COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN MANAGEMENT OF VILLAGE FUNDS IN KARO REGENCY 2015-2019

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Abstract – *This study aims to analyze the perspective of collaborative village funds management in Karo Regency. The Village Funds Policy based on Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages mandates Village Funds as a source of Village income which aims to improve the welfare of village communities. Management of village funds is a public policy that requires stakeholder collaboration and is cross-sectoral in nature to achieve its goals. A study on village funds management in Karo Regency can benefit from Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh's (2011) concept of collaborative governance. This research uses qualitative methods of data collection, including observation, interviewing, and documenting. A purposive approach was used in this study to identify informants. Data validation uses data triangulation, investigator, theoretical, and methodological. Data analysis uses data reduction, data organization, and data interpretation. Despite Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011)'s Collaborative Governance concept being fully implemented in village funds management, this study has found that the principles of participation, motivation, and capacity for joint action have not been fully implemented. This is due to the limited access to stakeholder involvement, inequality of stakeholder capacity, transactional work behavior that has not been included in the concept of Collaborative Governance theory. To complete the Collaborative Governance model of Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011) in the management of Village Funds in Karo Regency, it needs to be equipped with the dimensions of stakeholder accessibility, community political education, professional bureaucracy and Karo culture as new driving factors.*

Keywords: *collaborative governance; collaboration dynamics, village funds, Karo Ragency;*

INTRODUCTION

Village funds are one of the breakthrough government programs that aim to improve the welfare of rural communities. The Village Funds started in 2015[1]. Village funds are a step to increase regional development and increase the degree of decentralization in Indonesia. Every year, the government allocates large amounts of funds for the Village Fund Program. This allocation is used to finance various development projects in the village, such as infrastructure, health, education, agriculture, and economic improvement. Each village has the freedom to manage these funds according to village needs and priorities. Villages are also asked to involve the community in the process of planning, implementing, and monitoring funds. The existence of village funds is expected to improve welfare and empower village communities.

The flow of village funds management is basically quite complicated. From planning to accountability. The ability of the village government to manage village funds certainly has a major impact on the effectiveness of the use of village funds. The amount of funds received by each village is determined based on certain criteria, such as population size, area size, poverty level and village human development index. So, it is appropriate that the amount of village funds obtained by a village will be able to significantly affect the welfare of village communities if managed properly.

[1] Law No. 6 of 2014 concerning Village, mandates a budget allocation from the APBN to Villages which is called the Village Funds.

Management of village funds is correlated with public policy and administration. Village funds management involves various stakeholders[2] which is a form of public policy management with a collaborative approach. The concept of collaborative governance has emerged in the last two decades as a method for improving governance and public policy implementation. Literature on public administration has increasingly referred to collaborative governance (Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh, 2011:1). As a "medicine," collaborative governance is able to cure a variety of "diseases" associated with the failure to formulate and implement public policies, whether caused by politicization, budget constraints or swelling, or failures in implementing public policies (Ansell and Gash, 2007:455). Agranoff (2003:20) mentions collaborative governance as a new strategy in public management in the era of collaboration.

The existence of Collaborative Governance is caused by various driving factors, the two main factors that encourage the emergence of Collaborative Governance are "wicked problems"[3] or problems of unrest in society such as: impoverishment of education, chaos in the justice system, transportation congestion, becoming global problems such as climate change and weather problems. Solving complicated problems is indeed a little difficult for a particular organization to solve them independently, it takes the involvement of many parties to collaborate with each other so that complex problems can be resolved completely. The second driving factor is the increasing complexity in the governance context. The complexity of the problems in society demands a more effective and efficient change of government (Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh, 2011: 3-7). The Industrial Revolution 4.0 also pushed for a shift in the role of government and encouraged the involvement of actors outside the government (Schwab, 2016).

