



DISTRIBUTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE CAPSTONE DOCTRINE OF TASKS BETWEEN THE PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THOSE OF THE UN FOR BETTER EFFICIENCY OF MISSIONS ON THE GROUND IN AFRICA

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Abstract: *This article is part of a context of poor collaboration between the peacekeeping missions of regional organizations and those of the UN in the face of new conflicts in Africa. To put an end to this bad collaboration and raise the level of the missions, the author proposes a collaboration where the regional organizations should have the total responsibility to fight against these new conflicts while the UN missions play a support role at the level of the weaknesses, in this case the financial aspect. The author supports his assertion by demonstrating that this last configuration fulfills the success criteria of the capstone doctrine, which is not the case of the current cooperation between them, which takes the form of a command of the UN forces and executing role of regional forces. The success criteria of the capstone doctrine include legitimacy, credibility and national ownership.*

Keywords: *regional organization peace and security mission, UN peace and security mission, legitimacy, credibility, national ownership, capstone doctrine, news conflicts.*

INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping and security missions are undoubtedly one of the major tools of conflict resolution in the world today. Its action in favor of peace, however, was built gradually. Indeed, they were initially limited to tasks such as observation, surveillance and reporting, using fixed positions, patrols, overflights or other technical means, with the agreement of the parties; monitoring ceasefires and supporting verification mechanisms; Interposition as a buffer and confidence-building measure, all while using lightly armed troops¹. Later, its field of competence, as well as the staff who will take part in it, will considerably expand. Thus will fall within its scope, missions such as the creation of safe and stable environments while strengthening the capacity of the State to ensure security; facilitating political processes by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of governance institutions; the Provision of a framework to ensure that all United Nations agencies and other international actors pursue their activities at the national level in a coherent and coordinated manner, the monitoring of electoral campaigns and even the management of power in certain States etc². With regard to personnel, in addition to the military and police forces, they will now deal with economists, lawyers, deminers, election observers, human rights defenders, specialists in civil affairs and good governance, humanitarian workers and even communication and information experts³.

1. The peacekeeping mission, a task for the UN and regional organizations

Missions for peace are the main competence of the UN, in particular the Security Council (SC) on which the initiative of a mission is based, in its capacity as guardian of global security. However, this is not the exclusive competence of the United Nations. Regional organizations can also exercise

¹ <https://dppa.un.org/en/new-agenda-for-peace>

² file:///C:/Users/User/Desktop/Books%20Droit/capstone_eng_0.pdf

³ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/fr/our-history>.

this power under chapter 8⁴ of the United Nations charter. This work will only concern regional organizations in a strict sense because, in our opinion, other types of organization, in particular transnational military organizations, do not meet the criteria that we are going to cite. By regional organization in a strict sense, we mean organizations bringing together the States of the same continent. Some regional organizations working in peacekeeping today are: African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

2. Description of the nature of collaboration between UN peacekeeping and regional peacekeeping in Africa and its consequences

Nowadays with the advent of new conflicts such as terrorism and civil wars, particularly in Africa, we are seeing more and more the deployment of combined peacekeeping missions between the African Union and the United Nations.

These combined missions are governed by the following legal texts.:

-Chapter 8, Article 52 of the United Nations Charter "... Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security..."

- Article 105, chapter 6 of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)⁵ "...The role of the ASF is to provide Peacekeeping forces on a high level readiness capable of rapid deployment in response to a request by the UN or the AU or a given region..."⁶

- Chapter 10 of the Capstone Doctrine⁷ "transition and exit: 10.1 Partnerships and Transition Planning"

The deployment of these combined missions in Africa is done in a configuration of commander and executor. In fact, during deployments where the two categories of missions are called upon to collaborate, the personnel of the UN missions exercise most of the time command functions while the regional forces play an executive role. The UN forces will thus ensure, for example, functions such as the development of the combat strategy, intelligence, the direction of operations while it is the local forces which will go to the front. This pattern is particularly observable in several theaters of deployment, notably in Mali, in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and in Central African Republic (CAR). Even if several reasons are put forward to justify such organization among others: The principle of the non-use of force by the UN missions⁸; practical reasons in particular, the good mastery of the ground by local forces or even their direct interest in solving the conflicts; it remains that it causes many problems, namely:

-Slowness in decision-making. Indeed, given the extremely hierarchical nature of the command, the instructions sometimes arrive late or do not arrive at all due to disagreements between the members of the Security Council and the disengagement of the States, which prevents the troops from acting effectively⁹.

- Decision-making that is not in the interest of the people. Indeed, many disputes have often arisen due to the misunderstanding between the UN command and the local troops on the measures to be taken. In Mali, for example, the local forces have repeatedly complained that the MINUSMA command prevented them from flying over certain areas of the territory which were nevertheless under the threat of terrorism. In the DRC, MINUSCO forces have regularly opposed the search of their convoy while the country was in a situation of irregular exploitation of its natural resources.¹⁰ We

⁴ "Regional arrangements"

⁵The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is a set of institutions, legislation and procedures designed to address conflict prevention and promote peace and security on the African continent. The Constitutive Act of the African Union¹ lays down the legal basis for the APSA.

