



THE ATTITUDE OF BRITAIN TOWARDS THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS IMPACTS, JULY-SEPTEMBER 1985.

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Abstract:

The apartheid policy pursued by the government of the Republic of South Africa was born out of the expansion of violence committed by blacks in June 1985, which prompted the government of the Republic of South Africa to declare martial law in July 1985. Although the British government condemned the declaration of martial law, it is to reject the demands of the European Council and the United Nations to impose sanctions against the Republic of South Africa.

keywords:- South Africa, apartheid, Britain, sanctions, racial discrimination

THE INTRODUCTION

South Africa received great attention on the part of British politics, as Britain was associated with South Africa with strong historical relations dating back to the beginning of the eighteenth century, with the arrival of the first English settlers to the shores of South Africa. Despite the expansion of the South African government in the policy of apartheid, the British government continued to support it for a government South Africa continuously and defending it, especially during the era of Margaret Thatcher, who called for preventing the imposition of sanctions on South Africa and ending apartheid through peaceful means.

This study consisted of an introduction, two chapters, and a conclusion. In which the researcher has discussed the spread of violence in South Africa and the actions it took the government to reduce it as well as the reasons that prompted the government to announce these provisions and how the British government used to prevent the imposition of sanctions in the European Council and in the United Nations, as the British government did not hesitate to use its diplomatic efforts to prevent and encourage the countries of the world to prevent the imposition of sanctions against the Republic of South Africa.

THE FIRST AXIS: THE REASONS THAT LED TO THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW

The violence continued in the Republic of South Africa, culminating in 21 March 1985, which is today which coincided with the 25th Anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre, so Security forces shot twenty people who were on their way to attend a funeral in Oyttenham (*Uitenhage*) in the Eastern Cape (*Eastern Cape*). And it was the government at that time that funerals were forbidden in those areas; because it became a focus for meetings and protests, which in turn led to a confrontation between the mourners and the police, as he met many people killed in political violence⁽¹⁾.

Accordingly, the black demonstrators attacked several targets, it symbolized the Botha system, as a burnwa Police stations and other government buildings, in addition to the homes of policemen and



town councilors. Sometimes they killed the occupants of these buildings, and this was followed by protests in the regions, and boycotts of schools, With the spread of resistance in traNesvall, Orange Free, Natal and Cape Town . By mid-1985 the apartheid² regime had collapsed regions ,Street and defense committees proliferated ,and people's courts, across the countryAnd became as" people power organs" to replace the apartheid local authorities⁽³⁾. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that in June 1985 the African National Congress held its second consultative conference in Kabwe in Zambia in which he called for making the country "ungovernable"⁽⁴⁾.

To deal with the widening strikes,And acts of violence that saM by African patriots,Protest against the policy of apartheid in various parts of the worldRepublicSouth Africa⁽⁵⁾. Botha declared a state of emergency ,and customary provisions((State Of Siege in Witwatersrand , AndEastern Cape,and Western Cape regions in21July 1985, the first case imposed since the Sharpeville massacre before twenty five years ⁽⁶⁾. By this declaration, the police were given the power to arrest LdemonstratorsWithout warrants, L.Laindefinitely, without bringing charges against them, or allowing them to be informed by lawyers or their relatives, and gave the government greater power than it already exercised toFMonitoring radio coverage and spoilageaZia and journalistic disturbances. Police and security forces were deployed throughoutRepublicSouth Africa, thousands were arrested, including membersorganizedDemocratic FrontUnited⁽⁷⁾.

SECONDLY /BRITAIN'S POSITION ON THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS RESULTS, JULY-SEPTEMBER 1985.

Government announcement ledRepublicSouth Africa state of emergency,And its practice of violence against blacks moved international opinion against it, as the foreign ministers of the ten countries issued a decree members of the European Communitycommon(EEC) , including Britainstatement in22July 1985 about the situation inRepublicSouth Africa.The text of the statement: that the continuationsurvivaltheWestern companies inSouth Africa, wasfor himbeneficial effect of change, andthatCode of conduct for European companies with branches inRepublicSouth AfricaGood to do that . AlthoughFrance was among themthe ten European governmentsmembers inEuropean groupthat supported the statement, except ifHalt announced that it would recall its ambassador from South Africa and ban new investment there, and later that day called for a meeting of the Security Council. of the United Nations . It submitted a draft resolution calling for ending the state of emergency, releasing patriots who were subjected to a campaign of mass arrests, condemning the racist regime, and calling for imposing"Optional penalties"Stop any new investment, and ban the purchasethe krugrand, stopping loans guaranteeing imports, banning the conclusion of any new contracts in the nuclear field, banning the sale of any electronic equipment used in repression operations, and asking the Secretary-General of the United Nations to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution, after approval ⁽⁸⁾.

