within the Security Council regarding various security issues. Consequently, this has hindered the ability of these powers to adopt collective and consensus-based reactions towards the civil war in Syria. As a result, the ramifications of this crisis extended to different countries in the region, particularly Iraq, through the emergence of ISIS as a new threat to peace in the region and beyond. Additionally, the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis has reestablished conditions reminiscent of another Cold War. Furthermore, there are numerous other challenges to international security, such as the growth of international drug trafficking and the use of violence in wars and conflicts, as well as issues related to democratic governance and the rule of law, all of which require an active role from the Security Council.

¹ The sources of threats to international peace and security are no longer limited to wars between countries, but many other sources have been added to them, such as civil wars, environmental dangers, and poverty. The victims of infectious diseases and organized crime have become much greater than the victims of armed conflicts between countries, and the collective security system, as included in the Charter, and for many reasons, foremost of which is the voting system in the Security Council and the difficulty of achieving consensus between permanent member states, has shown us that the United Nations, with its current charter The texts of which have not undergone any significant changes, and with their current mechanisms, they have become unable to keep pace with global developments, and are no longer suitable for leading the current international system. The new collective security system required to achieve peace in our contemporary world must be able to deal with all sources of threats facing humanity, and be equipped with mechanisms that enable it to actually confront all of these dangers at all times, and not just be a council that meets after the outbreak of crises or wars, and that All the capabilities and resources that enable it to carry out all the tasks required by the developments of a globalized international system with overlapping interests are placed at its disposal, instead of being satisfied with limited resources that depend on the satisfaction and commitment of member states, and it is managed based on general principles, rules, and precise and clear procedures, instead of the general principles and rules that Most of its texts are ambiguous and open to conflicting interpretations. It must be subject to accountability, review, and monitoring, and not a system that enjoys absolute powers and is not subject to any political or judicial supervision or oversight. These are all conditions that are no longer available in the collective security system currently managed by the United Nations, which is suffering from almost complete paralysis.



2. We also witness the spread of the coronavirus, which poses a significant threat to international peace and security through its rapid spread worldwide. Furthermore, civil wars, terrorist organizations, and cyber-attacks are increasing globally. It cannot be denied that the Security Council faces real difficulties in confronting all these challenges, and the events of 2003 are a clear example of that. The war in Iraq led by the United States without the approval of the Security Council raised widespread concerns about whether the United States was heading towards unilateralism, thus turning its back on the United Nations. At that time, it seemed that the main issue for the Council was whether it could involve the United States in this war, regulate its exercise of power, and restrain its motives. As for the United States, it viewed the Council with the perspective of "to what extent can the Security Council serve as a tool to promote the interests of the United States in the world²."

3. The shift in policies among the five permanent members of the Security Council, as well as the complex relationships between them, has led to a significant change in the dynamics of interaction, giving rise to a new set of concerns. Today, the biggest threat to the Council's mandate is the possibility of paralysis, not to mention the decline, due to the burden-sharing confrontation between Russia, China, and the United States, particularly after their wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Adding to the growing sense of concern is the fact that the United Nations' peace-making and peacekeeping executive activities are currently limited to the Middle East. This fuels the prevailing belief that the Security Council has become particularly interested in resource-rich regions at the expense of others, which all major powers seek to control.

4. The pursuit of national interests has been and continues to be the prevailing compass in the policies of the permanent member states of the Security Council, regardless of the justifications put forward to preserve international peace and security. Permanent members have not reached a unified and coordinated understanding regarding Syria and Ukraine, as the Security Council finds itself trapped within the framework of the newly emerging Cold War. This was somewhat intriguing considering that former US President Barack Obama, after his election in 2008, promised to restore the central role of the Security Council in global diplomacy. Obama leaned ideologically towards pluralism and was determined to improve the United States' standing in the world. He encouraged a "reset" of strained relations with Russia and sought closer ties with China, in order to support both countries' efforts - within the Security Council - to take strong and decisive actions towards Iran. On the other hand, important concessions were made to Moscow regarding missile defense in Europe³, and the emphasis on issues of democracy and human rights in China was toned down. Our undertaking is premised upon answering the following question: How effective is the Security Council amidst a New Cold War? This has been accomplished through the presentation of the following study methodology: First: the conceptual framework of New cold war.

