

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROLIFERATIONS OF CONVENTIONAL AND NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

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Abstract: *International peace and security have recently come under serious danger from the spread of conventional and non-conventional weaponry. At the international and national levels, this has caught the attention of scholars and decision-makers. In order to better understand how the proliferation of conventional and non-conventional weaponry affects global peace and stability, this research seeks to look at these implications. This study made extensive use of secondary data from sources including books, journals, and the internet, and it used content analysis to analyse the data that had been collected. This showed that underdeveloped nations, have been thrown into chaos by the development of conventional and non-conventional weapons, and smaller states are now concerned for their existence. As a result, states that have never before had a propensity to create conventional and unconventional weapons are starting to do so. Thus, the proliferation of conventional and non-conventional weapons has been difficult to stop. Finally, International Atomic Agency should work with other pertinent national and international organisations to impose penalties on nations who disobey agreements on the spread of conventional and non-conventional weapons, if needed.*

Keywords: Peace, Security, Weapons, States, conventional weapons, non-conventional weapons

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, states and multinational enterprises associated with the production of these weapons no longer have the strategic ties that bound them when selling, trading, and producing their goods. This is true despite the proliferation of numerous international treaties on the prevention and sales of conventional and non-conventional weapons violence conflict has remained unabated and the proliferation of conventional and non-conventional weapons is on the increase (Ayson, 2008).

A large portion of the world was successfully divided by the Cold War into clearly defined groups of politically compatible nations and their allies, which forced nations to strategically exchange weapons and technology in order to achieve a shared objective. Since 1989, this coordinated strategy has been abandoned; non-state actors, in particular, have shown a propensity to sell conventional capabilities to the highest bidder (Carruthers, 2005).

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought forth another issue following the end of the Cold War. Countries like Poland, Latvia, Belarus, Romania, and Estonia, among others, were among the nations that had been under the Soviet Union before becoming independent governments with sizable conventional and nuclear weaponry (Davis, 1995). It is important to recall that many of these newly independent nations were financially unstable and in dire need of money. It was unnecessary to sustain or continue maintaining the arsenals that the Soviet government had left in these countries' hands since they were inappropriate for the smaller-scale conflicts or civil disturbances that these nations were anticipated to confront in the future. Due to high prices being paid by other nations and non-state actors, this rendered the weapons and the technological know-how to make them an appealing thing to sell. The increase in the number of conventional and non-conventional weapons in the immediate post-Cold War era, coupled with the rise of clandestine and terrorist organisations, stoked fears that these weapons might fall into the possession of rogue individuals or state actors who might use them for more evil purposes (Keohane, 2008).

In light of this, a vast array of regional and international treaties and protocols have been created to address the spread of conventional and non-conventional weapons production technology. Examples

of these treaties and protocols include Geneva protocol 1925 that seek to ban the use of gas and biological weapons was signed 125 nation-states. Atlantic Treaty 1959 that seek to internationalize and demilitarizes the continent was signed 42 nation-states. Limited Test Ban 1963 that ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water was signed 123 nation-states. Outer Space Treaty 1967 that seek to internationalize and demilitarizes space, the moon, and other celestial bodies was signed 94 nation-states. Latin American Nuclear Free Zone 1968 that seek to ban nuclear weapons in the region was signed 25 nation-states. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1968 seeks to prohibits selling, giving, or receiving nuclear weapons, materials, or technology for weapons was signed 178 nation-states. Seabed Arms Control 1971 bans placing nuclear weapons in or under the seabed was signed 92 nation-states (Rourke et al 1998).

Moreover, other arms control treaty includes Biological Weapons 1972 which bans the production and possession of biological weapons was signed 131 nation-states. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Treaty (SALT 1) ABM treaty (1972) limited the number and types of U.S and USSR strategic weapons (expired 1977). Threshold Test Band (1974) limits U.S and USSR underground to 150 kt. Environmental modification (1977) bans environmental modification as a form of warfare was signed 62 nation-states. SALT II (1979) limited the numbers and types of U.S and USSR strategic network. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (1985) prohibits the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons in the region was signed 11 nation-states. Intermediate Range nuclear weapon (INF) 1987 eliminates all U.S and Soviet missiles with ranges between 500 km and 5,500 km (Rourke et al 1998).