And the next day he was condemnedArchbishop Trevor Huddleston, head of the antiApartheid in Britain, at the opening sessionfor the peace conference heldin a churchcityWesley in Londonin the presence of representatives of the Methodists)Methodism) Around the World Botha's Recent Proceedings, as he declared "Apartheid is basically a form of"rowing", Andthatchurches insouthAfrica



is witnessing severe suffering to resist it for him. He called on Western governments to replace words with deeds in their opposition to apartheid⁽⁹⁾.

In the same context, a contract Council of Ministers British in 25 July 1985—meeting attended by Margaret Thatcher⁽¹⁰⁾, and the Speaker of the House of Lords and some British officials, The meeting included discuss many things, Of which mode in Republic South Africa, a clear up How During the meeting that since the declaration of a state of emergency in 21 July 1985 450 people were arrested, added the South African government with these procedures You will remain in control of the situation, but there will be no progress on it Solution problems Ha, unless measures are taken to deal with the complaints of the The majority of black. The Council also discussed the statement issued H Foreign ministers The ten member states of the European Community at 22 July 1985, France's proposal submitted to Security Council towards Republic South Africa⁽¹¹⁾.

Accordingly How suggest it must the the government of British to seek a Lee avoid duty penalties economical in the Security Council on South Africa, because from a No Ha To cause great economic losses to South Africa, while avoiding isolation The British government towards this issue, as it will appear to make limited criticism of the policy of apartheid compared to other Western countries, To achieve this, Howe pointed out the necessity a Close contact with the United States of America⁽¹²⁾. And Might The reason for this being in that stand Last It was similar to the position of the British government, although pressure increased dramatically in the US Congress to impose sanctions on South Africa. And At the conclusion of the meeting q The British government thought it was six will work veto (veto) in the Security Council, if require matter, whether alone or jointly with the United States of America⁽¹³⁾.

The British government continued to pursue issues related to apartheid through its visible presence in the Security Council. On July 26, 1985 Security Council held its emergency session⁽¹⁴⁾, Based on the previous invitation from the French government to Sanctions against the Republic of South Africa, so During the session, they discussed the deteriorating situation in the Republic of South Africa, and discussed the French project that calls for imposing "optional sanctions" on it, but the African members of the Security Council opposed this idea, and sought to make the sanctions mandatory⁽¹⁵⁾. In response use British delegates And The American veto "veto" (veto); to prevent the rise nation Burkina Faso (Burkina Faso) of submitting a request On behalf of the non-aligned countries, l Make modifications to the project make penalties on Republic South Africa is mandatory⁽¹⁶⁾.

Despite the differences that prevailed among the participating countries, the Security Council called for the imposition of "optional sanctions" on the Republic of South Africa, and its demand to end the state of emergency declared in 36 towns and cities, and to stop the widespread arrests of nationals⁽¹⁷⁾. After discussions Approved thirteen nation To impose sanctions on the Republic of South Africa, which included freezing any new investments in South Africa, banning the sale of all currencies in which it is minted, imposing restrictions in the field of exchanging sports activities and cultural relations, stopping export guarantee loans, banning any new contract in the nuclear field, and banning Sale of computer equipment that could be used by the South African army and police against Africans, and the release of all political prisoners in South Africa⁽¹⁸⁾.

Meanwhile increase T pressures Finance and diplomacy West on South Africa, to force it to cancel the imposed state of emergency In the evening 31 July 1985—hold a minister Foreign