Second: The Security Council's failure and the emergence of the new Cold War

First: The conceptual framework of the New Cold War

The Cold War was a period of intense rivalry between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, lasting from 1945 to 1991. The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was never "cold"⁴ nor a war in the general sense. While the two sides did not directly fight each

² V. Sebastian, 'Major Recent Trends in Violent Conflict' UNU Center for Policy Research, Occasional Paper (December 2014) 22

³ K. Robert, 'Superpowers Don't get to Retire', New Republic (26 May 2014) 15

⁴ The exact origins of the term "Cold War" are disputed; the expression appears to have emerged in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Today, the Cold War itself is traditionally believed to have lasted from the end of World War II until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The term "Cold War" came to refer to the dominance of a bipolar international order divided between two global hegemony teetering on the brink of open war. Thus, the "cold" aspect refers to the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union were not engaged in a direct conventional war, such as that of World War II, but were instead immersed in a frozen conflict, fought by proxy forces. The Cold War is viewed as they intensified after the Soviet Union obtained the atomic bomb and achieved nuclear parity with the United States in 1949, with nuclear brinkmanship reaching its peak during the Cuban



other, the war was waged through proxy wars in various regions of the world. The main wars of the Cold War became the fourth and fifth wars, namely Vietnam and Korea, respectively, with the highest casualties for the United States, second only to the Civil War and both World Wars. The world believed that the United States emerged as the victor of the Cold War, ending a conflict that lasted nearly half a century.

When analyzing the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, the diplomatic actions taken by the United States and Russia, and the economic threats posed by each side, and comparing the current state of tensions between the two sides to the Cold War era, many thinkers argue that there is a new model of a Cold War between the United States (and its allies in Western Europe) and Russia. The relationship between these military, diplomatic, and economic actions between the two sides is intertwined. Each action affects the others and vice versa, leading to retaliatory responses from the opposing side. Ukraine and Syria have become proxy conflicts for regional influence. These conflicts have resulted in repercussions for both sides, escalating simultaneously with the rising tensions.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 until the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2010, the United States has been the dominant power that was seemingly unchallengeable in the global system. Their sphere of influence spread throughout the world. Their foreign policies and external interests dictated interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Arab Spring witnessed the end of American hegemony as major powers like China and Russia began to align and grow. The upheavals resulting from numerous revolutions and conflicts led to the downfall of strong US allies in countries like Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia⁵.

In February 2014, the Russian-backed Ukrainian President Yanukovich was forced to leave his position after mass protests by the Ukrainian population. In his place, the Ukrainian people overwhelmingly elected Poroshenko to power. Ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine interpreted these events as a coup against a democratically elected president. In response, pro-Russian individuals began their protests in cities throughout eastern and southern parts of Ukraine. Under this pretext, the Kremlin saw an opportunity to regain some influence in the surrounding region. Shortly after, Ukraine descended into an ethnic-based civil war.

The term "new Cold War" emerged after Putin came to power and engaged in actions that expressed his dissatisfaction with the current situation, such as the intervention in Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and obstructing several resolutions against the Bashar al-Assad regime in the Security Council.

To evaluate the prominence of the term "new Cold War" in English media discourse, a quantitative analysis of international media outlets was conducted. The curve (Figure 1) depicts statistics between the years 1950 and 2015, revealing that the frequency of the term reached its peak in 2015 following Russia's annexation of Crimea.




Figure 1: Frequency of appearance of "new Cold War" in The New York Times, 1950-2015.⁶


Missile Crisis of October 1962. In the decades that followed, the threat of nuclear war, geopolitical competition, and ideological polarization among the distinctive features associated with the period.

⁵ T. Ian, 'New Cold War', Political Science, research methods (December 2005) 06

⁶ B. Jeremy and others, 'Divided Memory and the "New Cold War"', Thesis: The Rise and Decline of a Double-Edged Analogy, University of Florida Press. *Journal of Political & Military Sociology*, (2019) 102

The quantitative data highlights the frequency of occurrence of the phrase "new Cold War" in news media and online search activities. Figure 1 illustrates the number of articles containing the phrase "new Cold War" published in The New York Times from 1950 to 2015, evaluated in five-year intervals.