Also, the Missile technology Control Regime (MTCR) 1987 was signed by 25 nation-states to limits transfer of missiles or missile technology. Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) 1990/1992 reduces conventional forces in Europe was signed 20 nation-states and nonbinding Protocol in 1992 cover troops was signed 30 nation-states. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START I) 1991/1992 United State strategic nuclear forces between the United States and the USSR/Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. START II (1993) reduces U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) bans the possession of chemical weapons after 2005 was signed 157 nation-states among others (Rourke et al 1998).

On the whole, the United Nations (UN) has not had much success in trying to stop the spread of conventional and non-conventional weapons, and this cannot be separated from the fact that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are the biggest makers and distributors of the weapons. This study seeks to investigate the implications of the spread of conventional and non-conventional weapons on international security and peace.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION: CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND NON- CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Conventional weapons are term used to cover arms that are not nuclear, biological or chemical in nature, otherwise known as weapon of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Convention weapons include ships, aircraft, tanks, missiles, guns, rockets and other artillery (Kennedy, 1987). Though not classified as WMDs, the increasing sophisticated technologies used in the production of conventional weapons means that the destructive powers they possess have an increased killing capacity or capability (Klarem, et al 1998). In addition, the term conventional weapons or conventional arms generally refer to weapons that are in relatively wide use that are not weapons of mass destruction (e.g. nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Conventional weapons include small arms and light weapons, sea and landmines as well as (non-weapons of mass destruction) bombs, shells, rockets, missiles, and cluster munitions. These weapons are use explosive materials based on chemical energy as opposed to nuclear energy in nuclear weapons.

Besides, conventional weapons are weapons used to mean an explosive weapon, such as a bomb, the war head of a missile or an artillery shell. All such weapons contain explosive material which explodes when suitably triggered. In conventional weapons, the explosive material is something that can undergo some chemical reaction which proceeds extremely quickly and release a lot of energy. Basically, it can 'burn' so fact that it explodes. The first explosive material use in weapons is gun powder.

On the other hand, non-conventional weapons are weapon: use in warfare that are not specify in military warfare, such as drones, the use of the atomic bomb as use in the Second World War by the US. against the Japanese. These weapons are used to target the civilian population as well as the armed forces and



specialize in unconventional tactics like infiltrating into the enemy's camp, destroying enemy supplies and creating diversions.

However, non-conventional weapons target civilian population and political bodies directly, seeking to render the military proficiency of the enemy irrelevant through propaganda, subversion and to ultimately build environment of fear and confusion. This is largely use by terrorist and clandestine groups to decrease the morale of civilians and, when applicable, also the soldiers in the filed through concern for their families.

Also, non-conventional weapon is the opposite of conventional weapon or warfare, whereas conventional warfare is use to reduce the opponent's military capability, non-conventional warfare is an attempt to achieve military victory through acquiescence, capitulation or clandestine support for one side of an existing conflict through the use of covert or not well-defined tactics and weapons intensify environment of subversion or intimidation, and the general or long-term goals are coercive or subversive to a political body. In addition, to the surgical application of traditional weapons, other armaments that specifically target military can be used are: nuclear weapons, incendiary device or other such weapons (U.S. Army Special Forces, Training Manual, 2010).

LITERATURE REVIEW

There are growing literature on arms proliferation in international relations and strategic studies. According to Abdel-Fatau-Musah (1999), a variety of reasons are involved in the growth of small arms and light weapons in Africa. The stockpiles that the former Soviet Union, the United States, and their allies pushed into Africa in the 1970s and 1980s to fuel or finance proxy interstate conflicts during the Cold War continue to be a significant source of SALW. While the production and delivery of new weapons is often the focus of international efforts to stop proliferation.

Malam (2014) explores how small weapons proliferation affects regional security in West Africa and evaluates the regional organization's attempts to tackle the danger in order to make recommendations for how to deal with it. The study comes to the conclusion that some of the main internal factors that act as barriers to effective attempts to combat the issue in the region include the region's crippling economy, failure of states to provide the necessities of life, insecurity, increasing levels of unemployment, and above all corruption. Therefore, it asserts that all hands must be on deck at all levels to solve the issue, taking into account the region's significance to the continent as well as to the long-term maintenance of international peace and security.

