

INDIA AND THE QUAD: OPPORTUNE GEOPOLITICS OR INCONSEQUENTIAL COOPERATION?

RENUKA RAMACHANDRAN¹, RICHA DWIVEDI², ABHINAV SHRIVASTAVA^{3*}

¹Student, Symbiosis Law School, (SLS)

²Assistant Professor, Symbiosis Law School, (SLS)

^{3*}Assistant Professor, Symbiosis Law School, (SLS)

Symbiosis International (Deemed University), Pune

Vimannagar, Pune, Maharashtra, India

Email Id: abhinavshrivastava1992@hotmail.com

Abstract

The tragic death of Shinzo Abe and the inception of the Maiden West Asian QUAD, the recent rollout of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), and the 'Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific' and the QUAD's recent announcement of an extension of 50 Billion USD to bridge infrastructural lacunae and debt obligations in the Indo-Pacific have all pummelled the diplomatic alliance under the limelight and back into the microscopic scrutiny of scholars, political thinkers and strategists. Having displayed exceptional collaborative results in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, the QUAD is seen reorganising itself, with more structure, a concrete goal, defined ambitions and convergent interests.

The alliance, growing in determination, resources and effectiveness has been criticised by being equated to an Asian NATO by a disgruntled China, whose Belt and Road Initiative is being systematically undone and countered by the QUAD and their strategic policies, be it Indo-Pacific monitoring or a competitive module of vaccine diplomacy. However, despite diligent and extensive contribution in the QUAD's undertakings, India has been termed 'the weakest link' in the QUAD.

The purpose of this paper is to understand and analyse whether the QUAD is the future or past of regional geopolitics—whether it has the will, resources, and strength to spearhead international action and cooperation in the pursuit of its agendas—and where the balance of interest lies in India's membership in the QUAD.

Keywords: India, QUAD, crisis management, geopolitics, global administration.

Table of Contents

Introduction

1. QUAD and Geopolitics
2. India's Balance of Interest
3. Balancing Parallel Diplomatic Alliances
4. The QUAD and Crisis Management- Vaccine Diplomacy
5. Divergence Of Interests- India and the QUAD
6. Suggestions

Conclusion

INTRODUCTION

Recently revived in 2017, The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) or Shinzo Abe's 'arc of freedom and prosperity' held its first formal summit in 2021. The diplomatic network of Japan, Australia, India, and The United States of America, often referred to as the 'democratic security diamond' seeks to ensure a free Indo-Pacific, driven by unbridled forces of market economy, free from the clutches of manipulative and dilatory politics and prospective unwarranted military action, usurpation and dominance. The ulterior objective of the QUAD remains to promote international law-based order. This again was highlighted during the recently concluded QUAD dialogue in Japan. The joint statement



focused on “rules-based order rooted in international law” to promote and nourish international peace and cooperation¹.

Despite harbouring an anti-China subtext, the QUAD aims to engage collaborative efforts in the avenues of development, crisis management, climate change, technology, and chain management, among others. Upholding the principles of freedom of navigation and overflight, rule of law, peaceful and effective dispute resolution and territorial integrity, the QUAD, in their recent joint statement, reaffirmed their objective of establishing and maintaining international security and an ‘open rules-based order’ in the Indo-Pacific.

The tragic death of Shinzo Abe and the inception of the Maiden West Asian QUAD, the recent rollout of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), and the ‘Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific’ and the QUAD’s recent announcement of an extension of 50 Billion USD to bridge infrastructural lacunae and debt obligations in the Indo-Pacific have all pummelled the diplomatic alliance under the limelight and back into the microscopic scrutiny of scholars, political thinkers and strategists. Having displayed exceptional collaborative results in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, the QUAD is seen reorganising itself, with more structure, a concrete goal, defined ambitions and convergent interests.

The alliance, growing in determination, resources and effectiveness has been criticised by being equated to an Asian NATO by a disgruntled China, whose Belt and Road Initiative is being systematically undone and countered by the QUAD and their strategic policies, be it Indo-Pacific monitoring or a competitive module of vaccine diplomacy.

The paper seeks to understand and analyse whether the QUAD is the future or past of regional geopolitics- whether it holds the will, resources, and strength to spearhead international action and cooperation based on international law in furtherance of its agendas, where the balance of interest lies in India’s QUAD membership. The paper highlights the effectiveness of QUAD in leading the regional geopolitics amidst players like ASEAN, BRICS in the Indo pacific. The paper also discusses whether the QUAD is the future of Indo-Pacific geopolitical administration and strategy or the past of a relief and reconstruction assemblage.