From the 1950s to the 1980s, the usage of "new Cold War" articles in The New York Times was rare (averaging 7.4 articles per time period) and showed relatively slight variation over time. From 1990 to 2005, the rate of usage increased by approximately three times compared to the previous baseline (averaging around 21 articles per time period) and significantly rose in the period 2006-2010 when the frequency was six times higher than before 1990. However, the largest increase in frequency occurred in the recent period (2011-2015), with nearly 150 articles featuring this phrase.



NYT=New York Times, WSJ=Wall Street Journal. Russia:

K=Kommersant, NG=Nezavisimaia Gazeta. Germany

SZ=Süddeutsche Zeitung, FAZ=Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

The frequency of appearance of the "new Cold War" in international media from 2005 to 2015.⁷

To obtain a more accurate picture and evaluate the geographic coverage of the latest trends, Figure 2 focuses on an eleven-year period from 2005 to 2015 and includes data from additional news outlets in the United States, Germany, and Russia. From this detailed analysis, we can see, first, that the results from the New York Times (NYT) in Figure 1 for the last two periods largely reflect two conflicts to some extent in 2008 and 2014, respectively. This pattern closely mirrors the results from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), with conflicts occurring in the same years (although the total number of articles mentioning the "new Cold War" is lower than that in the New York Times).

Secondly, the double peak pattern is also observed in the aggregated results of the two German newspapers, as well as those of Russian news sources, albeit with notable differences in the relative magnitudes of the peaks and the timing of the first one. In the German case, the first peak occurs after approximately two years (in 2010) following what happened in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. With the Russian news outlets, the timing and relative size of the peaks vary significantly between Kommersant, Nezavisimaia Gazeta (K + NG), and Izvestia. In the case of Kommersant, the initial peak in 2008, despite coinciding with that of the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, is somewhat modest compared to what it was in 2014. With Izvestia, the pattern is reversed, as the first peak is significantly higher compared to the second one. Additionally, the

⁷ Ibid. at 103



first increase in the number of Izvestia articles occurred before a year, in 2007, compared to most other sources, and it continued to decline slightly during the year 2008⁸.

The results presented in Figure 2 indicate that there are major increases in frequency that consistently appear on an international level. The first peak occurs in the period between 2007-2008 or (later) in 2010, and the second peak in 2014. Additionally, the results in all sources indicate a period of calm usage from 2011 to 2013, followed by a moderate to sharp decrease from 2014 to 2015. These patterns align with the time-related effects of prominent international events that suggest increasing tensions between Russia and the West in close proximity to each conflict. Examples include the period preceding the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 and the ongoing Ukraine crisis that started in late 2013 and escalated in early 2014.

In summary, the results in Figure 1 and Figure 2 tend to support our study regarding the types of events and developments that are likely to produce temporal effects, making the "new Cold War" prominent in both cases.

Second: The Security Council's failure and the emergence of the new Cold War

Mearsheimer⁹ presents a relatively unbiased perspective on the causes of the conflict. He argues that this conflict is not simply a result of Russian aggression but rather the outcome of 25 years of Russian humiliation and deterioration. The main point of contention for the Russians was the expansion of NATO into their sphere of influence, encroaching closer to their borders. Ukraine had been trying for years to join NATO, but without success. Putin still fears the idea of a NATO base in the Black Sea near Russia. In this sense, Mearsheimer believes that Russia, the former great power, dominated by Western realist policies after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is not to blame. Instead, he argues that the fault lies with the United States and the West in their expansionist policies of NATO and the European Union, as well as their efforts to spread democracy in the region.

The Obama administration embarked on this approach based on its recognition of the need to halt the depletion of American capabilities in the costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Obama was more focused on withdrawing the United States from its military commitments rather than initiating new ones. Initially, the Obama administration paved the way for notable actions by the Security Council on several issues. Sanctions against Iran and North Korea were strengthened regarding their nuclear programs, and authorization was given to use force to protect civilians in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya. However, the Arab Spring in early 2010¹⁰ raised concern and disagreement among Security Council members, particularly after the alleged violation by NATO of the Security Council mandate in intervening in Libya in 2011 (Resolution 1973)¹¹. The dispute specifically involved the United States, France, and the United Kingdom on one side and Russia and China on the other. Relations between the two camps deteriorated further over how to respond and react to the escalating civil war in Syria, which each camp viewed through the lens of their own interests and competition in the region. At the same time, China appeared to align tactically with Russia. Later, Russia's invasion of the Crimean Peninsula in the spring of 2014 and its subsequent repercussions had serious effects on relations between the East and the West within and outside the Council. For example, Moscow was expelled from the G8 summit circles¹².