countries the European Commission, among them was the British delegate Rifkind, meeting in Helsinki (*Helsinki*), The meeting discussed the policies to be followed to end apartheid. During the meeting, the Netherlands, Denmark, France and Ireland pressed to agree to the imposition of "voluntary" sanctions, along the lines of the Security Council resolution of July 26⁽¹⁹⁾ They also expressed their desire to summon their ambassadors to South Africa to consult with them, with the aim of participating in preparing joint measures against South Africa, while Italy, Belgium and Germany suggested sending a ministerial tripartite mission, composed of the Ministers of Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands to South Africa, for the purpose of fact-finding and to urge Botha to start a dialogue with blacks and express their opinions on the serious developments in South Africa. And meeting with representatives of political, social, economic, religious and cultural circles, regardless of the sect to which they belong, provided that these contacts include the official opposition, and that they particularly request that they have the opportunity to hold a meeting with Nelson Mandela. The foreign ministers of the aforementioned countries considered that the tripartite ministerial mission is an attempt to contribute to ending apartheid, and he noted that in the event that tangible progress is not achieved within a reasonable period, these countries will reserve the right to reconsider their position. And they saw also, the best way to put pressure on South Africa is to withdraw the ambassadors⁽²⁰⁾.

The foreign ministers of countries supported a call to apply Resolutions of the Security Council on South Africa on July 26th. In addition, they saw that the South African government should take concrete and immediate measures, representing the opening of a real dialogue with the true representatives of the black population. The ministers also decided to send a tripartite ministerial mission to South Africa, consisting of the foreign ministers of Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands⁽²¹⁾. And although the states in Helsinki supported these proposals, the British delegate refused to reject that, under the pretext of a statement that sanctions will not lead to the changes that everyone would like to see, and that a statement can be issued reaffirming the previous position of European countries, and criticizing it. No dialogue. After a long and serious argument between the two assembled, the British delegate agreed just on a call forwarding to Ambassadors for a meeting at the political committee to the European Commission. And it was also agreed that the presidency of the European Commission would communicate with the South African government regarding the proposal to send the Tripartite Commission⁽²²⁾.

As a result of the increasing intensity of strikes in the Republic of South Africa, and fearing the increase in international pressure to impose sanctions on his country, the South African Council of Ministers held a special planning meeting, in which it considered the latest proposals of the recent Special Ministerial Committee (*Special Cabinet Committee*). The Council of Ministers assessed the escalating internal unrest and the growing international pressure the country is facing, as well as the government's position on the constitutional reform plans. After discussions among ministers it was agreed that President Botha would use his inaugural address at the National Party Conference in Natal to be held on 15 August 1985 as an opportunity to announce some "important new constitutional guidelines", namely the government's acceptance of blacks remaining in white areas, also accepting that the six non-independent black homelands would not necessarily move toward independence; And that the blacks in these areas (homelands or bantustans) and the so-called white



areas of the Republic of South Africa will become equal citizens in their constitutional conditions, including having their voice heard in decision-making at all levels of government, and negotiations will have to be held with the blacks in South Africa to reach an agreement on How will they be accommodated in a new constitutional order?⁽²³⁾.

Accordingly, President Botha sent a message in 5 August 1985 to Thatcher, He referred to the decision of the foreign ministers European Commission around Issue He sent a tripartite mission to his country and confirmed that it would be "In the place of greeting" From his government, provided that the visit does not include any right on the part of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of A to the European Commission In interfering in the internal affairs of his country, and she really wanted to investigate the facts. He also indicated in his letter that two years ago he had formed a ministerial committee to Make some constitutional amendments in the future that can satisfy—From the point of view H —The aspirations of the people of South Africa as a whole, as the Committee made a number of proposals Which Botha felt would have an influence on the political future of dullness, And it will be "In the place of greeting" from the British government⁽²⁴⁾. In his letter, Botha also indicated that he had seriously studied these proposals, and that he intended to issue an announcement about his government's decision, which would be taken on the basis of what he considered to be in the interest of the Republic of South Africa and the South African region, and that he would send his foreign minister to it to explain these developments. To turn it into reality, Botha asked his secretary of state Writing letters to the German chancellor Helmut Josef Michael Kohl (*Helmut Josef Michael Kohl*), And Thatcher, And US President Reagan, Botha explained in the message TH Also that He will carry out some reforms that "serve the people of South Africa". Not only did Botha write these letters to the British, American and German leaders, but he also instructed his foreign minister, Baek Bo T To send a number of letters to the foreign ministers of Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy, proposing that the three ministers meet his foreign minister in Western Europe in mid-August 1985⁽²⁵⁾. The South African government was not satisfied with that, but the South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs stated, on August 8, in an interview with iStation. with me . bad. American (*American Broadcasting Company*) that his government is ready to make changes in the applicable laws - after conducting negotiations with the "moderate" national leaders - noting at the same time that the explosive unrest was caused by "extremists' attempt" to obstruct such negotiations⁽²⁶⁾.