1. QUAD and Geopolitics

The Indo-Pacific region accounts for 65% of the world’s population, 63% of the global GDP, 46% of the world’s merchandise trade and around 50% of the global maritime trade, and is therefore a pivotal geography in influencing and insulating, both, factor and product markets in the global economy. The QUAD countries in themselves make up for about 52.67% of the global GDP (India- 22%, USA- 23.93%, Japan- 5.24%, Australia-1.5%). In terms of economic size and degree of development, the Indo-Pacific area is extraordinarily heterogeneous, with substantial variances in security establishments and resources. India has been an active member in processes such as the *Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)*, the *East Asia Summit*, and the *ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus* in order to leverage its position in this continental cluster.

Indian foreign policy with respect to the Indo-Pacific represents the demonstrated manifestation of three key strategic objectives². These include safeguarding republic sovereignty and territorial integrity, the successful completion of the nascent “20th Century Nation-Building project” and transitioning into a ‘leading power’ as opposed to a ‘balancing power’ in the midst of a multipolar geopolitical milieu. While India enjoys almost parity with its QUAD counterparts across parameters like Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and defence potential, it displays precarious performance in developmental metrics of GDP per capita, economic size and efficacy³.

¹ D. R Chaoudhary, *India emphasizes international law in Quad joint statement, (2021) The Economic Times.*

² S. Lalwani, *Reluctant link?: India, the QUAD, and the free and open indo-pacific, mind the gap: national views of the free and open indo-pacific, (2019) 27 German Marshall fund of the United States.*

³ M. Beckley, *Unrivaled: why America will remain the world’s sole superpower, (Cornell university press, 2018).*



These diverse statistical differences in intranational capacities within the QUAD lay the foundation for contradicting interests, priorities, and commitments within the diplomatic alliance.

Collaboration among the Quad countries should not be based solely on economic considerations. There is a delicate line between economics and security at times. When the question arises as to whether the Quad should coordinate, say, on technological development or investor screening, the answer is in the affirmative. However, it can't be about competing better with China in the market. The focus should be solely on reducing immediate security risks. The Quad is not about constructing proprietary supply chains, trading blocs, or national economies. Such remedies would simply exacerbate the illnesses brought on by China's market manipulations⁴.

2. India's Balance of Interest

India's adoption of the 'Rules-Based Order' (RBO) was catalysed by three pivotal occurrences⁵. The first was a paradigm shift in the Indian approach to foreign policy from Nehruvian dogmas of strategic autonomy and non-alignment to a more standardised and proactive stance. The second is India's cognizance and acknowledgement of the exigent desideratum of a more aggressive deportment or position against 'the Red Dragon' and the third development was India's active membership and involvement in transnational treaty agreements to highlight its presence among global leaders and supplement its own undertakings in defence, diplomacy, infrastructure, etc⁶.

India's speech at the Shangri-La dialogue recapitulates the fact that despite dissimilitude in the understanding of RBO among countries, India solemnly seeks to unify collective efforts of "all nations in this geography as also others beyond who have a stake in it"⁷ in revamping and reorganising an "unwavering commitment to realise a peaceful, open, equitable, stable and rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond"⁸.

India's membership to the QUAD has proposed a juxtaposition of national interest within an international bloc of regional cooperation and diplomatic balancing of policies and priorities in order to avoid conflict in parallel regional cooperation alliances with diametric interests.

As a QUAD member, India may leverage this position to secure a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council, upgrade its defence manufacturing technology, become a major blue economy, be party to more FTAs, improve transboundary economic cooperation and even assume leadership in a post-pandemic world. The QUAD proposes a shift in the fulcrum of geopolitics and the balance of power in the global order and offers protection against the hegemonistic tendencies of strong countries.

*Pant and Mattoo*⁹ discusses India's military vantage as a consequence of the QUAD. India has now signed an information-sharing and logistics support agreement with Australia and the two countries have participated in exercises like AUSINDEX and AUSTRA HIND in the wake of their defence and maritime security dialogues. Japan and India have undertaken collaborative military exercises like the JIMEX and Dharma Guardian and have entered into agreements on mutual fulfilment of services and supplies along with the signage of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).

Lastly, India and the USA have also engaged in entrenching defence collaborations via the GSOMIA, the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), etc., in consonance with military exercises like YUSH ABHYAS, Tiger TRIUMPH, etc. This will allow India to upgrade its defence manufacturing, strategy, and

⁴H.L Thu, *QUAD 2.0: New perspectives for the revived concept: views from the strategist*, (2019) Australian strategic policy institute.