Thus, the Libyan, Syrian, and Ukrainian crises have been among the primary causes of division and disagreement among Security Council members, which had not been seen for a long time. The escalating tensions in the Security Council reflected the growing power of China and Russia, with

⁸ G. Alexey, *'Russia-EU relations at a crossroads: preventing a new cold war in a polycentric world'*, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, (Moscow, Russia, 2015) 143

⁹ John Mearsheimer is an international relations theorist.

¹⁰ Researcher Salam Ahmed Sawair defines the Arab Spring as those revolutions that have occurred in several Arab countries since the outbreak of 2010 as a result of various reasons and goals, which are united by one denominator, which is the revolution against the existing regimes of government, and replacing them with other, more democratic regimes.

¹¹ See : <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/fr/s/res/1973-%282011%29>

¹² See Robert, above n.3 at 23

China's tremendous economic rise by 2011, making it the world's second-largest economy, and by 2013, the largest oil importer, influencing its positions on several cases on the Council's agenda¹³. This represents a significant change in the new millennium, especially considering that China, before this period, was primarily focused on using the Council to prevent recognition of Taiwan. As for Russia, since Vladimir Putin's return to the presidency in 2012, he increasingly viewed Russia's interests as diverging from those of the West, which intentionally sought to hinder Russia's return as a major power on the international stage. Additionally, Russia's relative economic decline and its hostile relations with the West since 2014 have made it increasingly reliant on China for selling its natural resources, at a time when China's economic potential and investment capabilities surpass Russia's ability to invest in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. As a result, despite Russia's outwardly more rigid positions compared to the West, its relationship with China remains notably imbalanced, with Russia still favoring China in its political and economic relations¹⁴. Therefore, the widening gap between the permanent members of the Security Council can be attributed to the fact that China and Russia are working in harmony alongside each other in the Council. After improving their relations since resolving their remaining regional disputes in the early years of the last decade of the 20th century, the two parties now share a unified and equitable approach within the Council, guided by both countries' strong attachment to the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference, which seem to be applied to a lesser extent in Russia's relations with the former Soviet republics, as seen in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine. Their common and widely expressed goal is "multipolarity," indicating that they view the Security Council as a suitable forum for restraining and regulating American power¹⁵.

In the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia suffered harsh punitive justice from the victorious faction of the Cold War¹⁶. The Russian politics and economy were not only in a state of turmoil after the collapse but the West sought revenge for the 45-year-long conflict by undermining and humiliating Russia. This humiliation laid the groundwork for a strong leader in the Soviet-style to come to power. Under whom could the Russians be unified? Vladimir Putin.

Under Putin's heavy hand, Russia began transitioning from the humiliated state to a strong and unified international power today. Russia is slowly working its way out of this immense hole through a combination of resource exploitation, economic policies, and alliances. Under Putin's rule, Russia has become the fifth-largest economy in the world based on per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity. Russia has increasingly turned away from the West and instead aligned itself more with the East. To regain national pride, Russia started reorganizing and rearming its military and formed a closer alliance with China.

In this context, Russia has followed Mearsheimer's offensive realism¹⁷ theory by emphasizing the importance of power in the international system. The primary motivation for Russia is no longer to increase military spending for defensive capabilities but rather to utilize it for offensive purposes. Russia's recent conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East mark the beginning of its attempt to project influence and establish allies through the demonstration of power. There has been a resurgence of proxy actors supported by both the United States and Russia in the Syrian and Ukrainian conflicts.

This combination of theories provides a framework that helps explain the actions of both Russia and the United States thus far, including the relative rise in power of Russia and its allies to challenge

¹³ Haider Abd Kadhim, 'The Role and Effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council in Light of International Power Competition: An Analytical Study', *Journal of Political Science, International Studies Branch, College of Political Science, (University of Baghdad, November 2019)* 235

¹⁴ M. David, 'The International Struggle over Iraq: Decision-Making in the UN Security Council 1980-2005', (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 44

¹⁵ M. David, 'Conclusions', in David Malone (ed), *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Boulder; Lynne Rienner Publishers) 7-11

¹⁶ See Jeremy, above n.6 at 106

¹⁷ The term offensive realism expresses a theory in international relations, which states that states tend to compete and conflict in order to achieve their self-interests, and weak states glorify stronger states for fear of them, and for fear of aggression, and to ensure their survival and continuity in the global system.