This study aims to analyze the process of the dynamics of collaboration in the management of Village Funds, especially the planning, implementation and monitoring stages in Karo Regency. This research will reveal the dynamics of collaboration which includes multistakeholder involvement, the underlying motivation for multistakeholders participating in the collaboration process and the capacity of multistakeholders to take joint action.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1 Collaborative Governance Concept and Framework

Strengthening public participation in governance is in line with the development of democratic values which gave birth to the paradigm of good governance, dynamic governance, and collaborative governance. In Kooiman's view (1991:1), these three phenomena are a response to public dissatisfaction with the role of the government and the market which continue to experience *tug-of-war* in battling the influence of each bunker on people's lives. Minogue, Polidano and Hulme (1998:8) stated that people want their rights to be protected, their voices heard, and their values and desires respected.

Van Buuren and Edelenbos (2007) claim that collaborative governance is a reaction to top-down planning and decision-making in line with Kooiman (1991), Minogue, Polidano and Hulme (1998). As stated by Van Buuren and Edelenbos (2007:105):

"*An alternative to traditional planning and policy-making approaches that emphasize government over citizens, are largely technocratic oriented, and are adversarial in nature*".

Furthermore, Van Buuren and Edelanbos (2007:105) suggest that there are 4 (four) advantages of a collaborative governance approach in solving complex problems in planning and decision-making processes, there are 1) Acceleration of policy process, 2) More flexible policies better suited to changed circumstances, 3) Providing various alternatives (enrichment) in solutions, and 4) Enhancing democratic legitimacy.

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[2] Various stakeholders involved in managing village funds include: Local Government, especially the Community and Village Empowerment Services, Subdistricts, Inspectorate, Village Government and BPD, Attorney and Police, Non-Governmental Organizations, Mass Media and Academics.

[3] The Wicked Problem refers to public problems that are difficult or impossible to solve when the government sector works alone.

Public Administration has adopted collaborative governance as a general term, although collaborative governance is still defined in different ways and used inconsistently. Cooperative governance can also be described as collaborative public management, multi-partner governance, network governance, and hybrid sectoral arrangements, as well as co- management regimes, participatory governance, and civic engagement (Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh: 2011:2). Smith (2012:29), for example, argues that collaborative governance is collaboration that involves representation by key interest groups. A collaborative governance approach is proposed by Booher (2006:8) as a means of representing all relevant interests. Government agencies and concerned citizens work together to solve problems through collaborative efforts, according to Reilly (2001:53).

According to Emerson et al (2011:2), collaborative governance is:

“A process of public policy decision making and management that involves people in constructive ways across the boundaries of government agencies, levels of government, and/or public, private, and civic spheres to accomplish a public purpose that cannot otherwise be accomplished”.

This definition shows that collaborative governance is not limited to the government domain, but also involves stakeholders outside the government in the process of policy making and management of policies. Collaborative governance is a process of multipartner governance. The trend of involving non-government actors in collaborative governance is in line with Schwab's views on the Industrial Revolution 4.0. Schwab (2016) stated that the impact of the Industrial Revolution 4.0 on the government sector was a shift in the role of non-state actors (government) in administering government. Schwab (2016: 66) states: *".....Governments must adapt to the fact that power is also shifting from state to non-state actors.....".*

Ansell and Gash (2007:2) defined collaborative governance as follows:

“It involves one or more public agencies directly engaging non-state stakeholders in an informal, consensus-based, and deliberative decision-making process with the aim of making or implementing public policy or managing public assets”.

Based on Ansell and Gash's (2008: 544) collaborative governance process, there are six important criteria. 1) government agencies initiate it, 2) nongovernmental organizations participate in it, 3) participants are directly involved in decision-making decisions, not just "consulted" by government agencies, 4) formal organizations, 5) forums where decisions are reached by consensus, and 6) the focus of collaboration is policy and public service issues. Emerson and Nabatchi's (2015) study in the Collaborative Governance Regime expands the view of collaboration as a system that interacts with the wider environment. Collaborative governance is based on system contexts such as resources, policy and legal frameworks, politics, and power condition. Collaboration drivers such as leadership, incentive consequences, interdependence, and uncertainty will drive the dynamics of collaboration (dynamic collaboration). A collaborative relationship is characterized by principled engagement, shared motivation, and capacity for action collectively.