Christopher (1995) noted in the article he wrote "The Relationship Between the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons" that no study has been done on the relationship between societal collapse and globalisation. The lack of substantial investigations into this issue is much the more concerning given that these weapons are still often used in countless violent conflicts and other related crimes in the post-cold war era. He said that the 34 major armed conflicts that the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) documented in 1993 mostly included the employment of light weapons. According to him, light weapons are suitable for irregular soldiers like insurgents who lack the legal framework of a professional Army since they often do not require much training or experience to use. According to Yakubu (2002), a number of variables contribute to Nigeria's high rate of small weapons proliferation. These include, among other things, stealing firearms from individuals or the government, small-scale weapon production, and weapon trafficking. He said that the country has seen alarmingly large-scale weapons smuggling. Deadly weapons are periodically transported into the country through our open borders while being disguised as pieces of clothing, autos, or housewares. This situation is a hint that the problems of the North African rebellion are now affecting Libya, which borders the Niger Republic and Northern Nigeria.

According to Krause (2007), the use and accessibility of increasingly sophisticated weapons has resulted in a decline in state power. This is especially evident given the rise in crime. It is often believed that crime and insecurity are not primarily caused by guns. Instead, insufficient structural forms that either create or maintain human insecurity in the broadest way are the root of crime. It is clear that a large portion of the widespread usage of small guns and light weapons is a response to the need for individual security when customary social relations fail or appear to be about to fail. It is also obvious that the ease with which firearms are accessible fosters and deepens unhealthy tendencies.

According to Hazen et al. (2007), the concerns of armed conflict and the expansion of SALW are negatively impacted by the police's inability to regulate violent crime, uphold law and order, and provide the general population with adequate safety. Nigeria has vast and open borders, thus none of the law enforcement agencies now have the personnel, tools, or training required to do their work effectively. Nte (2011) asserts that acquiring SALW is closely tied to a dispute escalating into a full-fledged war. Despite the fact that these studies have added to the body of literature, there is still a void in the implications of the proliferation of weaponry on international peace and security, thus this research effort seeks to fill that gap.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A variety of theories have been developed by scholars in the fields of international relations and strategic studies to analyse weaponry and armaments. The investigation, which aims to explain how nations band together to achieve global peace and security through disarmament and armaments control, is positioned within the idealist viewpoint and collective security theory to the study of international relations. The theory of collective security provides the most comprehensive justification for the idea of limiting the spread of both conventional and non-conventional weapons. The idealist interpretation of international relations is the foundation of the collective security theory. It is a theory based on international organisations working together to solve new issues that appear to be threats to global security.

Idealists believe that a global system based on collective security should be created to replace the current, anarchic system, which lacks a centralised enforcement mechanism. Several fundamental prerequisites that are necessary for applications form the foundation of collective security theory. According to the theory of collective security, each state must share responsibility for ensuring the security of all other states. It posits that every nation shares the same perception of every threat to the global order and is prepared to incur a risk to defend it.

In addition, because of this, all states are less safe when one state is unstable. In order to combat any danger to global peace, it is necessary for all states to act together. This theory, for instance, was put to use when the P5+1 nations used the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to successfully prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran from continuing to develop its uranium enrichment programme. As a result, all economic and political sanctions that the international community had imposed on Iran were later lifted.

Globally speaking, the proliferation of conventional and non-conventional weapons poses a significant threat to the security of individuals, societies, and nations, as well as a significant barrier to long-term security and prosperity. To control the spread of conventional and non-conventional weapons around the world, the United Nations (UN), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Regional organisations, and NGOs have put in place a variety of treaties, conventions, and enforcement mechanisms.

PROLIFERATIONS OF CONVENTIONAL AND NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

States spend the majority of their financial resources on conventional weapons. Conventional weapons are also sold at the international market or delivered to other states as part of military aid programmes. Major conventional weapons transfers decreased in the early post-Cold War years, remained stable in the late 1990s, and then started to diminish once more in 2001. With about a third of the world's total arms transfers during the previous five years, the United States is the world's biggest supplier of arms. From 2004 to 2008, 78 percent of the world's armament shipments came from Russia, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (Bromley, 2009).

It is impossible to quantify the precise quantity of conventional and non-conventional weapons in use, but several sources have made estimates of both the annual production rates and potential revenue streams.

According to the "Inside Story" programme on the Aljazeera TV network, "the sale of conventional weapons is estimated to be worth \$8.5 billion dollars a year, eight million guns and other firearms are produced each year around the world, and mathematical analysis shows that more than 200,000 weapons are manufactured each day, more than 12 million ammunition are manufactured each year, and the majority of them are manufactured in the United States." Eight million firearms and other small arms



are produced each year worldwide. Only roughly a third of the 875 million small weapons in use globally are in the possession of security forces that are duly authorised (Stohl et al., 2010).