⁵I.Hall, *Modi and the reinvention of Indian foreign policy* (Bristol university press, 2019).

⁶I.Hall, *India and regional rules-based order: equity and inclusion*, (2020) 16 *Security Challenges* 3.

⁷Prime Minister's keynote address at Shangri la dialogue.

⁸*Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership: Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World*, (2015), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

⁹H.V. Pant and S. Mattoo, Eds., *The Rise and Rise of the 'Quad': Setting an Agenda for India*, (2021) ORF Special Report No. 161, Observer Research Foundation.



intelligence structure. Membership to the QUAD will make India a preferred investment destination, more so after India's display of 'Vaccine Maitri' during the Covid-19 pandemic.

*Abhijit Singh*¹⁰ opined that QUAD participation in the Indian Ocean would undoubtedly be beneficial in fostering cooperative habits with friendly naval countries. The Indian navy must aim to expand its involvement with the navies of Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, not only to improve interoperability, but also to obtain important strategic technology. However, India's navy leaders must recognise the benefits of maritime diplomacy. Military indications to China must not be interpreted as an invitation to confrontation, especially at a time when both sides are attempting to reach an agreement on the disputed border in Ladakh.

*Trisha Ray*¹¹ iterates that the QUAD must evolve in tandem with the Indo-Pacific concept. The "Indo-Pacific" has developed beyond its maritime security roots: it now encompasses concerns such as sustainable development, trade, infrastructure, and inclusive digital transformation, as well as the diverse perspectives of countries inside and outside its geographic boundaries. The change of the Indo-Pacific from a word synonymous with the QUAD to a bigger ecosystem of which the QUAD is only a component is critical to this shift. To eventually move beyond its roots in conflict, the QUAD will need to endorse a disruptive technology action plan that will outlast any elected government as well as short-term trends, one that is focused not just on exclusion but also on increasing the overall safeguards, adaptability, and dynamism of technology supply chains and ecosystems.

3. Balancing Parallel Diplomatic Alliances

While the QUAD seeks to maintain territorial integrity in the Indo-Pacific and counter any expansionist tendencies, India needs to be mindful so as to not jeopardise its position in the BRICS and SCO whose members have incongruent interests to those of the QUAD. The BRICS provides India with "transnational reach" with respect to international engagements in pharmaceuticals, IT, automobiles, banking, defence, mining, oil and gas, raw materials, etc. Furthermore, the BRICS-instituted New Development Bank lent India 1 billion USD for its fight against Covid-19. The NDB carries out its primary objective of offsetting the western hegemony that the IMF and World Bank have over international financing. This awards BRICS countries more bargaining power, more transparency, and a better-suited banking format.

Given the extreme importance that both QUAD and BRICS and other allied alliances hold for India, India needs to maintain a balance between its obligations to and in all these alliances, most of which have conflicting interests. Some scholars opine that India should either assume a dormant role in the BRICS or a stance of least dependency in the QUAD. However, neither of these positions reflects well on Indian foreign policy and action. India has been displaying apt diplomacy in keeping the balance so far, be it by abstaining to vote against Russia in the UN with respect to the Russia-Ukraine issue or by signing the BECA agreement with the USA. India must ensure that it does not become a puppet at the hands of hegemonic superpowers and get caught in the crosshairs because India has much more to lose than gain from such an engagement. However, India does seem to be in a good place, since no country has historically displayed non-alignment better than India.

Despite its extensive international activities and eager partnerships, the Indian Ocean continues to be New Delhi's top priority¹². All facets of Indian security are threatened by fundamental and structural changes in the region, as are India's global aspirations and vision. India will devote all of its resources and efforts to protecting the Indian Ocean during a crisis, as this region serves as the cornerstone for its global leadership role. The evolving security situation in the Indian Ocean necessitates a shift in India's military and security response.

¹⁰A. Singh, *Maritime Diplomacy is Vital for the Quad's Success*, (2021), Observer Research Foundation.

¹¹T. Ray, *A Quad 2.0 Agenda for Critical and Emerging Technologies*, (2021), Observers Research Foundation.

¹²D.M. Baruah, *Partnerships as a Central Pillar of India's Indo-Pacific strategy*, (2020) Carnegie endowment for international peace 12.