American influence and military dominance in the international system. Coupled with China's growing economic hegemony, Russia explicitly challenges American military superiority. All of these actions culminate in the creation of a new international system, transitioning from American hegemony to a multipolar order¹⁸.

The Cold War, characterized by its lack of direct confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union, was fought through either direct combat with supported opposition groups or through indirect means on both sides. The recent conflicts in Ukraine and Syria remind us of the proxy conflicts during that era. Neither side actively seeks direct engagement with the other. Instead, both aim to gain influence in each region by supporting their respective proxy groups.

NATO has deployed its forces to new bases in Eastern Europe in response to the situation in Ukraine. In light of these events, there have been discussions about the beginning of a "new Cold War," although former US President Barack Obama has stated that it is "not a new Cold War." Obama's position can be interpreted as follows: as a politician, he does not want to further deteriorate relations with Russia and still hopes for an improvement in the situation. Therefore, he avoids using the term "Cold War." However, analysts must confront reality and acknowledge that it is evident that a Cold War is indeed occurring between the West and Russia¹⁹.

Russia openly intervened in Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. After recognizing their independence, Russia engaged in a process of "creeping annexation." Once again in 2008, Moscow conducted referendums in both regions regarding joining Russia. In these referendums, Georgians who were expelled from these areas did not participate. The majority of participants believed that Russia, not Georgia, had defeated the US military forces on Georgian territory. Unfortunately, the "lesson of Georgia" was not enough for the West to realize that Russia had resumed a Cold War with the West.

As a result, the "lesson of Georgia" was followed by the "lesson of Ukraine": because there were no negative consequences for Moscow in the case of Georgia, it repeated the same actions in Ukraine and annexed Crimea without any serious steps taken by the West against Moscow.

Despite the escalating situation in the southeastern region of Ukraine, Moscow remains convinced today that it will be able to maintain control over the Crimean Peninsula regardless of the outcome of the rest of the conflict. It is only after experts of the "lesson of Ukraine" began extensively discussing the Cold War that it became apparent that this Cold War is not a new one, but rather a continuation of the same conflict with the same conflicting parties and no major differences in the applied confrontation methods.

The results of the 2014 Gallup survey²⁰, conducted just weeks after the Crimea referendum, confirmed that there was a relatively clear popular approval of the notion of a new Cold War at that time. When asked whether they believed "the United States and Russia were heading toward a new Cold War or not," fifty percent of American respondents answered "yes" (with 43% answering "no"). In comparison, only 25% of those polled in a Gallup poll conducted in February 1991 (following a failed coup attempt by the Russian military) believed that the United States and the Soviet Union were returning to the "Cold War," while 64% rejected the statement. Such responses provide evidence of the initial split in the perception of a potential analogy, which spans between accepting and rejecting a specific purpose.

The Cold War is being waged by the United States against Russia through the use of color revolutions and regime change. Beyond being a new strategy, the revival of political geography blends with economic geography in order to thwart a more dangerous decline for the United States, particularly regarding its global dominance. This "new" policy is based on the United States' old strategy after World War I to prevent deepening economic relations between Russia and Germany, or an agreement between Russia and China. As history has witnessed, the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 was the one that disturbed Western allies after World War I, as it threatened to make both Germany and Russia more

¹⁸ See Jeremy, above n.6 at 16

¹⁹ V. Papava, *'Old or new cold war is the new cold war continuation of the old?'*, Cicero foundation Great Debate Paper (October 2014) 5

²⁰ Gallup is one of the institutions that conduct public opinion polls in America.

independent from Anglo-American (Western) influence and control, particularly in terms of their influence and control over dynamic economies²¹.

