



AN OVERVIEW OF PAKISTAN'S KASHMIR POLICY DURING PERVAIZ MUSHARRAF REGIME: FROM HOSTILITY TO NORMALIZATION

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ABSTRACT

Pakistan and India remained hostile neighbours with strained bilateral relationship right after getting independence in 1947. Multi factors contributed for this hostility, but however the ‘Kashmir dispute’ between the two state is main bone of contention. This dispute is considered a parameter of their mutual relations as both states went to war on this issue several times and caused surliness between the two countries. Both states remained uncompromised in their stands on their official policies from 1947 to 2001. The events of September 11, 2001, drastically changed the world order and also disturbed the framework in which Pakistan’s Kashmir policy had run since 1989. The 9/11 attacks set off a hasty downslide in Indo-Pak relations. India tried to use the ‘war on terror’ to its advantage, by trying to equate freedom fighters with global terrorism as she pictured the Kashmir problem purely as a matter of combating terrorism. This research paper seeks to present an overview and nalysis of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy during the Musharraf regime with special focus on its impact on the factors demanding a change in earlier policy of non-compromise. Further, between the two states in their mutual relations.

Keywords: *Bilateralism Kashmir, Musharraf, India, Pakistan, Terrorism,*

INTRODUCTION

The movement for Partition of the Indian Sub-Continent into two independent and sovereign states of India and Pakistan in 1947, drew its realization from Allahabad address of Dr. Allama Mohammad Iqbal in 1930, according to which the Muslim-majority areas of undivided India would be given right to join Pakistan(Sayeed, 1969). The growing political consciousness and desire of independence among the Indian Muslims were further strengthened after the passage of the Lahore Resolution of 1940 by Quai-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. All-India Muslim League (AIML) as well as All India National Congress (AINC) had worked against British colonial rule, which ultimately compelled the British authorities to transfer power to these two political parties in August 1947 (Qureshi, 1965; Saeed & Sarwar, 2009).

Right after World War II, the British Government was in a hurry to transfer powers to the representative political parties under the 3rd June plan of partition. A great-grandson of Queen Victoria, Lord Louis Francis Mountbatten (1900-1979) arrived in Delhi on 22nd March 1947 and took over charge from Lord Wavell. Mr. Mountbatten had little knowledge about the ongoing political issues of India at that very critical time, and therefore he



poorly managed the plan of partition as advised by the British Parliament¹. In particular, the issues of the division of big provinces (Presidencies), and princely states were not treated following the aspirations of its citizens (Qureshi, 1965).

According to Saeed & Sarwar, (2009), there were 562 princely states, which was roughly a third of British colonial India's territory and constituted a quarter of its population. These princely states were ruled by native princes and most of them had executed treaties or various kinds of agreements with the British Crown. When the British left India, there were certain ambiguities over the future status of the princely states. The Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 had clearly stated that the Paramountcy of these states could neither be retained by the British Crown nor transferred to the new government (Saeed & Sarwar, 2009). The 3rd of June Partition's Plan in its conclusion referred to the status of these princely states in the following words:

"All the rights surrendered by the States to the Paramount Power will return to the states. Political arrangements between the states on the one side and the British Crown and the British India on the other will thus be brought to an end (Ali, 2001)."

The Indian Independence Act of 1947, in Article 7, stated that the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapsed, and with it all treaties and agreements in force at the date of passing of this Act between His Majesty at that with respect of the Indian States. But in practice such independence was ruled out, and these states were compelled to accede to India or Pakistan (Qureshi, 1965).

Most of these princely states had either joined India or Pakistan except for the four states namely Hyderabad, Junagarh, Mangrol and Kashmir, which became a bone of contention between the two neighbours. In Junagarh and Hyderabad, the situations were quite alarming because the rulers of these states were Muslim while the majority of its population were non-Muslims. However, unlike Junagarh, and Hyderabad, the ruler of Kashmir was a Dogra Hindu, while the majority of its population were Muslims. It may be noted that the Nawab of Hyderabad desired to remain independent while rulers of Junagarh, and Mangrol had decided to accede to Pakistan in August-September 1947. After announcing accession with Pakistan, both states were forcibly occupied by India (Chatterjee, 2023).

The ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh signed a Stand Still Agreement in August 1947 with Pakistan² and had remained undecided about the future of Kashmir. On the other hand, Pakistani leadership apprehended it as a delaying tactics and got an impression that he was only buying time as to join India. Being a Hindu, he had a hostile attitude towards the Kashmiri Muslims, while he had shown considerable inclination towards India. The Maharaja had devised complete plan for the suppression Kashmiri Muslims and according to which he disarmed Muslims who were serving in State's Army and Police. In September the Dogra Army, the State Police, the Hindu Mahasabha and local Hindu gangsters started a concrete campaign for the annihilation of Muslims throughout Kashmir. This brutal plan, with the use of state forces, caused a local uprising in Kashmir (I. Hussain, 1998).

Analyzing this uprising and the use of forces, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan issued instruction to the then Army Chief Pakistan to invade Kashmir,

¹ Mr. Atlee, the British Prime Minister in his speech at Parliament, had directed the then viceroy to execute partition plan of India and to transfer powers to the representative political parties.

² During the partition process the state of Kashmir decided to remain independent and offered a Standstill Agreement to India and Pakistan with identical telegrams on August 12, 1947. The text is as follows:

"Jammu and Kashmir Government would welcome Standstill Agreements with India (Pakistan) on all matters on which these exist at present moment with outgoing British India Government".

Pakistan was signed the Standstill Agreement immediately, while the Indian government delayed and asked for further discussion on its contents.



however, his order was not complied. Thus, on October 23, 1947, the Pakhtun tribesmen crossed the border of Pakistani and entered Kashmir to help his Kashmiris brethren. In desperation, the Maharaja and his family fled from Srinagar and sought military assistance from India. The Maharaja was asked to accede to India on October 25, 1947, which was accepted by India on October 27, 1947, and consequently, India landed her troops in Kashmir. It was in May 1948 that Pakistan's Army also intervened in Kashmir due to her security interests, which resulted in full full-fledged war between the two neighbouring states (Group, 2003).

Due to successive victories on the part of the tribal men and the support of Pakistan, the Indian government reported the Kashmir problem to the United Nations on 1 January 1948. On 1 January 1949 the UN was successful in declaring a ceasefire line in the two countries. With the active involvement of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) have been passed several resolutions to create a peaceful environment between India and Pakistan.

After long hostility over Kashmir and its impact on the economy and society India and Pakistan to review their relations to minimize the cost benefits of the Kashmir dispute. Both countries are facing the challenges of "Hindutva" by India, while Pakistani society is influenced by the militant ideology of the Afghanistan war. Rid, (2015), has pointed out the importance of people-to-people contacts in the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan through alumni, trade, track-two conferences/dialogues, research, women, art and culture, workers, and intelligentsia links that resulted in 'Pakistan-India Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy (PIPPFD) formed in 1994 and Aman ki Asha initiated in 2010(Rid, 2015).

In 2008 though Bombay attacks created mistrust between the two countries and after the end of the Musharraf regime and after the general elections in Pakistan the PPP won and came to power. Under the leadership of Asif Ali Zardari the PPP government declared India as a "Most Favoured Nation" to normalize relations with India (Tribune, 2 November, 2011).

This paper focuses on Pakistan's Kashmir policy under the Musharraf regime (1999-2008) and analyses the developments that followed during his tenure. The Musharraf era has had a significant impact on Pakistan's Kashmir policy and drastically changed Pakistan's long-ago position from 1947. Successive governments have been following a new policy with new dynamics due to changing international and regional politics.

Musharraf's coup détente and Pakistan Kashmir policy (October, 1999-July 2001):

General Pervez Musharraf took power in a bloodless coup, on October 12, 1999, by overthrowing the elected government of Mia Mohammad Nawaz Sharif. He declared himself as chief executive for three years, while the then-president Rafiq Tarar remained in office until June 2001. General Musharraf formally appointed himself as president of Pakistan on June 20, 2000 (Alfiyah Ali, 2009). Some commentators described the coup as "the single most serious reversal of democracy," as it ended eleven years of weak and inefficient competitive party politics in Pakistan (Diamond, 2000).

Pakistan's economy was in a shaking position with growth of 4.2%, but it had a budget deficit worth 6.1% of GDP and its external debts were uncontrollable. Pakistan's Exports and remittances from abroad were falling day by day and international agencies and banks like the World Bank, IMF suspended their programs and loans to Pakistan after the 1998 nuclear tests. The foreign reserve assets fell rapidly, and the country was on the brink of default (Husain, 17 January 2005). On the international front, Former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook emphasized for restoration of civilian government immediately. Pakistan was suspended from the Commonwealth and treated as a virtual pariah state at the international level (Sattar, 2007). Though he was criticized for the coup at the same time, he was accepted by the US policymakers as he was a moderate and likely to pursue foreign policy objectives of the US in the region. Some observers noted that, after taking the reins of government Musharraf will have a 'pleasantry surprising to the Clinton administration' (H.N.Akhtar, 2007).