4. The QUAD and Crisis Management- Vaccine Diplomacy

The QUAD displayed their collective resolve to extend the scope of the alliance into health and disaster management through their vaccine diplomacy aimed at countering potentially unscrupulous vaccine policies and debt trap diplomacy operating during the pandemic. The QUAD members collectively decided to donate over 1.2 billion vaccines to countries in the Indo-Pacific by the end of 2022, over and above the vaccines provided under the aegis of the WHO and the COVAX facility. The countries fused Japanese funds, Indian production capacity, American technology, and Australian logistic expertise to culminate into an effective vaccine production and delivery mechanism with a prospectively robust supply chain management system, resilient disaster management and cooperative economic strategies. India was expected to undertake the extensive production given its production capacity, availability of labour and economies of scale. Japan, in turn, provided soft loans to India to achieve these targets, backed by Australia's "last mile" delivery support.

However, the pandemic's unanticipated surge in intensity and reach rescinded the QUAD's vaccination partnership. India's 'Neighbourhood First' policy succumbed to the disastrous 2nd wave of Covid-19. To date, the QUAD has pledged around 5.2 billion USD to the COVAX facility and have additionally delivered over 670 million vaccine doses individually, of which 265 million vaccines were delivered to Indo-Pacific countries. Obviously, the QUAD has failed to meet its vaccination targets but what is interesting is that they have not only been unsuccessful in meeting the targets, but have also shied away from the goal in entirety by stating in a recent joint statement that the QUAD will now be focussing their resources on disaster preparedness and early-detection technologies, community action, and other technologies and avenues that aid in prevention and mitigation as opposed to cure and rehabilitation. The stand was that Covid has now taken a backseat in the list of the QUAD's priorities seeing as the pandemic has been slowing down in incidence and intensity and that the global order needs to be prepared in the event of a reoccurrence of a catastrophe of the same effect.

5. Divergence Of Interests- India and the QUAD

The breakdown of the QUAD vaccine initiative holds up a mirror to the realities of the intricacies of international diplomacy and priorities. The initiative saw its first hurdle when the USA saw an unprecedented increase in Covid infections, after which the USA closed itself off to its QUAD obligations, stating national security and health emergency. The second hit came when India faced its 2nd wave of Covid-19, hampering its ability to produce jabs exclusive of those required to immunize its own citizens.

This reflects that the alliance needs to enforce a stricter, compliance-based order that does not undermine the QUAD's undertakings and awards it reliability, accountability, and transparency. The member states need to organise their priorities and accord their efforts validity, exposure, resoluteness, positive enforcement, and conscious responsibility if they want to be taken seriously in the global ecosystem.

India's conceptualisation and aspirations with respect to the Indo-Pacific are notably more focussed on the Indian as against the Pacific Ocean, owing to justifiable weariness over border skirmishes and multifarious transnational economic, banking, security, and diplomatic relations along the Indian sub-continent.¹³

India recognises territorial boundaries starting from the east coast of Africa to certain sections of the Middle East as falling under the ambit and aegis of the QUAD and its jurisdictional manifesto. However, the USA on the other hand, neglects both, Africa, and the Middle East in its definition of Indo-Pacific, reflecting a pattern of motivated and pointed involvement in diplomatic measures and strategies that stay true to the values of the red, white and blue¹⁴. Furthermore, President Joe Biden's unilateral nomenclature of the QUAD as an "*alliance of democracies*" is a belligerent reference to China, which

¹³M.C. Miller, *The Quad, AUKUS, and India's Dilemmas*, (2021) Council on Foreign Relations.

¹⁴V. Mishra, *India-US Relationship under the Biden administration: apprehensions and outcomes*, (2020) 15 *Indian foreign affairs journal* 4.



jeopardises India's stand in global trade and commerce with China, who has surpassed USA to become India's leading trade partner.

Yet another impediment in a full-fledged Indo-US partnership is India's justified scepticism towards USA's reliability and credibility as a long-term partner¹⁵. U.S.-Pakistani military connections have long been seen in New Delhi as supporting Beijing's destabilisation of India policy. Business ties are hindered by disagreements over trade restrictions, intellectual property rights, H1B visas, and market access. It has not been simple to reduce the negative effects of disagreement on these matters in order to advance bilateral collaboration. Washington is accustomed to being the dominating party in relationships. However, India will not be the kind of coalition partner that the United States fostered during the Cold War, since India is a growing great power, not a declining one¹⁶.

The recent asseveration of the US-Australia-UK defence partnership, monikered the 'AUKUS', is a reflection of the sentiment of a 'nation-first' policy making, reiterating that the QUAD assumes no responsibility for collective security and that members honour bi/multilateral treaties as superior in alignment with national interests.