1.2 Village and Village Funds Policy

The words "desa/village", "hamlet", "*desi*" come from the Sanskrit language "*swa-desi*" which means homeland, hometown, birthplace (Kartohadikoesoemo, 1984:15). In general, a village is world-wide and consists of a small community that resides (permanently) in a particular locality, fulfilling their needs and living in a certain area. From various literature on the history of village development, as presented by Wasistiono (2014), Nurcholis (2011), Maschab (2013), Zakaria (2000) Suhartono (2000), Koentjaraningrat (1984), Husken (1998), Widjaja (1996) can be traced regarding village arrangements from time after time. During the colonial period of the Dutch East Indies, villages on the Java and Madura Island were regulated through the *Inlandsche Gemeente Ordonantie* (IGO). Meanwhile the *Inlandsche Gemeente Ordonantie Buitengewesten* (IGOB)[4] is used for villages outside Java and Madura Island. In the early days of independence, village regulation was made through Law No. 22 of 1948 which was later refined by Law No. 22 of 1948. In 1957, Law No. 1 of 1957

[4] IGO Inlandsche Gemeente Ordonanntie 1906 (IGO 1906) and IGOB Inlandsche Gemeente Ordonanntie Buitengewesten 1938 (IGOB 1938) is a Village arrangement during the Dutch colonial period in Indonesia.

concerning Principles of Regional Government which makes the Village to Level III Region. Village regulations continued with the issuance of Law No. 19 of 1965 concerning Villages (*Desapraja*), as a transitional form to accelerate the establishment of Level III Regions throughout Indonesia, although this policy was not implemented due to the political situation in 1965.

During the New Order era, village arrangements were regulated through Law No. 5 of 1979 concerning Village Administration. Then during the 1999 reform period, Village arrangements were regulated as part of regional government through Law No. 22 of 1999 concerning Regional Government, which was later replaced by Law No. 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government. In Law No. 22 of 1999 and Law No. 32 of 2004, the village defined to be part of Regional Government. A change in this condition has occurred since the passing of Law No. 6 of 2014[5] concerning villages. As stated in the 1945 Constitution, chapter 18B point (2) lays the groundwork for this regulation.

"Until they cease to exist and as long as their rights are recognized and respected, the state recognizes and respects customary law community units and their traditional rights".

The village is the spearhead of community development and welfare, according to Law 6 of 2014[6]. A village's authority is recognized, and funds are provided so that it can manage its potential for improving its people's welfare. Government Regulation No. (PP) No. governing the Village Funds as a source of village income is one of the fundamental changes to the Village Law, which is regulated by the State Budget (APBN). The village funds derived from the APBN are governed by PP No. 8 of 2016 as amended by PP No. 60 of 2014. Cite from (Suwaryo, 2010) there are several matters that must be considered regarding village decentralization. There are at least 3 things that indicate that village autonomy is really running. these are:

1. Political decentralization (devolution) in the form of delegation of authority and power from the state to the villages
2. Decentralization of development in which villages must be independent in determining their regional development needs (local self-planning), not just bottom-up planning.
3. Decentralization of finance, namely the transfer of funds from the state to villages directly which are used to meet village development needs

In Sutoro's view (2015: 41), this Village Funds policy is a redistribution of the economy in the form of funds from the APBN. Furthermore Sutoro (2015: 41) states that: "...Village Funds are the redistribution of state money to villages which is a resolution to solve socio-economic injustice due to intervention, exploitation and marginalization by the state". Irawan (2017) mentions the Village Funds policy as a form of affirmative policy that specifically provides recognition for the Village (recognition) and increasing the authority of the village government (subsidiarity). Village income is derived from APBN transfer budget allocations, and the Village Funds is used for Village activities to enhance the welfare of the Village community. Through Village Funds, public services are improved in villages, poverty is alleviated, the village economy is advanced, gaps between villages are bridged, and rural communities are strengthened as subjects of development.