There were extremely joyous sentiments among the masses and sweets were distributed and hoped that the military had come as a blessing and would streamline the political affairs that caused Pakistan to the verge of economic collapse (Schofield, 2002). The Musharraf regime adopted the past path in dealing with India by pointing, 'Kashmir as a central issue around which the two countries intact and not cordially interacted. General Pervez Musharraf, while presiding over the 30th session of the Azad Kashmir Council declared that "The recent developments in South Asia have shown that Kashmir is a nuclear flashpoint in the region and the international community has also recognized it (News, December 19, 1999). By explaining the importance of Kashmir for Pakistan, General Musharraf, during his visit to Muzaffarabad on December 27, 1999, stated that "Pakistan is Kashmir and Kashmir is Pakistan. There are no negotiations, no talks" with India unless the Kashmir issue is discussed." (News, December 28, 1999).

Musharraf followed an aggressive Kashmir policy and can be judged from the Kargil crises and his close generals like (Aziz, Usmani and Mahmood) who were in favor of jihad in Kashmir. All of them had a key role in the Kargil crisis a supported the armed struggle against India. Future Pakistan's Kashmir policy was expected to determine by the Orthodox-Jihadi catena which was seriously taken by the policymakers (Amir, 7 January, 2001). The militancy was seeded, and nourished during the Afghan war by the financial support of Saudi Arabia, and espousal by the United States and Pakistan to confine the Soviet Union in the East direction. When they were used fully to pull out the Soviets from Afghanistan the scenario remained and they were left without reins in this region. After two decades they penetrated in society so deeply that in 2001-2, Pakistan was the hub of fifty- eight (58) religious political parties and twenty- four (24) armed religious militias of different extremist ideologies, the latter category popularly known as Jihadi Groups (Abbas, 2015). They openly promoted their ideology and could be found everywhere. Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider announced in February 2002, that the government had decided to prohibit these groups from fundraising in the name of Jihad in society, from showing banners, and from displaying arms. He also assigned the National Crises Management Cell (NCMC) to collect data on Jihadi activities, fundraising, and funding of all such organizations (Zeb, 2007).

Some Jihadis organizations turned their attention to the indigenous uprising of Kashmiri that has just begun in Kashmir against the Indian occupation. They turned the nationalist movement into a transitional Islamist resistance movement. The Indian government repeatedly blamed Pakistan's ISI for supporting these groups (Behera, 2001). Some analysts believed that Pakistan supported these militants, by all means, to pressure the Indian government on one hand and to settle the Kashmir dispute on her terms and conditions. Musharraf viewed that Kashmir trumped all other bilateral issues. He clarified that "There is no other dispute" (Group, 11 July, 2002). Some argued scholars that Pakistan in past was not in a position to defeat India decisively in wars and these militant groups were in a better position to counter India, effectively in Kashmir at a low cost (Blom, 2002).

Hijacking Incident:

An Indian Airline plane was hijacked on 24-31 December 1999 by some Kashmiri freedom fighters. India has started propaganda against Pakistan to defame Pakistan and its position in the world community. The plane was landed first in Lahore. India said that Harkat ul Mujahideen was involved, in this and had the full support of the Pakistani government. Pakistan turned down the allegations and said that it had allowed the plane to land at Lahore airport purely on a humanitarian basis, as consistently captain had warned and requested that the aircraft had almost run short of fuel (Malik, 2005). In an initial response to the hijacking incident, Foreign Office spokesman Tariq Altaf stated that under international laws, there was no option for Pakistan but to allow the plane to land (Kumar, 2000).

General Pervez Musharraf on December 28, while interviewed with CNN, cleared the Pakistan position and said that his government had "absolutely no involvement" in the hijacking of the plane. He said, "We do not really know the facts and the people as to who have hijacked (the plane)." He asserted that Pakistan had cooperated with India fully "and we would like to cooperate with them totally"(Nation, 29 December, 1999). The hijackers demanded for release of their top leaders like Maulana Masood Azhar leader of Harkat ul Mujahideen, Ahmad Umar Saeed Sheikh, and Mushtaq



Ahmad Zargar, founder chief of Al-Umar Mujahideen, in exchange for 155 passengers. The Indian government accepted the hijacker's demands and they were released. This incident caused the relations between the two countries to the lowest ebb (Kumar, 2000).