While the AUKUS, whose expressed objective is to restrain adverse Chinese influence, is beneficial to India as a force to contain China without being party to it, the AUKUS also exposes asymmetry in the sharing of sensitive defence information. This is evidenced by USA's agreement to divulge sensitive submarine technologies to Australia under AUKUS, keeping the QUAD counterparts India and Japan in the dark, defenceless against the unpredictable neighbour- the very nation AUKUS seeks to contain. It is therefore ironic that the very countries that may be primary victims are conveniently allowed to remain sitting ducks or serve as guinea pigs for the better-equipped nations.

This asymmetrical bilateral agreement within the QUAD, contradicting their objectives, showcases a divergence in priorities, partnership standings and commitment to the QUAD, subsequently rationalising India's decision of diversifying its sourcing of defence appurtenances. These assemblages are referred to as "mini-laterals" by defence analysts. Security cooperation has increased, especially in the marine sector, with the United States acting as a conduit.¹⁷

Another evidence of negligence of maritime diplomacy and international strategy is the disregard of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and their potential as a defence institution¹⁸. While naval capabilities have grown, there appears to be no genuine effort to redress the funding inequity that favours the army. Additionally, delays and cost overruns stem from general disputes over procurement, which affect naval spending as well as other Indian defence spending. As a result, crucial strategic assets such as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which are located at the mouth of the Malacca Strait and might serve as a critical node for compulsion or deterrence, have been neglected and require greater capability and operations.

India's strategic goals demand a wider range of allies and resources in its approach to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The overall utility of the Quad can end up being diminished as a result, rather than increased. Although they all support the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept, the Quad is a framework created to produce convergence on fundamental principles, goals, and capabilities. It will be put to the test by centrifugal forces, primarily from India, which will prevent or at the very least significantly postpone convergence.¹⁹

6. Suggestions

Being a relatively nascent bloc despite inception in the early 2000's, the QUAD is still navigating through the nitty-gritties of the agreement, identifying administrative lacunae therein and bridging the same through cooperative politics.

¹⁵S. Upadhyay, *India-US defence partnership: challenges and prospects*, (2019) 14 *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 2.

¹⁶M. Malik, *Balancing Act: the China-India-US triangle*, (2016) 179 *World Affairs* 2.

¹⁷E.C Avery, *Japan, the Indo-pacific, and the "QUAD."*, (2018) *Chicago Council on Global Affairs*.

¹⁸D.M. Baruah, *Partnerships as a Central Pillar of India's Indo-Pacific strategy*, (2020) *Carnegie endowment for international peace* 12.

¹⁹*supra* note 1.



While the QUAD boasts of prime membership of some of the strongest countries of the free world, there are certain aspects left to be desired. The Indo-Pacific, despite being one of the richest ecosystems, is still majorly comprised of third-world countries with unimpressive infrastructure systems, poor disaster management modules and weak communication networks.

There is a need for improved physical and digital connectivity, multifaceted trade networks and agreements, ameliorated systems of infrastructure and robust communication linkages.

It is of pivotal importance that countries understand the trade-off between national and bloc interests to identify the most mutually beneficial and symbiotic arrangements.

The scope and potential of the QUAD in terms of economic expansion and growth via trade and commerce is presently stunted owing to the absence of adequate terrestrial cables in the Indo-Pacific and a lack of underwater cable connectivity in regions of the Bay of Bengal. The *UNCTAD Automated System for Custom Data*, despite being operational in eliminating information asymmetry and trade barriers, cannot dismiss the lacunae in interstate connectivity issues.

There is an exigent desideratum for technological regulations and policies pertaining to digital literacy, cybersecurity, common database for information sharing, cyber fraud, etc. to counter the ever-growing cyber-attacks on a country's soft power.

The *Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)* only encompasses a small part of the Indo-Pacific under common FTAs. Moreover, the laxity and flexibility in the enforcement of RECP obligations reinforces the need for a broader institutional framework to hedge connectivity and commerce in the Indo-Pacific.

Countries in the Indo-Pacific are categorically susceptible to Non-Traditional Security (NTS) threats, especially natural disasters, given the geographical location and anthropocentric history. The QUAD needs to proactively collaborate and lead the efforts in setting up standardised or common mitigation strategies, capacity building, community training, reconstruction and rehabilitation, etc. so as to preserve the integrity of the Indo-Pacific ecosystem- biological, economic and political.