It was evident that if Ukraine were to be annexed by a powerful NATO, it would create significant vulnerabilities for Russia that could easily be exploited by Washington. In the worst-case scenarios, it could even be used to destabilize Russia itself. All of these factors are coupled with other escalation risks between the United States and Russia, primarily due to the policy of first-use nuclear weapons against a conventional attack, the deployment of advanced conventional weapon capabilities by the United States, missile defense systems, the lack of control over conventional weapons, the failure to reduce strategic weapons, and confidence-building measures being reasons for the bilateral instability alongside other hotspots like Syria and the Baltic region²².

These events demonstrate that Washington's containment is not solely focused on Russia, as the United States actively employs a policy of "containment"²³ against China and North Korea. By 2010, this led to an arms race between the United States and China. It also led to Pyongyang testing hydrogen weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in September 2017 with a range of 6,700 to 8,000 km. However, the most significant is the geostrategic path in the Middle East, where the United States has been vigorously moving to overthrow the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. After already overthrowing the Libyan government, the United States is supporting extremist groups there to topple the government. Furthermore, it is evident that the United States was the one who ignited the Iraq War forcefully in 2003. Iraq was an old ally of the former Soviet Union, just like Libya, and Syria still is, while Afghanistan was also a client state of the Kremlin before the Soviet invasion²⁴.

The tangible hardness of structural competition is evident in the creeping ineffectiveness of international law, the promotion of the principle of regime change, and the abandonment of the presumption of innocence as a principle in international affairs. The United States, the United Kingdom, and a number of their allies flagrantly violated international law in 1998 when they bombed Yugoslavia, then in 2003 when they invaded Iraq, and again in 2011 when they intervened in internal political conflicts in Libya and Syria, causing catastrophic consequences for both countries. On the other hand, some members of the international community criticized Russia for its "disproportionate

²¹ Kh. Zulfqar and U. Mansur, *'Washington's New Cold War against Russia'*, (Margalla Papers Issue - I, 2019) 13

²² Following the Bucharest summit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated before the Duma (Parliament) that his country would not stand idly by in the face of the decision to expand the alliance towards Ukraine and Georgia.

He added that the response would be in the form of increasing economic and defense capabilities, without forgetting to point out that the Russian government would carefully study a parliamentary resolution calling on it to recognize the independence of the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which split from Georgia after a war in the nineties of the last century.

²³ George Kennan proposed a containment policy framework based on a set of motives and circumstances that made him believe in its importance and the necessity of including it within American strategies. It is manifested as follows: The inherent antagonism between capitalism and socialism: Kennan considers that there is a clear discrepancy between the capitalist approach led by the United States and the socialist approach claimed by the Soviet Union. In this regard, he says: "The meaning of this concept is that Moscow cannot rid itself of the belief that there is a set of goals that combine the Soviet Union with countries that are considered capitalist countries, and this is no wonder, as the prevailing belief in Moscow is that the goals of the capitalist world are hostile to the Soviet system, and therefore hostile to the interests of the peoples." which this system is in charge of." Therefore, he considers that the idea of hostility exists in the ideology and doctrine of the Soviet Union, and that the United States must be careful in dealing with this Soviet doctrine, which at its core dictates the inevitability of the eventual collapse of capitalist society. Belief in the infallibility of the Communist Party: Kennan believes that there is dominance of the one-party Communist Party over the Soviet authority, and he considers that it is always right and that its orders must be adhered to within the goals set by the leadership. He acknowledges that the members of this authority do not care about ideas and arguments that come from the outside world and other sources. In this context, he says: "Thus we see that the Kremlin does not find anything shameful in retreating before a greater power. Then, if the Kremlin does not find itself under the pressure of a timetable to achieve its goals, it does not panic if necessity imposes on it such a retreat. So, according to Kennan, the hostility between capitalism and socialism, Soviet hegemony, and its indifference to outside opinions, prompted him to urge the necessity of containment. Kennan points out that "it is clear in these circumstances that it is inevitable that the first element in any policy adopted by the United States will be diligent, long-term, and at the same time resolute work to contain the tendencies of Russian expansion.

²⁴ Kh. Zulfqar and U. Mansur, above n.20 at 19

use of force" in the Caucasus in August 2008 and its invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Against the backdrop of conflicting approaches and divergent interpretations of different parts of international law, a new Cold War has intensified, with the United Nations Security Council increasingly turning into a field of confrontation rather than providing a platform for seeking middle-ground solutions and cooperation²⁵.