The British government welcomed this, and it was agreed that Thatcher would not meet Botha, but instead he would where Ferguson as her personal envoy in Vienna⁽²⁷⁾.

And according to schedule, The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, Bek Botha, traveled to Vienna, a hold a meeting between and between Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Foreign and Commonwealth Office British a Wayne Fj Regson, F.; J 8 August 1985. And everlasting Beck Botha His welcome to the meeting, and outlined the main proposals to be pursued by his government no Further constitutional change to be announced by the President in his speech at 15 August 1985, who shot it (crossing the Rubicon) (*crossing the Rubicon*) describing it as "historic". It will emphasize three goals, Which: Firstly There will be shared responsibility (ie, including blacks) in decisions affecting the country as a whole, which means "sharing power at the highest level", secondly shared citizenship, Third Undivided South



Africa. Beck Botha confirmed that the policy will be abolished homelands, and that contact has been made with some black leaders. He added that he would put forward proposals. On August 15, 1985 - from his point of view - On a group of "black radicals," including Bishop Tutu, and representatives of black organizations, Botha appealed for support from the British government, noting that outside understanding, particularly from the British government, "Very helpful. He has About gratitude government of the policy that was pursued. The British government⁽²⁸⁾.

In response, Ver pointed out to the difficulties facing the British government, to maintain her relationship with Republic South Africa confirmed the support of the governments. Botha's proposals depends on "seriousness" that the British government will take out the blacks. Proposals to be put forward the speech which Botha will deliver, their willingness to join in real discussions; Because the British government saw the participation of blacks as indispensable, to achieve its aspirations in a stability and prosperity in the region. Ver pointed out to the Foreign Minister's proposals, represented in the release of Nelson Mandela, and the statements of the ten countries were discussed at the meeting. The concern of the South African government about the activities of the tripartite commission, which will visit the country at the end of the year, which may lead to the addition of new sanctions against his country, and to request Botha of the British government took the lead, only to confirm that the ten countries may take a collective decision, and that the European Commission insist on doing so. Ver visited, Bek Botha tried to justify raiding Gaborone previously, except that the South African government condemned South Africa's action, he asserted that the government of British Home Affairs No excuse can be given South African government in this regard, since the government of British Home Affairs cannot accept a military incursion, "killing innocent civilians", This is confirmed by a vote in the Security Council. Moreover, this procedure made the task of the British government in resistance against South Africa more difficult, and more than you expect⁽²⁹⁾.

In light of this he sent Peter Ricketts (Peter Ricketts) Assistant Special Secretary to the Secretary of State, On August 9, 1985 message to Thatcher's private secretary, He explained the opinion of the ministers in the meeting held between Owen Ferguson and Beck Botha, He asserted that the British government would need to think carefully about how it would respond for a speech to be delivered by Botha, when it is issued. On August 15, 1985, stressing that it was in the interest of the British government to give South Africa's statement a fair chance, so it should urge - From his point of view - Partners in particular and others, who are not automatically inclined to judge South Africans for thinking clearly before they dismiss the "Manifesto" as inappropriate, or worse, also suggest that the British government coordinate its general response with the American and German reaction⁽³⁰⁾

Based on these developments, correspondence began between the British Foreign Office and the Prime Ministry. In August 1985 - send a letter to the Head of the South Africa Department at the British Foreign Office, and Under-Secretary for African Affairs, telegram to Patrick Moberly (Patrick Moberly) British Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa, among which the increasing pressures on the British government to take economic measures against Republic South Africa, represented by the legislation put forward by the US Congress⁽³¹⁾, and change in the position of some countries that previously opposed sanctions, notably France and Australia⁽³²⁾ In addition to the pressures she was subjected to the British government within the European Commission, to adopt a societal position that supports sanctions. As for The American position The congressional action had a strong impact as a



result of the new and favorable developments in Republic South Africa. Despite the fact that the US government has consistently vetoed mandatory sanctions at the United Nations, however the government of British confirms that it is unable to rely on such assurance; Because of the suspicions of senior officials Britons within the administration about that Especially after Congress approved imposing sanctions on South Africa⁽³³⁾.

but regarding to Within the European Commission, Reef has made it clear that the position of the British government it has become very difficult; Because of the French decision to announce specific economic measures against South Africa. Accordingly sent Minister of Foreign Affairs How message to Thatcher, between Where the increasing pressure to get attention the government To the potential dangers of isolating Britain. In light of this, Thatcher noted in her response that the government strongly opposed the sanctions, because of their impact In Britain, it demanded that the Foreign Office analyze it set of th Means of mobilizing support against such measures, because they run counter to the interests of the British government that it Sanctions are unlikely to achieve their goals. She wanted to see recommendations on how to deter a government Republic South Africa for its action against located states south continent Africa that lead to increased pressure on the the government of British to imposing sanctions, while encouraging it to move forward with a number of measures to improve the prospects for dialogue with black leaders at the domestic level.⁽³⁴⁾.