Besides, nearly 60% of all weapons in the world are in the hands of private individuals, and there are 640 million small arms in circulation worldwide, one for every ten people. At least 1,249 firms across 92 nations produce 8 million new guns annually. According to the small arms survey, sub-Saharan Africa's military spending increased by 47% in the late 1990s, while the region's life expectancy decreased from 50 to 46 years and at least one million firearms are stolen or lost worldwide each year. Additionally, more than 500,000 people are killed by small arms every year (Africa Council of Religious Leader, n.d.). Evidently, the quantity of conventional weaponry in use is really concerning. Light weapons and small arms have various benefits that facilitate their circulation and make it simple for crime-related manufacturing and trade. Small guns and light weapons have typically been characterised as having the following characteristics as distribution facilitators: cheap cost and widespread availability, ease of use and longevity, fatalities, polarity and concealability, military, police, and civilian usage, etc. Since there is little technical skill required, the manufacturing of small guns and light weapons is quite high all over the world. It is economically inexpensive to produce and inexpensive according to market theory, enabling quick and widespread expansion of both production and sales. They are lightweight and portable. This facilitates movement and occasionally allows for undefeated movement. Small guns and light weapons are utilised by the military, police, civilians, and covert groups in contrast to bigger weapons of mass destruction that are cumbersome to transport (Boutwell, 1998).

It is important to note that the production technique for this weapon has advanced over time, moving from conventional industrialised nations to developing countries like China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. The world's largest producer and exporter of weapons is still the United States. One of the contributing elements to the economic imbalance between the traditionally split Northern and Southern hemispheres is the capacity to produce and supply weaponry, whether conventional or non-conventional (Spear, 2005: 109).

Some of the technologies used in weapon development, like nuclear power reactors that produce energy instead of utilising electricity, can have substantial positive effects on society. Those already knowledgeable about how to produce them, however, typically reject to share the information in an effort to stop the spread of conventional and non-conventional production. These nations frequently see this unfavourably since they may interpret it as an effort to further sever the economic ties between some governments and deny them access to these technology (Spear, 2005: 109).

Moreover, countries that lack the ability to produce weapons are confined to the position of "buyers," whereas those who do so are in the far more advantageous position of providers.

The prevailing school of thought is that the best way to stop the further spread of conventional and non-conventional weapons is not to stop their manufacturing, but rather to make them more difficult to export. The export of both conventional and non-conventional weapons has been reduced by a number of international organisations, but the main emphasis is typically on technologies related to weapons of mass destruction and those that can be modified from conventional capabilities to be used with various kinds of weaponry. For instance, organisations, such as CoCom and the Wassenaar Arrangement, have so far had substantial restrictions, particularly those relating to governments that provide the weaponry. As a result of the reliance on the supplier nations to abide by the rules set out by these organisations, the limitation on the shipment of conventional weapons is in place. However, despite the fact that the provision of weapons is a significant economic booster, many supplier governments are reluctance to fully cooperate (Spear, 2005). (Spear, 2005: 109).

On the whole, one example of this is China's refusal to abide by the NSG's (Nuclear Supplier's Group) policies, as demonstrated by its continued sale of nuclear reactors to Iran for civilian purposes, despite its apparent intentions to join several non-proliferation organisations on a full-time basis (Davis, 1995: 602). Even if this scenario has nothing to do with the creation of conventional weapons, it does highlight the challenges faced by organisations working to stop the proliferation of weapons technologies when the supplier governments have their own objectives.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROLIFERATIONS OF CONVENTIONAL AND NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Let us state it from the onset that the United Nations does not condemn the use of conventional weapons by its member states from using conventional weapons but object to the use of non-conventional weapons. Today, the world's most lethal weapons are nuclear ones. One might conceivably murder millions of people by destroying an entire metropolis, endangering the ecosystem and the lives of generations to come as a result of its long-lasting devastating impacts. Such weapons are dangerous just by virtue of being there. Although there have only been two instances of nuclear bombs being used in combat, there are apparently still 13,080 nuclear warheads in existence today, and there have been more than 2,000 nuclear tests performed. Disarmament is the best defence against these threats, but accomplishing this objective has proven to be a very challenging task (<https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/disarmament>).

Also, important is that biological weapons spread pathogens or poisons that can injure or kill people, animals, or plants. They can be extremely infectious and fatal. Such weapons would allow diseases to cross national boundaries and might hasten their global spread. Dramatic results might result from the intentional release of biological weapons or poisons by state or non-state actors. Such occurrences might result in food shortages, environmental disasters, terrible economic loss, widespread sickness, anxiety, and public mistrust as well as to the tragic loss of life.