CONCLUSION:

Based on this study, we can conclude that Washington's containment policy is not only focused on Russia. The United States actively employs a policy of containment against China and North Korea as well. By 2010, this led to an arms race between the United States and China. As a result, Pyongyang conducted tests of hydrogen weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in September 2017. However, the most significant aspect lies in the geostrategic path of the Middle East, where the United States has made strong moves to overthrow the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. After already toppling the Libyan government of Muammar Gaddafi, the United States supports extremist groups there to overthrow the government. Furthermore, it is evident that the United States played a significant role in igniting the Iraq War forcefully in 2003 and Afghanistan. Iraq was a longstanding ally of the former Soviet Union, just like Libya, and Syria remains so. Afghanistan, prior to the Soviet invasion, was also an allied state of the Kremlin.

There was a profound disparity in the aftermath of the Cold War. While the structures that engaged in the Cold War, including ideological structures, were dismantled on one hand, they were maintained on the other. The functions of organizations like NATO were not replaced with a shared collective security system but rather reinforced and expanded. In contrast to Russia's early enthusiasm for the establishment of a genuine common security system through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, it failed to account for the unequal end of the Cold War. The same applies to the "more flexible" structures of the Cold War.

The unequal dimension of the Cold War is accompanied by internal asymmetry within Russian politics. Russia relinquished its claims to ideological leadership for an alternative system to global capitalism and the geopolitical leadership of an alternative military and political bloc. However, it did not abandon its cultural identity or aspirations for global participation in leadership. The external incoherence of one party in the old Cold War conflict allowed for the demand to supervise the transformation of the other. While initially welcomed in Russia, this led to increasing resentment, resulting in escalating tensions within the internal asymmetry. As the new conservatives in Washington emphasized the imperial and global role that promoting democratic values should play, Moscow began reaffirming self-rule in international affairs, insisting on the sovereign right of each state, culminating in the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula.

The first and perhaps most dangerous strategic failure of the Security Council is the beginning of a new nuclear era. The United States' unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in December 2001 led to a new state of instability in proliferation issues. The Americans clearly indicated that they did not plan to extend the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991 (START I) beyond its expiration date on December 5, 2009. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 suggests that non-nuclear-weapon states are vulnerable to attack, while those who possess them (such as North Korea) are dealt with through diplomatic channels. The Iranian leadership did not miss the lesson. India and Pakistan have already been welcomed into the nuclear club, and Israel is a secret nuclear power, with the list of nuclear states likely to grow in the near future. The planned British renewal of Trident missiles contradicts the spirit of Article VI²⁶ of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which commits states to "good faith" disarmament. The nuclear superiority of the United States over both China and Russia was declared in a famous article, which had no ambiguity in its statement: the American plan announced in June 2007 to deploy elements of missile defense (MD) in Poland (a battery of ten anti-ballistic missiles) and the Czech Republic (installation of radar for

²⁵ G. Alexey, above n.8 at 144

²⁶

See: <https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html#:~:text=Article%20VI,strict%20and%20effective%20international%20control.>



missile tracking) represented a breakthrough in bringing the return of nuclear weapon deployment to the heart of European policy. Russian and American missiles are still on launch-on-warning status, and with the deterioration of the Russian early warning system since the end of the Cold War, the risk of accidental nuclear war has greatly increased, as has the threat of nuclear terrorism.

The second strategic failure is the uneven progress of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO expansion has been a subject of significant controversy since its first proposal following the Soviet collapse, and various arguments will not be exercised here. While Moscow has never welcomed NATO's growth, its position has become more rigid. Yeltsin took a relatively relaxed view of expansion in the early 1990s, and when asked in an interview on March 5, 2000, whether Russia would join someday, he replied, "Why not?" and under equal conditions." Vladimir Lukin, at that time chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the State Duma, reiterated this sentiment, arguing that the optimal solution would be "NATO expansion to include Vladivostok." In a spirit of realism, Putin stated in his press conference on July 18, 2001: "We do not consider NATO an adversarial organization, and we do not consider its existence a tragedy, although we do not see the need for it. It was born as a counterpart to the Warsaw Pact... Now there is no Warsaw Pact, and there is no Soviet Union, but NATO exists and is growing." With the Baltic republics joining now and NATO's increasing engagement with countries on Russia's borders from Ukraine to Georgia, Russian leaders have begun to feel "contained."