Contemporary formats like *US's Vision Planning and Consulting (VPC)*, *the IOM Asia-Pacific Regional Data Hub*, *Bangladesh's Coastal Crisis Management Centres (CCMCs)*, etc. need to be supplemented by the collective resources of the QUAD.


Conclusion

The strategic and political significance of the Indo-Pacific, as highlighted previously, cannot be dismissed in the global ecosystem. The QUAD's presence, therefore, allows for a formal, concentrated effort to consolidate resources, ambitions and activities in the furtherance of the achievement of a free, open Indo-Pacific, respecting territorial integrity, freedom of movement and equity of resources and opportunities.

The formation and positive results of the QUAD have inspired the transpiration of other mini-lateral and multilateral agreements and blocs like the AUKUS, the West Asian QUAD, etc. that have seen inception to realise streamlined international goals based on a rules-based approach, distributive politics and collaborative strategies. However, since there is a lot of overlap in the membership of these different diplomatic alliances, it becomes important for countries to balance their interest, power dynamics and terms of trade and agreement and ensure compliance and compatibility with parallel alliances, without jeopardising political relations, military tactics and determined modules resource allocation.

The QUAD is at the cusp of asserting its strategic agenda to ringfence the Indo-Pacific region from the military and geopolitical ambitions of China. The evolving dynamics of trade, economics and naval ubiquity in the region poses unique set of challenges and the QUAD needs to demonstrate superior calibre of sustained military collaboration, consistent diplomatic stance and value based political synergy to stay relevant and stamp its strategic might.

The future may witness an expansion of the QUAD. The QuadPlus initiative during Covid and the recent engagement with Taiwan are vestiges of expansionist vision in the path to create the much-anticipated Asian Arc of Democracy. This will aim to encircle China to render it dependant of the QUAD countries for trade movement and military options. Nevertheless, there is need for this democracy association to



move the needle towards inherently obvious economic, trade, technology and political partnership among the member countries and not be weakened by a military oriented obsession with China and its territorial plans.

Consistent leadership sponsor is essential for the QUAD to position itself as a powerful collective on the Asia Pacific front. The countries being democracies are prone to periodic shift in political leadership and the Charter needs to protect the collective from myopic and hasty decisions. In the unimagined future if China were to adopt a democratic political system, the QUAD will be ready and fit natural ally and this emboldened dispensation will be a worthy military counterweight to NATO and shall significantly impact the geopolitical balance towards a stronger and fortified Asia Pacific.

References

- D.M. Baruah, Partnerships as a Central Pillar of India's Indo-Pacific strategy, (2020) Carnegie endowment for international peace 12.*
- D.M. Baruah, Partnerships as a Central Pillar of India's Indo-Pacific strategy, (2020) Carnegie endowment for international peace 12.*
- E.C Avery, Japan, the Indo-pacific, and the "QUAD.", (2018) Chicago Council on Global Affairs.*
- H.L Thu, QUAD 2.0: New perspectives for the revived concept: views from the strategist, (2019) Australian strategic policy institute.*
- H.V. Pant and S. Mattoo, Eds., The Rise and Rise of the 'Quad': Setting an Agenda for India, (2021) ORF Special Report No. 161, Observer Research Foundation.*
- Hall, India and regional rules-based order: equity and inclusion, (2020) 16 Security Challenges 3.*
- Hall, Modi and the reinvention of Indian foreign policy (Bristol university press, 2019).*
- Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership*
- M. Beckley, Unrivalled: why America will remain the world's sole superpower, (Cornell university press, 2018).*
- M. Malik, Balancing Act: the China-India-US triangle, (2016) 179 World Affairs 2.*
- M.C. Miller, The Quad, AUKUS, and India's Dilemmas, (2021) Council on Foreign Relations. Prime Minister's keynote address at Shangri la dialogue.*
- S. Lalwani, Reluctant link?: India, the QUAD, and the free and open indo-pacific, mind the gap: national views of the free and open indo-pacific,(2019) 27 German Marshall fund of the United States.*
- S. Upadhyay, India-US defence partnership: challenges and prospects, (2019)14 Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 2.*
- Singh, Maritime Diplomacy is Vital for the Quad's Success, (2021), Observer Research Foundation.*
- T. Ray, A Quad 2.0 Agenda for Critical and Emerging Technologies, (2021), Observers Research Foundation.*
- V. Mishra, India-US Relationship under the Biden administration: apprehensions and outcomes, (2020) 15 Indian foreign affairs journal 4.*
- Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World, (2015), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.*