Clinton visits India and Pakistan and Pakistan:

US foreign policy for South Asia had shifted from Pakistan to India after the end of the Cold War in 1990. The main reasons were Pakistan's pro-Taliban policy, missiles, and nuclear policies which created mistrust and deep concerns for the US and made the two countries poles apart after the aftermath of nuclear explosions in 1998, Kargil conflict in 1999, and the fourth military coup in 1999 (Rajeswari, 2000). The Indian government of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was also keenly interested in having cordial relations with Washington after the breakup of her old ally in the region the Soviet Union and Clinton's visit was the first-ever visit by a US President in two decades (Iftikhar.H.Malik, 2008).

During the Clinton administration, the United States tilted towards India due to its regional importance and influence and remained anti-Pakistan for the policies pursued at that critical period. New Delhi tried to refrain Clinton to visit Pakistan and some impartial analysts observed that such type of approach caused worsened their relations in this critical juncture (Ahrari, August 2001). President Clinton arrived in New Delhi on March 21-25, 2000. On March 21, Clinton and Vajpayee met one-on-one for half hours and discussed bilateral issues including the Kashmir crisis and the nuclear issue, of the high value dilemmas of the region. Initially, Pakistan was not included in his itinerary. He bitterly neglected and showed cool shoulder to Pakistan for her policies and due to undemocratic regime. But Pakistani Ambassador to Washington Dr. Maleeha Lodhi played a key role to convince Clinton to include Islamabad into his proposed visit of South Asia. He stayed in India for five days while in Pakistan, he just spent five hours. On March 25 the president flew from Bombay to Islamabad (Indurthy, 2005). On the Kashmir dispute, he asserted that borders cannot be redrawn, the Line of Control must be respected by both countries and there is no military solution of this dispute. In the Kashmir problem it was a bilateral issue that must be settled between India and Pakistan alone. About the US role, he said that we cannot and will not mediate or resolve the dispute, and urged India and Pakistan must start a dialogue to solve the Kashmir dispute. US ambitious are cleared in the region but want to avoid dragging into the Kashmir issue (Ershad, 2005).

The inclination toward India and Clinton's cordial five-day visit to India, compared with five hours in Islamabad produced a mixed reaction in Pakistan. The significance of Kashmir dispute in the regional peace and security stipulated by the former chief of army staff Aslam Beg said. 'We don't need to enter an arms race with India, but we cannot let Kashmir go. Let Kashmir become a bleeding wound for India,' stated a former chief of army staff, 'The costs will be heavy on both sides, but heavier for India' (Schofield, 2002, p. 44).

Unfortunately, on March 20, some unidentified people killed 35 Sikhs in the village of Chittisinghpura in Anantnag district, fifty miles southwest of Srinagar. The tragic incident was pre-planned to defame the Kashmiri who fought against the Indian occupation. India once again accused Pakistan and the militants for these killings. Pakistan refused the allegations. The Indian Government before investigating this massacre of Sikhs blamed the Lashkar-e Taiba and the Hizb-ul Mujaheddin for this and they negatively expressed Pakistan's involvement in this event. When the three human rights activists investigated the incident, they concluded that the finger pointed towards 'renegades' rather than the militants who were considered behind this bloodbath (Schofield, 2002, p. 228). Thus, the Pakistan-controlled militant conglomerate declared a ceasefire in June 2000. Musharraf offered to talk at any place, any time and at any level' and even proposed a no-war pact with India on August 2, 2000 and said:

I've been saying let's forget about history, let's forget about the past, I want peace and I agree with you I am for resolving this dispute of Kashmir, let India come forward, I am for talking to, at any place, to any leadership of India. So I'm offering all kinds of peace initiatives but the ball, may I say, is in the Indian court (Bennett-Jones, 2 August, 2000).

New Delhi constantly adhered to her past Kashmir policy and often turned down suggestions for resolving the Kashmir dispute. The militants argued that by adopting the jihad way, they had inflicted



heavy costs on the 'Indian occupying force'. They viewed and expressed that the Indian troops had suffered casualties and were living in a continuous state of anxiety and the Indians were losing control over the State. The Indian troops were facing psychological problems. This state of affairs was going in favour of Pakistan, and she had the upper hand over the Indians. The Jihadi were nasty against any compromise or negotiation with India on Kashmir, it followed, was criticized as illogical and unwise on the part of Pakistan (Yasmeen, 2003, p. 195).