In World War I, both sides employed gas attacks to inflict excruciating pain and significantly increase the number of deaths on the battlefield. This marked the beginning of the current usage of chemical weapons. In essence, these weapons were just common munitions like grenades and artillery rounds that had been loaded with well-known industrial poisons. Among the chemicals employed were mustard gas, phosgene (a choking agent), and chlorine. The outcomes were random and frequently fatal. The death toll came to about 100,000. More than a million people have died worldwide as a result of chemical weapons since World War I (<https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/disarmament>).

However, weapons other than weapons of mass devastation are known as conventional armaments. They include a variety of tools, such as battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, small arms, and light weapons and ammunition among others. They are the most well-known and frequently used weapons in conflict and criminal situations.

In the recent past, a variety of wars have involved the employment of conventional weapons, with the Al Qaeda attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre in September 1999 being one of the most well-known instances (Sandler, 2005). However, this act has shown that the strength of conventional weapons, when utilized skillfully, may also be completely catastrophic (Post, 2005). There has been a general concern among Western Countries that such terrorist groups might acquire WMDs. The majority of conventional weapons now have an increasing range, giving them the capacity to inflict devastation on a global scale and giving terrorist groups very simple-to-access capabilities.

The effect that conventional weapons' presence has on how severe wars are can be used to judge their destructive capability. For many years, the African continent has been torn apart by civil conflicts, and the availability of weapons has often played a crucial role (Lujala et al 2005). The quantity and variety of weapons accessible to the opposing groups in these internal wars are correlated with death rates (Lacina, 2006). Although the fatalities of "soldiers" physically participating in these fights are expected, a frequent pattern in civil wars is more civilian mortality in confrontations where artillery or aircraft capabilities are used (Lacina, 2006).

Additionally, according to Jooji et al. (2022), the spread of small guns and light weapons into Nigeria has been sparked by arms producers and their banking system allies. They continued by saying that because of the enormous profits made from the sale of weapons and ammunition, arms producers and their financial allies will continue to encourage violent war. To this end, each act of aggression that may possibly result in war will continue to be pursued by the armaments industry and its allies in the financial system. The inference is that the entire society will suffer as long as weapons manufacturers and their financial allies continue to profit from the selling of weapons and ammunition.

One of the contributing elements to the economic difference between the historically divided northern and southern hemispheres is the capacity to supply and produce guns, whether they fall under the category of conventional weapons or those classified as Weapons of Mass Destruction. However, it is

pertinent to note that nuclear power reactors can also be used to generate energy without requiring electricity and can provide enormous advantages for the citizens. Those who already know how to make weapons, however, typically refuse to disclose their information in an effort to stop the spread of weapon manufacture (Spear, 2005).

It is important to note that the easy access to firearms and ammunition fuels crime, terror, political repression, and human misery among civilian populations. Illegal arms transfers have the potential to destabilise a whole area, facilitate the breaking of arms embargoes, and exacerbate the violation of human rights in nations that are engaged in violent war. The Sustainable Development Goals are particularly challenging to achieve in countries with active war or widespread criminality.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The proliferation of both conventional and unconventional weaponry is a dangerous issue in the contemporary world system. Due to the advancement of these technologies, modern weapons are utterly lethal, capable of great devastation and killing, and increasingly effective at great distances. As a result, missiles are more likely to be utilised in attacks on civilian targets and are more appealing to non-state actors like militant groups or terrorist groups. Conventional arms trade provides a significant economic boost, and as a result, many contributors who have access to weapons frequently engage in proliferation. States lacking the ability to produce weapons are compelled to do so since having weapons gives a nation some degree of hard power, strengthening its position as a global power. There have been several attempts throughout the years to reduce the destruction caused by these technologies, despite the multiple allures of weapon proliferation. A good example of this is the work done to make it illegal to use landmines in the Ottawa Treaty, which may be seen as an effort to lessen the destruction caused by conventional weapons. Lastly, the International Atomic Agency should work with other pertinent national and international organisations to impose penalties on nations who disobey agreements on the spread of conventional and non-conventional weapons, if needed. Lastly, The United Nations General Assembly's approval of the Arms commerce Treaty (ATT) in April 2013 signaled a turning point in the efforts of the international community to control the world's commerce in conventional weapons and advance peace and security. Hence states should adopt significant political action in the actualization.

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