In its management, the Village Funds is not only dominated by the village government but also involves non-government actors. In the development planning process, there are several drafting teams who are members of hamlet forums, village meetings and village development planning meetings. This stage was also attended by several representatives from the village community. The level of community participation in village development planning, based on their abilities and power, can be categorized into three groups, there are active participation, partial participation and do not participate (Setiawan, Suwaryo, & Rahmatunnisa, 2020) because on collaboration there are shared power among capability and capacity of each stakeholder to solve the problem (Raharja, 2010). To implement Cash-For-Work (PKT), a policy was developed in the village in which village funds were used to prioritize community involvement. Furthermore, supervision of the Village Funds uses is not only carried out internally by the local government, but also involves law enforcement officials. In addition, community empowerment also involves village assistants from outside the government.

2. RESEARCH METHODS

Researchers in Karo Regency use qualitative methods for research on collaborative governance and village funds. A collaborative governance model was chosen to investigate the meaning of collaborative governance in the management of village funds. This is based on the opinions of Creswell (2009), Ritchie and Lewis (2003) and Denzin and Lincoln (2003), that qualitative research is research that aims to analyze in depth a phenomenon or case related to the focus of research that is explored in the field.

Furthermore, Creswell (2009) suggests that qualitative research is conducted to: 1) Explore certain meanings, 2) Understand and explore the context, 3) Identify unanticipated phenomena, 4) Understand the processes that occur behind the phenomena, 5) Building causal explanations (caused explanations), and 6) Describing patterns. Based on those six considerations, this qualitative research is formed and used to reveal the depth phenomenon of Village Funds management in Karo Regency in 2015-2019 on collaborative governance perspective. This research is exploratory research, which tries to dig the data deeply and expose what is obtained in the field such as information, opinions, ideas, attitudes, and actions from informants. The informant determination in this study was determined by a purposive sampling technique, it is selecting the informants with the specific aim for revealing the views of the actors involved in managing village funds in Karo Regency. Regarding data validation, triangulation was used, namely data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theoretical triangulation, and methodological triangulation. Data analysis in this study was carried out using the stages of data reduction, data organization, and data interpretation.

3. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Management of Village Funds in Karo Regency

Village Funds Management is part of Village financial management which includes the stages of planning, implementing, administering, reporting and accountability. At the planning stage for the use of Village Funds, an informant from Village Head Organizations (*Papdesi*) said that Village Funds uses planning had been carried out according to the stages stipulated in the existing regulations and had also involved the Village community. The local government, both from the Village Community Empowerment Service (Dinas PMD) and the Sub-District delegation, stated the same thing, where the two Regional Organizations also helped in preparing village development plans.

Based on PP No. 43/2015 concerning Regulations for Implementing Law No. 6/2014 concerning Villages, in particular article 128 which regulates village assistance by Regional Work Units (SKPD), the government and regional governments organize village community development with tiered assistance. The assistance provided by SKPD can be assisted by professional/expert assistants, village community empowerment cadres, and/or third parties. The sub-district head or other designation coordinates village community assistance in their area. Professional assistants have the duties and functions of overseeing the distribution of village funds in terms of facilitating the village government, Village Consultancy Agency (BPD) and village communities in preparing the Village Midterm Development Planning Process (RPJMDesa) and Plan for Village-Level Development (RKPDesa), managing the remaining Village Funds in the Village Cash Account (RKD). Apart from that, it also facilitates the village government and BPD in compiling Village Government Budget (APBDesa), compiling reports on the use of Village Funds, submitting proposals for Distribution of Village Funds from the Regional General Cash Account (RKUD) to the Village Cash Account (RKD). Professional assistants are also tasked with assisting district/city SKPDs in compiling reports on the realization of channeling and consolidating the use of Village Funds.

The existence of these village assistants is felt necessary considering the mean capacity and capability of village human resources is still low, so it is feared that will be many obstacles in implementing the Village Funds use. The village assistants on Karo Regency are as follows: 6 experts, 21 village assistants, 32 village field assistants, 17 technical village assistants. By the number of village assistants, it is considered sufficient to assist 259 villages in 17 districts.