India and Pakistan faced extreme pressure from the international community. Pakistan was facing coming out of 'international isolation' and for India, the Kashmir quagmire was going expensive day by day and its human rights violation in the valley by the security forces badly damaged her image. The Indian government handled the situation in Kashmir with iron hand, which was a clear hurdle in its 'rise to great power status image' at the international level. The changing international scenario was not in favor of both Pakistan and her president and the latter was caught between the devil and the deep blue sea (Bennett-Jones, 2007).

Road to Agra Summit: (July 2001)

Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, on May 23, 2001 surprisingly announced, that Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee had decided to invite President of Pakistan, General Musharraf to visit India. Vajpayee wrote a formal invitation letter that was received two days later stated,

For the welfare of our people, there is no other recourse but pursuit of the path of reconciliation, of engaging in productive dialogue and by building trust and confidence. I invite you to walk this high road with us....we have to pick up the threads again, including reviewing the composite dialogue, so that we can put in place a stable structure of cooperation and addressed all outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir.

Four days later General Pervez Musharraf formally accepted the invitation in reply he is saying, *The root cause of tension between our two countries is the unresolved Jammu and Kashmir dispute. I, therefore, look forward to sincere and candid discussions with you to resolve the issue of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the wishes of Kashmiri people* (Mahmood, 2005, p. 1).

These developments were welcomed on both sides of the border but the religious political parties and militant groups disapproved and warned Musharraf for any bargaining and they also claimed that he had no right to deviate from Pakistan's stand on Kashmir (Dawn, 2001a).

What factors were behind such a U-turn and to hold talks with Pakistan, without any pre-conditions? The Indian media was a bombshell on the government's sudden change on Pakistan policy. "Until Wednesday morning, India's policy was that it won't even play cricket with Pakistan. By that evening the policy had changed so totally that India was ready to lay out a red carpet to welcome the Pakistani dictator for talks without preconditions." It is believed that the US played a decisive role to come closer Musharraf and Vajpayee for meeting, as P.Cohen argued that due to the US active engagement in South Asia India and Pakistan came close but some hold that the US was only a facilitator (Abbas, 2015, pp. 196-197). Before he left for Agra, Musharraf held several meetings with community leaders, journalists, opinion-makers and intellectuals to assess their opinion about putting on a normal footing with India. He clarified that Pakistan would not plan 'sell out' the future of Kashmir and his government would not make any compromises in this regard (Yasmeen, 2003, p. 197).

President Musharraf arrived in New Delhi on the morning of 14 July, met with high officials and dignitaries. The following day, the summit shifted to Agra where the two delegations were stayed in adjacent hotels. Both sides started the summit with optimism and the result of the talks on the first day was seen as positive. Sharp differences emerged over the final statement that would re-launch the bilateral dialogue. The sticking points centered on were Kashmir and cross border terrorism. India refused to accept the centrality of the Kashmir dispute and insisted on including the question of insurgency in the declaration. Pakistan also expressed great concerned over the reference to the Agra process as a continuation of the Simla and Lahore Declaration (ZahidHussain, 2007, p. 105).

The approaches were poles apart of the two rival leaderships, Pakistan stand was 'Kashmir first' against 'Kashmir last' but India had via versa and remained firmly stand on her demand (Quinlan, 2005, p. 105). The morning of July 17, 2001, Musharraf had a breakfast meeting with Indian editors and exchanged his views with frankly and with much emotion about India-Pakistan differences. He



made clear his strong feeling about Kashmir, “I keep talking of Kashmir, and you keep talking of cross-border terrorism and confidence-building measures. What confidence building? Confidence building is the solution of Kashmir” (Bennett-Jones, 2007, p. 306). The dialogue between the two leaders broke down over these very issues after 10 sessions of intense discussions, including four between Prime Minister Vajpayee and General Musharraf. The summit ended abruptly without a joint statement or a joint press conference. In fact, some key factors were responsible in its failure, to come on an acceptable agreement (Behuria, 2009, p. 439).

First, news conferences by both sides during the initial stages of the visit played a negative role as contradictory statements about whether Kashmir was a center point of discussions or not posed a hurdle to present a common consensus in the whole process. Secondly, At Lahore, Nawaz Sharif failed to get the support of the military in his talks and come on an agreement with India, at Agra, Vajpayee had not succeeded in reconciling differences within his coalition before the summit began. The Indian leadership was not ready to approve the language of the draft communiqué that foreign ministers of both the countries had developed. It is common belief that the hardliner L.K. Advani sabotaged it and the joint statement idea was dropped by the Indian side at the last moment (Abbas, 2015, p. 197; Sattar, 2007, p. 238).