Description of the interwar period in the twentieth century as the "Twenty Years Crisis," during which none of the major issues on the agenda were resolved after the end of the Great War in 1918, and many of them worsened. There was also a failure to permanently transform Germany into an outcast and humiliated state, as well as an intellectual failure to confront the military trend (Japan), fascism (Italy), and Nazism (Germany) in a timely manner. The crisis of the twenties ended with the first year of the greatest traditional war in history, but in the nuclear age, a renewed confrontation would be even more dangerous. Just as the Second World War was the aftermath of the failed peace settlement that followed the First World War, this "new" Cold War is the result of the effective inability to overcome the structures and remnants of the Second World War. It raises controversy about the start of a new Cold War, with essential issues such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and how the consequences of this invasion, which paralyzed the Security Council from taking action to stop it, have been repeatedly announced as the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, after nearly two decades since the fall of communism, we have entered a period of doubt and lack of trust between the major nuclear powers. This has ushered the world into a period of ongoing institutional competition between Russia and the West, where new disputes have arisen over issues such as the appropriate role of multilateral mechanisms. These disputes were further exacerbated by Russia's war against Ukraine, as Russia's actions disrupted many decisions regarding its ally Syria, marking the beginning of the division between Russia and the West, where Russian-American relations are the central axis around which world politics revolve. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, these behaviors provided both countries an opportunity to revive the metaphorical term "Cold War," which symbolizes the contemporary international relations of a fundamentally tense relationship that cannot be resolved within the global perspectives of either party but requires a rethinking from both sides. These powers completely neutralize the Security Council when it comes to their vital interests.

Finally, we find that the major powers pursue aggressive behavior when it comes to their interests, disregarding the United Nations Security Council. They act violently to dispel their fears, as was the case during the invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies in 2003 without UN authorization. The same applies to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The League of Nations was formed as an inevitable result of the end of World War I, and the United Nations was established as an inevitable result of the end of World War II. Wars have demonstrated the ability to shape systems, so it is difficult to see any reform or change in the United Nations to keep up with ongoing developments without a war. It is very challenging to add any provision or amend any article related to the Security Council peacefully. The major powers view international institutions as mechanisms to control states. Therefore, we find that realist theories are more capable of explaining international politics



compared to liberal theories, which see states inclined towards cooperation and institutions as instrumental in compelling states to cooperate and renounce wars.

Recommendations:

The following are a set of worthwhile recommendations that our current undertaking has empowered us to put forward:

- a. The activation of international law
- b. The establishment of a new international structure to replace the United Nations Because it's from the results of World War II.
- c. The immediate dissolution and disintegration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

REFERENCES

- [1] V. Sebastian, 'Major Recent Trends in Violent Conflict' UNU Center for Policy Research, Occasional Paper (December 2014)
- [2] K. Robert, 'Superpowers Don't get to Retire', New Republic (26 May 2014)
- [3] T. Ian, 'New Cold War', Political Science, research methods (december 2005)
- [4] B. Jeremy and others, 'Divided Memory and the "New Cold War"', Thesis: The Rise and Decline of a Double-Edged Analogy, University of Florida Press. *Journal of Political & Military Sociology*, (2019)
- [5] G. Alexey, 'Russia-EU relations at a crossroads: preventing a new cold war in a polycentric world', Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, (Moscow, Russia, 2015)
- [6] Haider Abd Kadhim, 'The Role and Effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council in Light of International Power Competition: An Analytical Study', Journal of Political Science, International Studies Branch, College of Political Science, (University of Baghdad, November 2019)
- [7] M. David, 'The International Struggle over Iraq: Decision-Making in the UN Security Council 1980-2005', (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006)
- [8] M. David, 'Conclusions', in David Malone (ed), *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Boulder; Lynne Rienner Publishers)
- [9] V. Papava, 'Old or new cold war is the new cold war continuation of the old?', Cicero foundation Great Debate Paper (October 2014)
- [10] Kh. Zulfqar and U. Mansur, 'Washington's New Cold War against Russia', (Margalla Papers Issue - I, 2019)
- [11] <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/fr/s/res/1973-%282011%29>