At the planning stage, informants from Yapidi saw that the community and village government were not ready to plan the use of the Village Funds. Yapidi saw it as if the BPD did not know their duties and functions, even though some BPD were subordinate to the village head, so they followed whatever the village head was doing. Informants from village assistants saw that village development planning was still limited to a formality. Indeed, the existing stages were followed and included the community, in fact, especially in the early days of the Village Funds, many village development plans were made by the sub-district, or "consultant" from the PMD official, commonly called as "catering".

Looking at the documents presented by each village, especially the Village Midterm Development Planning Process (RPJMDesa), Plan for Village-Level Development (RKPDesa) and Village Government Budget (APBDes), there is a strong impression that the participatory process mandated at the planning stage has not done well. The planning documents presented by most of the villages still have the same narrative, the presentation of the Village Government Budget (APBDesa) structure, even the names of some villages have not been changed even though the signing of the document has been done by a different Village Head and/or BPD. Analysis of this document confirms the statement of a research informant who stated that most of the village planning and budgeting documents were "catered".

When the planning stage has been carried out by other people who are not actively involved in the collaborative mechanism, the same thing also happens at the implementation stage. The Village Head and Village Treasurer, as the main person managing village finances (specifically the Village Fund) carry out their duties by an "operator" or "consultant" help who appoint by them or whose offer themselves. The financial transaction process continues to follow the formal procedure line as mandated by the applicable village financial management rules, but financial administration is made by certain people who don't even follow the financial management process at all. This condition indicates that there are inconsistencies in various financial management documents, including: purchases of goods that are not contained in the Budget Plan (RAB) or Village Government Budget (APBDes) documents, implementation of transactions that are not supported by valid and accountable evidence.

As an illustration, during the 2015-2019 period, violations of Village Funds in Karo Regency which were processed by law and decided by courts totaled 3 (three) cases, namely: former Head of Kuta Tonggal Village, Namanteran District, former Head of Tanjungpulo Village, Tiganderket District, former Head of Suka Village Nalu, Namanteran District. From the percentage level, 3 of the 259 villages in Karo Regency are relatively small, namely 1.15%. This broke the concerns of various parties at the start of the Village Funds, where it was feared that many village heads would have problems managing the Village Funds. The financial management audit of local government, according to 4 criteria, 1) compliance with government accounting standards; 2) full disclosure; 3) compliance with laws and regulations, and 4) the effectiveness of the internal control system (Rahmatunnisa, 2016).

However, on the other hand, the low level of violations against the law on the management of Village Funds in Karo Regency is not a guarantee that the management of Village Funds has been running very well. This was stated by the Secretary of the Inspectorate of Karo district:

"The percentage is indeed low, only 3 out of 259 ex-village heads who were convicted by the courts. Does this show that we, as village supervisors, including the Village Community Empowerment Service, and also the District, have carried out our duties properly, or is there something behind this?. Because in fact there have been a lot of complaints from the community about violations of this Village Fund. Indeed, people report verbally, and this is an obstacle for us to process the report further. The Karo people have strong kinship, in that village there must be a family kinship relationship with the village head, so they are reluctant to report. Don't let there be "negative collaboration" in the village."

The various views raised throughout this research indicate a tendency that stakeholders do not fully view the village as an entity that has limitations, historical uniqueness, and a locus for most of our society. The limitation of a complete perspective on the village and its consequences in the management of the Village Funds only has implications that it is easy for us to blame the village when fraud and/or mismanagement of village funds occur. Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) reports that village funds have been corrupted more frequently during the years 2015-2018. From 2015 to now, the government has disbursed 186 trillion IDR in village funds, according to ICW data released at the end of November 2018. Indonesian villages have received 74,954 of these funds. 184 corruption suspects have been arrested and IDR 40.6 billion has been lost because of village fund corruption. It was reported that 17 cases occurred in 2015. A total of 41 cases were reported in the second year. A total of 96 cases of corruption in village funds were reported in 2017.[5]

The problem of corruption in village funds has been approached instrumentally by using the Village Financial System (Siskeudes)[6] application since the end of 2015. The application is expected to make village financial governance more effective, efficient, and accountable. BPKP noted, the number of villages using the Siskeudes application version 2.0 as of March 22, 2019, had only reached 37,086 villages, or 49.48 percent of the total villages which reached 74,957. However, for the Siskeudes application version 1.0, up to December 31, 2018, it has been used in 70,094 villages, or 93.51 percent of the 74,957 total villages. The quality of stakeholder collaboration which is the source of the problem turns out to be approached by introducing very technocratic applications. This also confirms the existence of competency gaps that facilitate the practice of "technical brokering" of village funds management, whether in the form of "catering" to chartered operators or even officials/staff at the sub-district level or the PMD Service in the district.