Third, At Tashkent, Simla and Lahore the negotiations were conducted mainly in private atmosphere until the two rivals neared closure, but this was not happened at Agra. The unnecessary media involvement from the very beginning impaired the prospects of success. They did not follow the rules, how to deal with media in such occasion as in previous summits (Kux, 2007, p. 47). Fourth, the Media can make up a public mind about an event and its importance and the actors involve in it can be presented as vital, but the Indian media at Agra summit was instinctively suspicious of the Musharraf’s intentions. He was presented as an “Architect of Kargil”. They are reminding Vajpayee and his colleague that the Pakistani president after all was a military dictator responsible for subverting the Lahore peace process, and they often questioned, “Can we Trust Musharraf” (Bennett-Jones, 2007, p. 306).

Both sides blamed each other for stubbornness in the whole process but the fact was that neither side was ready to resist pressure from their respective hardliners. The failure of summit was a surprise for the media journalists and frustration of the Pakistani delegation. Before departing Agra for Islamabad:

I met Prime Minister Vajpayee at about eleven o'clock that night in an extremely sombre mood. I told him bluntly that there seemed to be someone above the two of us who had the power to overrule us (Musharraf, 2006, p. 299).

About the summit, he hoped that ‘I came back empty-handed, but the Summit was not a failure’. Prime Minister Vajpayee also underlined the progress that was made ‘towards bridging the two approaches in a draft joint declaration. Pakistani foreign minister also given similar statement, ‘Agra Summit was *‘natamam*, not *‘nakam*’ (inconclusive not a failure)’ (Sattar, 2007, p. 237). After the failure of Agra Summit Musharraf was convinced that the extremist forces in Pakistan increasing day by day and creating chaos inside and outside of Pakistan defaming the whole nation. He had decided to be tackled effectively. He renewed his old campaign with new enthusiasm. Musharraf intensified the rise of Jihadi groups, who started attacks in Pakistan and India as well in response of his changing policy toward India (Abbas, 2015, p. 198).

War on Terror 9/11 Environment and Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy:

9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States of America drastically changed world politics in general and South Asia in particular. The US declared that every nation of the world will decide, ‘with us or with terrorists. The US almost immediately identified Taliban-ruled Afghanistan as a state sponsor of al Qaeda and attacked Afghanistan in 2001. Ministry of Pakistan Foreign Affairs stated President Pervez Musharraf in response to 9/11. He condemned the loss of life and property in Washington and New York in the terrorist attack. He called on the world powers to come together against terrorism in all of its forms. On 19 September, in a televised address to the nation, Musharraf stated that



Pakistan's defence and strategic assets, its economic rival, national integrity and solidarity, and Kashmir cause were the four main apprehensions that he joined the war on terror (Dawn, 2001b). He also noted with great concern that India had plans to use the situation in her favour and struggling to declare Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism and to damage the Kashmir cause. A trade-off on Kashmir was at the top of the Pakistani agenda (Post, 2001).

On September 15, 2001, an all-parties conference was called headed by Vajpayee and offered all types of facilities to America against Taliban regime and Osama bin Laden and his network. The conference also pointed out that Pakistan is the mastermind of the terrorism in the region. After the conference Vajpayee declared that India is also facing terrorism in Kashmir and stated that New Delhi will be ready for target attacks in Azad Kashmir, where training camps of militants are operating. The Indian Propaganda line failed because Pakistan adopted a provident policy that made it a frontline ally in the war on terrorism (Sattar, 2007, p. 268).

A war against terrorism has been started and Pakistan also joined with the US as an ally against terrorism. India tried her best to defame and declare Pakistan a terrorist state and sponsor cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. New Delhi tried to use the 'war on terror' to its advantage. US policy in the region is to fight against terrorism, fundamentalism, and extremism which caused tremendous pressure on Pakistan's Kashmir policy. Islamabad walking on a tightrope has tried to maintain a distinction between freedom struggle and terrorism but the US was not ready to accept that definition. India portrayed the Kashmir problems purely as a matter of combating terrorism and declared that it had also the same right as the US hunted down al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan (Iqbal, 2002).