⁶ <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/Architecture.pdf>

⁷ file:///C:/Users/User/Desktop/Livres%20Droit/capstone_eng_0.pdf

⁸ Agenda for the peace of Boutros Boutros Ghali 1992

⁹ <https://www.jstor.org/stable>

¹⁰ <https://afriquexxi.info/Dans-l-est-de-la-RD-Congo-l-inefficace-lutte-contre-les-minerais-de-sang>

also note the older cases in Somalia and Rwanda of the decision not to intervene when the civilian populations were being massacred¹¹.

- The non-inclusion of national authorities in decision-making and in management, which is a source of tension and loss of confidence. We heard people complaining that they did not understand why troops were stationed when people were being attacked right next to them¹². This is the case, for example, in the DRC where the populations are under attack from the forces of the M23¹³ and in Sudan where a new civil war has broken out again.

3. Proposals in the light of the Capstone doctrine for better collaboration between the UN and regional organizations in the context of peacekeeping missions

Those criteria that UN forces are unable to meet are referred to in the capstone doctrine as success factor. Failure to respect these factors according to this doctrine therefore justifies the multiple failures of peacekeeping operations in Africa over the past two decades. However, given the importance of collective action to deal with new threats, the ideal would be to find the best approach. It is in this sense that we are proposing a reorganization of cooperation in order to establish relations which would leave full command of the missions on the ground to the regional forces, with action by the UN and its forces which would be limited to support for the level of weaknesses. This seems to be a more effective measure, especially when analyzed with regard to the success criteria of the capstone doctrine which are among other: credibility, consensus of parties and national and local appropriation.

Regarding the criterion of credibility, it means that a mission should be able to meet the needs of the people on the ground. The missions of the regional organizations present more guarantees of success insofar as the troops will be better engaged given that they will be directly concerned by the conflict and the command carried out in the interest of the mission. In addition, the troops will be able to intervene more quickly. Another aspect is also that according to which, initially, their involvement as an instrument to provide security was in the context of peace enforcement missions¹⁴, which means that they are naturally associated with missions where there is no peace on the ground unlike UN missions that were born under traditional ceasefire monitoring objectives. In addition, regional organizations such as the African Union have a peacekeeping mission management structure which is the complete opposite of United Nations missions whose basis for action is the practice and work of Doctrine.

Regarding the criterion of legitimacy; it means that a mission should have some support to be effective. The tendency for States to reduce their contributions to international peacekeeping missions in order to invest at the regional level is a mark of the legitimacy accorded to these regional missions. Similarly, African local populations seem to be better at adapting to these local forces. Take the case of the Lake Chad and Mali areas, where European Union forces, French operations and African Union missions operate alongside UN blue helmets. While the French operations and that of

¹¹ David AMBROSETTI UN PEACE OPERATIONS FACED WITH THE RISK OF IRREMEDIATABLE DISCREDIT: WEAKNESS AND SELECTIVITY <https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00344491/document>

¹² Sarah Vernhes (22/06/2016) Au Congo, The incredible helplessness of UN soldiers in the face of the massacres of villagers, le monde Afrique (<https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article>)

¹³ <https://press.un.org/fr/2023/cs15185.doc.htm>

¹³ M23 mean "March 23 Movement": It is a Congolese Revolutionary Army group that is for the most part formed of ethnic Tutsi.

¹³ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/27/shifting-alliances-in-sudans-darfur-as-new-civil-war-fears-rise>

¹⁴ Peace Enforcement is used as a tool to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has decided to act in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.

the UN are under fire from criticism because of the persistence of insecurity, the missions of the African Union seem to be held less rigorously¹⁵.

Regarding the criterion of national and local ownership: It means that for a mission to succeed, local people must be involved in the process. One of the objectives pursued by the African Union is the management of the problems of Africans by Africans themselves¹⁶. The management of the problem by regional organizations will necessarily involve neighboring States both for the political resolution and for the contribution of troops and weapons. Similarly, the mastery of the terrain will be an advantage for the different troops. The feeling of not being occupied due to the presence of military forces belonging to great powers.

CONCLUSION

In view of what has just been presented, it therefore appears that a configuration in which regional organizations are better involved in conflict resolution is better suited to the success criteria of the capstone doctrine. Such a configuration would notably help the UN to remain in its traditional function of peacekeeper in order to avoid the dishonor of the failure of the forces attached to it in a given field of operation. And faced with the financial difficulties of African regional organizations, they will initially have to count on the financial support of the UN but while keeping in mind to acquire financial autonomy.

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¹⁵ Barkhane is an operation launched by france in 2014 in partnership with the five countries of the Sahelo-Saharan zone (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad), members of the G5 Sahel. The objective: to fight against armed jihadist groups throughout the region. barkhane was operating alongside the takuba force of the european union and MINUSMA in the sahel area. between the year 2022 and 2023, all these operations in this area were terminated.

¹⁶ Jean-Marie Clament (2016) The regionalization of responses to African crises; national defense magazine



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