3.2 Collaborative Dynamics of Village Funds Management in Karo Regency

Dynamics of collaboration in the management of Village Funds in Karo Regency sequentially starting from the dimensions of principled engagement, shared motivation, capacity for joint action and drivers, collaborative governance regime, system context surrounding the adoption process and the results of the dynamics of collaboration with the concept of collaborative governance. As far as research process, the collaborative dynamics of managing Village Funds in Karo Regency still does not reflect a principled engagement. Stakeholders have not been involved together since the beginning in managing the Village Funds. Regional governments and village governments still have a very dominant role, so there is no equal impact between stakeholders in the collaboration process. Equality of influence is an absolute requirement for collaboration, which prioritizes function, not structure.

Several empirical phenomena in the field that reveal the difficulty of engaging with principles can be described as follows. First, the asymmetry of interests. These symptoms can be seen from the results of interviews and field observations, especially stakeholders from internal local government circles and external government circles. Internally, the government tends to adhere to the principles of orderly administration, digital-based governance, and refrain from fraud in order to avoid legal problems. However, more specifically within the internal government itself, there are still those who have the principle that the limited competence of village fund managers is an opportunity to sell influence, offer document processing services or carry out practices that are not commendable to intimidate or take advantage of administrative errors as an entry point for unfair working relationships. transactional.

Second, information asymmetry. When the interests of the actors involved in the management of village funds are not congruent, the next consequence is the condition of information asymmetry. Parties who control information, especially related to village funds, such as sets of regulations, technical guidelines/guidelines for using village finance applications, financial transaction systems use the information they have as bargaining power. This phenomenon can be found, for example, in the preparation of reports and the process of auditing village financial reports which are carried out simultaneously with regional financial reports. If the main official of the Village Head, Village

[5] https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2022/04/19/icw-kasus-korupsi-terbanyak-terjadi-di-sektor-anggaran-dana-desa-pada-2021; https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2019/11/16/163922565/sepanjang-2015-2018-icw-catat-ada-252-kasus-korupsi-di-desa?page=all

[6] The application developed by the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency (BPKP) and the Ministry of Home Affairs, 2015

Treasurer, technically confirmed Activity Implementation Team (TPK) generally directs that technical information be requested to the village funds operator.

Third, village bureaucratization. Since the introduction of the village fund policy, which is directly transferred to the RKUDes, villages as part of the State/regional financial management regime are treated the same as Regional/Regional Government Work Units to compile planning documents, budgets, and financial reports. An excessive demand, village government entities that have been marginal and far from the hustle and bustle of the government bureaucracy, are now preoccupied with administrative techniques, financial application instruments and the formalization of forms of village democracy as guided deliberation forums.

The second dimension of the dynamics of collaboration is shared motivation of stakeholders in the management of Village Funds in Karo Regency. In this section, it will be seen to what extent interpersonal elements or social capital between stakeholders can be built. There are four elements that will be described, namely: building a shared spirit for mutual trust, mutual understanding, internal legitimacy, and strong commitment (development of trust, mutual understanding, internal legitimacy, and commitment). Trust is an important part of collaborative governance, this trust will be built through transparency, accountability, active involvement of all parties, and respect for differences.

Regarding the management of Village Funds in Karo Regency 2015-2019, stakeholders gave various responses. As stated by the informant, the management of the Village Funds should be a collective agreement, even though there are still deficiencies and limitations, this is understandable and becomes material for evaluation in the future. As a collective agreement, the consequence is that all Village Fund management activities must be directed to the existing plan or agreement.