Musharraf's decision to join the war on terror has water water-shade effect on Pakistan's Kashmir policy. Pakistan intelligence agency ISI, trained militants in Taliban's camps in Afghanistan, for Kashmir Jihad. Americans were not ready to turn a blind eye to the Afghan-Kashmir nexus. US directed, Musharraf to close all these camps, operating in Kashmir (Munir, 2007, p. 631). After 9/11, Pakistan once again has hope that the US may be willing to become a mediator in the issue of Kashmir. For this purpose, General Musharraf ordered to ban the Jihadist Organizations and pursued the path of confidence-building measures. General Musharraf tried to convince the US to play this role but Washington has a strategy to keep involvement in the issue of Kashmir as a facilitator, not as a mediator. But on the other hand, India still has clung to the idea of India and she is not ready to give up this idea through compromise (Barki, 2007).

Pakistan's Kashmir Policy a Clear Shift:

The tension between the two countries mounted when in October 2001 the suicide attack on the Kashmir Assembly building in Srinagar caused 36 lives and several injured including civilians. The Indian leaders and military commanders warned of 'hot pursuit', sending troops into Azad Kashmir to destroy militant training camps there (Ahmad & Bashir, 2004, p. 63). The ongoing crisis further intensified between the countries when a few armed men attacked the Indian Parliament in December 2001. India without investigations blamed two Pakistani-based Islamic militant groups, Jesh-e-Muhammad and Lashker-e-Taiba, for the attack. India withdrew its High Commissioner from Pakistan, cut all air, land links and placed its military on high alert, and moved three-quarters of a million troops to forward positions along the Line of Control and the internal boundary with Pakistan. India demanded immediate Pakistani action against the organizations responsible for the attack and threatened to take matters into its own hands unless Pakistan ended cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. To appease India, America announced a ban on Lashkar-e-taiba on December 21, 2001 and later on praised Musharraf's role in the war on terror and steps taken by his regime against militancy in Pakistan (Mahmud, 2005).

The threat of war, coupled with US pressure, forced Pakistan to take action against the militant groups. On 12 January 2002, Musharraf banned LeT and JeM, which were blamed by India for the Parliament attack. He also promised not to let Pakistani territory be used for cross-border terrorism. He declared that Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for terrorist activity anywhere in the world. No organization will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir. The Indian government positively to Musharraf's 12 January speech and the subsequent move to curb the



militants. On 28 May, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw visited Islamabad and asked Musharraf to take tougher measures to counter cross-border terrorism. He arrived in New Delhi on the next day; Jack called on the Indian leaders to exercise restraint. He also told the Indian leadership that Musharraf had promised to close down 'all terrorist camps' operating in Azad Kashmir (Hussain, 2007, p. 163).

The US and other countries like the European Union, Russia, and China, directly or indirectly stressed India to cool down and both countries came back from the brink, and opened dialogue (Racine, 2007, p. 391). US involvement and pressure was going on both India and Pakistan. On 6 June, the US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, arrived in Islamabad for a deal between the hostile countries to normalize relations, and to compel Pakistan to take stern actions against militant organizations. During his meeting with Musharraf he put the critical question: 'What can I tell the Indian? He asked. He wanted to know whether Musharraf would agree to a 'permanent end' to the cross-border terrorist activity long accepted by Pakistan. Musharraf replied with 'yes'. The next day Armitage left for New Delhi and briefed Indian leaders about his talks with Musharraf. Musharraf's agreement to the word 'permanent' backed by the US assurances to India that he would keep his word, immediately led to the easing of tension. It was a hugely significant foreign policy victory for India (Hussain, 2007, p.110). The Musharraf-Armitage agreement was a turning point in Pakistan's U-turn in Kashmir policy. The changing policy of Kashmir was due to extremism inside Pakistan and external pressure from the US and the international community to reconsider it. In a speech in Srinagar in April, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee extended a 'hand of Friendship' to Pakistan and called for the resumption of dialogue with Pakistan. Both Pakistan and India agreed to implement a ceasefire line along the LoC and on the Siachen Glacier. In an interview with the BBC on 18 December, Musharraf offered to give up Pakistan's traditional policy of insistence on the implementation of the UN resolutions on Kashmir. Both countries approved plans for track-two diplomacy among former senior generals, diplomats, and intellectuals to discuss, nuclear restraint, stabilization, and trade ties to move for normalization (Chari, 2007, p. 124). On 6 January 2004, at the end of the SAARC summit held in Islamabad, the two countries signed a joint statement that revived composite dialogue and resolved peacefully all contentious issues, including Kashmir. President General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan showed great flexibility and offered many proposals to solve the Kashmir dispute. He even dropped the demand for a UN-mandated plebiscite in Kashmir and met India 'halfway' to resolve the dispute provided India also showed the matching flexibility (Choudhry & Akhtar, 2010, p. 51).