Informants from the PJTK stated that since the beginning of the management of the Village Funds, there was no spirit of mutual trust, on the contrary, there was suspicion, as stated:

"We actually have a social control function in managing this Village Fund, we also have a moral obligation to participate, contribute to monitoring, so that what is the goal of this Village Fund can be achieved for the welfare of the community, but our existence is often suspected only for certain interests, We also do not deny that there are individuals who take advantage of opportunities for individual interests that are pragmatic in nature." Media tries to intimidate the village government, especially its head if he or she makes mistakes, according to the village government.

Other informants argued that the Village Funds management process should have shared motivation in the sense of having the same vision to build a better Karo Regency in the future, starting from the village. However, in practice, each stakeholder has different views and concepts depending on the knowledge, experience, and issues as far as their knowledge.

The final dimension of the dynamics of collaboration relates to the capacity for joint action between stakeholders in the management of Village Funds in Karo Regency. In this section, it will be seen to what extent joint action is formed that considers the capabilities, leadership and resources possessed by each stakeholder to be synergized through a procedure that is mutually understood to produce a power that cannot be generated if only the stakeholders themselves do it.

In contrast to the two previous dimensions which are more non-physical in nature, in this dimension the form is seen in a more real way. This means that what is built in the process of principled engagement and shared motivation is concretized in the form of actions that can be felt and seen with the naked eye. There are four elements explained, namely the procedure for uniting institutionalized actions, leadership, knowledge, and resources (procedural institutional arrangement, leadership, knowledge, and resources). First, the procedure for unification of actions that has been institutionalized has been accommodated in all stages of managing village funds, especially in deliberations on the preparation, budgeting, implementation, and supervision. The inclusive institutional model, participatory governance and the various support teams that were formed were intended for all stakeholders to take part from upstream to downstream. However, resource imbalances, information asymmetry (information asymmetry), interest asymmetry contribute to the distortion of stakeholder actions.

Second, leadership at all levels and community members. At the village level, of course, the leadership of the village head is very decisive as a node for all levels of the community, be it hamlets, neighborhoods or RT/RW. Leadership at the village level is basically also known as collective leadership through the BPD institution, the hamlet head who is the representative of the community in formulating policies, implementing, and supervising implementation. However, bureaucratization and differences in interests distort the construction of leadership in the village to become segregated between elected officials (Village Heads) and those appointed (BPD and/or Hamlet Heads). This conflict becomes a latent conflict at least for the next election period. This is a form of latent conflict which is a weakness of participatory democracy carried out at the village level in a communal setting that is not used to contesting.

Third, knowledge of village funds. The capacity of stakeholders to know all the rules, mechanisms and governance of village funds also determines joint action. When the knowledge about the substance of managing village funds is not the same, collaboration is difficult because there is no unified basis for thinking and acting between stakeholders. When someone is expected to be involved in an issue with very minimal knowledge of this, of course it is difficult to produce actions that are in line with other established actors in the entire series of activities. Village funds are also subject to this problem, especially when the internal village government actors do not all know the same mechanisms and substance, let alone responsibilities and duties. Moreover, with the tendency of "catering" practices for all administrative, technical and village financial accountability work, it is difficult to expect the same knowledge capacity among village stakeholders.

Fourth, the resources of village funds management actors are also unequal. When resources are unequal, it is also difficult for stakeholders to take joint action because the power to contribute or as beneficiaries will not be the same. As an illustration, the physical work in the village is generally handled by residents who have more financial capacity or are used to having connections with employers/providing partners. For other residents with limited financial capacity, they will generally become workers in every physical activity funded from village funds in their area. With a very different construction of community resources, the initial intention of village funds to drive the village economy has not been fully realized in the practice of administering village governance.

3.3 Drivers of Dynamic Collaboration

The ongoing dynamics of collaboration which involve the dimensions of principled involvement, shared motivation, and capacity to take collective action, are driven by 4 (four) factors, namely leadership, incentive consequences expected by stakeholders, interdependence between stakeholders and uncertainty (leadership, consequential incentives, interdependence, and uncertainty). As a driving factor, these four things can accelerate the process of collaboration so that their role can be as a catalyst, dynamist and creating conditions. As a catalyst, it becomes a bridge that can respond to stakeholder reactions. The role of the dynamist is to provide impetus to make the collaboration process stronger, and as a role to create conditions trying to maintain situations that allow the collaboration process to run quickly. The dynamics of collaboration taking place at the village level, especially in the management of village funds, according to the results of observations, interviews and study of documents that were obtained during the research can be sorted as follows. 1) Leadership, 2) Consequential Incentives, 3) Interdependences, 4) Uncertainty, 5) Political Education of Society, 6) Professional Bureaucracy, and 7) Culture.

3.4 Theatrical Collaboration: A Village Funds Management Model in Karo Regency

The theatrical collaboration intended from the results of this study illustrates that all mechanisms and processes for managing village finances, especially village funds, can indeed be observed on the surface taking place procedurally the same as the rung tradition (resident deliberation) in the karo custom which is limited to a ritual so that the party can take place. Likewise, collaboration in managing village funds is carried out theatrically. Beautiful to look at, but only limited to rituals and far from the substantial quality that is the hope of all stakeholders.

Why the theatrical collaboration model can take place in the context of village funds management can at least be observed from ecosystems that are not yet supportive, historical contexts and Karo cultural customs which prioritize harmony and resource capacity as well as unequal power relations between stakeholders. Why is it called theatrical or theater? It is borrowed the term of Geertz (1980) because the presentation of the collaboration that is presented is quite interesting but does not take place according to actual reality. The dynamics of collaborative governance is more interpreted as an entertaining spectacle rather than carried out substantially by improving the quality of governance, inclusive institutions, equality of resources and capacity of stakeholders.

3.5 Alternative Models and Prerequisites for Success

To improve the collaborative governance model that is able to uncover empirical facts about village funds management in Karo Regency, it is recommended that in the context of adding cultural aspects, especially the kinship traditions of residents, it becomes one of the factors considered, and the driving factor is added the aspect of representation so that no one feels left out. in collaborative dynamics. In addition to perfecting the model, several prerequisites in supporting the successful implementation of collaborative governance at the village level, especially for village funds management policy issues, need to fulfill the following matters.

First, the matching of stakeholders which provides space for the representation of all role models is not only limited to the actors required in government, but sources for these figures can also be taken from clergy and traditional leaders who do have roots in the community and are not appointed by the government. The existence of these role models at least provides space for collaboration for marginal parties who are reluctant to voice their interests and aspirations.

Second, a joint framework that contains all indicators of success and can be monitored for fulfillment in all stages has been carried out collaboratively. This framework model can be made manually or computerized which contains all historical traces of stakeholders' aspirations to create mutual trust as well as a forum for corrections if there are inconsistencies from stakeholders.

Third, changing the culture of transactional work to become professional, starting with government sector stakeholders to provide sufficient confidence to actors outside the government that the collaboration to be built is not just an annual ritual but substantial collaboration for the common good. Central figures such as Regional Heads, Village Heads, Government Officials, and law enforcement officials should be role models and pioneers of this collaborative movement so that other actors can see a strong commitment from the government.

CONCLUSION

Referring to the discussion of the village funds management process in Karo Regencyin terms of collaborative governance theory, it can be concluded that the following matters can be concluded: Village Funds Management in the perspective of collaborative governance in Karo Regency in 2015-2019 has not run substantially optimally. This is caused by access to limited stakeholder involvement. As a result, the management of Village Funds has not become a commitment, responsibility, motivation and joint action of multi stakeholders. Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh's collaborative governance model in managing Village Funds in Karo Regency needs to add the dimensions of accessibility, community political education, professional bureaucracy and Karo culture as new driving factors. Additional dimensions and new driving factors are solutions for more participatory Village Funds management practices in Karo Regency. Some of the things that are recommended are that it is necessary to provide access to wider involvement of stakeholders, so that the management of Village Funds in Karo Regency from a Collaborative government perspective is more optimal. It is necessary to add the factors of community political education, professional bureaucracy, and Karo Culture to the Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh's collaborative government model in the context of collaborative governance in managing Village Funds in Karo Regency.

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