Musharraf, due to his support of the war on terror and concentration on the western border, it was vital for Pakistan to have peaceful and normal relations with India. Kashmir remained a hot issue and New Delhi and Islamabad's foreign policies were greatly affected by Kashmir toward one another. He has taken some steps to solve this by withdrawing from Pakistan's traditional Kashmir policy and agreeing to negotiate to solve it bilaterally.

Steps taken by the Musharraf regime to normalize relations:

For an amicable solution to the Kashmir dispute, Musharraf on 24 October 2004, suggested a three-phased formula, he said (a) the state had distinct geographical regions with different religions, sects, and languages, (b) some should remain with Pakistan and others with India, (c) the other could become autonomous, be placed under UN trusteeship or a condominium or divided between two countries (Sattar, 2007, p. 271). In December 2005, he suggested a 4-point formula consisting of (a) soft borders, (b) demilitarization, (c) self-governance and (d) a joint mechanism/supervision mechanism to solve this old dispute between the two countries. India's reaction was cool and remained standing on its official stated position on Kashmir, as an "integral part" of India. He also offered other suggestions to India regarding border issues as a no-war pact, mutual reduction of forces, and denuclearization of South Asia were not taken seriously by India (Racine, 2007, p. 410). The composite dialogue started in March 2004, in which Kashmir and terrorism were the central points, and dominated the whole process, but there was clear-cut difference in perceptions held by the countries. Pakistan showed grave grievances, as a lot had been done for India to withdraw from its principle stand, on Kashmir, and stop 'cross-border terrorism'. India has not shown any flexibility in the resolution of Kashmir. India also counters the concern that Pakistan still supports the jihadi



option in Kashmir and does not fully stop cross-border terrorism. In October 2005, after the second round of talks, a joint statement was issued in which 'possible options for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the Kashmir issue will find out with sincere and purposeful manner and no one will be allowed to sabotage the peace process (Times, 2005). joint statement after Musharraf - Manmohan meeting, has been issued on 16 September 2006. Both leaders agreed that a mutually agreed and acceptable options for a peaceful negotiated settlement of all issues between India and Pakistan, including Kashmir. They also agreed a need for 'an India-Pakistan anti-terrorism institutional mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations' jointly by the two countries (Bennet-Jones, 2007, p. 315).

President Bush visited Pakistan March, 2006:

That was an eye-opener event for Pakistan when Bush arrived in South Asia in early March 2006. During his visit to India, he talked about economic and human developments in India while visiting Pakistan and Afghanistan Bush discussed war and military actions and put more pressure on Pakistan to do more to eliminate Al Qaeda. During this visit, Bush's vision was obvious about India and Pakistan. So he gave more importance to India than Pakistan. India was a natural and potential ally of the US but, Pakistan was a strategic one (Lavoy, 2006, p. 2).

The Mumbai setback:

In November 2008 a band of ten well-armed terrorists launched an onslaught on India's leading and commercial capital, Mumbai, which led to the slaughter of 166 people including 25 foreign nationals from eight different countries. This attack occurred at a time when the foreign minister of Pakistan, Shah Mahmood Qureshi was visiting India to discuss issues related to the ongoing dialogue process including Kashmir, the Chenab River water, and trade ties between the two countries. The immediate effect was a sharp downturn in India-Pakistan relations. The peace process launched in 2004 was suspended amid mutual recriminations as India blamed Pakistan for the outrage and later denied responsibility (D. S. R. Hussain, 2011, p. 338).


CONCLUSION

Generally, Pakistan's Kashmir policy is guided by two factors, first, after independence, the army has fully controlled Kashmir and Afghan polices and second, the past hostile experiences with India. The hostile attitude towards India is due to past wars legacy, international politics in the region and to get and maintain a leading role in regional and international level. The Kashmir issue is playing a dominant position in Pakistan's foreign relations with regional and international big powers.

The historical development in Pakistan 's Kashmir policy was not drastically changed as we can observe on different occasions. Pakistan's policy on Kashmir is not acceptable to America and other big powers as they have their strategic interests in the region. The Musharraf regime faced multi-dimensional challenges after 9/11 that compelled the Pakistani establishment to review the Kashmir Policy of Pakistan in the changing environment and due to all these factors, the Musharraf regime tried to normalize relations with India over Kashmir. Pakistan tried to reduce the pressure coupled after 9/11. This policy was continued by the civilian regimes after the end of Musharraf's rule in 2008.

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