As a result, it was decided to hold a meeting at the level of the British government, in which the risks to the interests of the British government involved in its policy during that period, and alternative policies, would be assessed., confirmed Thatcher It is the intention of the British Government to continue to promote, as far as possible, its policy, And The goal of the British government is to avoid putting it in a position where it has to choose between harming its interests in South Africa and harming its interests elsewhere, explaining to the Foreign Office that the ability of the British government to influence the events taking place in Republic South Africa, on the limited international public opinion, must therefore continue to maneuver as skillfully as possible between international pressure on the one hand, and understandable reluctance on the other. the government On the other hand, by coordinating action with its Western partners through which it can pre-empt some of the criticisms directed at it., and call to take More far-reaching measures, this On the one hand, on the other hand, Thatcher felt that she should be kept fully informed of the direction of the Rain both major western countries, and in Africa and the Commonwealth⁽³⁵⁾.

And in 15 ab 1985 The ruling National Party of the Republic of South Africa held its conference in Durban found in it Peter Botha, President of South Africa, a letter announced to undertake a new series of political reforms, including black participation in the political process, education reform, and It was described as "for the benefit of Africans", with the aim of calming world public opinion⁽³⁶⁾.

This discourse caused discontent in British political circles. The British government expressed its "disappointment" with Botha's speech, particularly for his refusal to release Nelson Mandela without conditions, and Denis Healy, spokesman for Britain's opposition Labor Party, stating that "Botha missed an opportunity to save South Africa from a bloody, tragic conflict", and also that it "It was not a positive speech", and did not achieve From his point of view Significantly the expectations of



progress aroused by Pick Botha in his meeting with Owen Ferguson in 1985 in Vienna, in which he explained that the focus of the speech will be on participation of all races, including blacks, for decisions affecting the country as a whole, common citizenship, and an undivided South Africa, but Botha in his speech did not make something regarding shared responsibility. Botha made it clear that he believed in the participation of all societies in matters of common interest, but he did not specify how to achieve this. As for shared citizenship it wasn't clear also. Therefore, the British government saw that the speech was a public confirmation of the government's commitment to the path it had charted in South Africa, and that it had not made concessions to the demands of others, which in turn would lead to an international reaction that would be affected. Responses of black leaders in South Africa⁽³⁷⁾.

The matter did not stand on the official position of the British government, it was lost. Press attacked British Prime Minister of South Africa Botha. In an article published by *The Times* (The Times) Under the title (When Breaths Exhaust Hope in South Africa), she indicated that Peter Botha's speech gave only the least amount of hope for the possibility of bringing about a change in the "racist" government policy, but rather that this speech had thrown the Republic of South Africa with greater difficulties than it had been. Botha, in his speech, robbed the opportunity that "moderate" black leaders were waiting for to open a "fruitful" dialogue, or to enter into serious negotiations, and foreign governments trying to avoid imposing an economic embargo on South Africa would be forced to impose it, prompted by the prevailing idea that it was unable to adopt a firm stance⁽³⁸⁾.

And based on this a meeting took place between Thatcher and the British Foreign Secretary Howe in 4 September 1985. During the meeting, the latter indicated to the discussions that he decided to take place after a week. So with the ten ministers about the imposition of sanctions on South Africa, and in opinion it is necessary to approve the measures taken by the ten ministers, without commitment what he called "possible measures" v. South Africa, taking into account the different interests of member states. Thatcher supported the opinion of the Foreign Minister, as she considered it wrong to acknowledge the phrase "study". Procedures; Because that may indicate that the government of British She was ready to take action, and also emphasized that it would be better to look for "more ambiguous" formulation such as looking at ways in which Member States could respond to the situation in South Africa, taking into account their separate national positions. the meeting⁽³⁹⁾.

European Commission held in September 10, 1985 (For political cooperation in the European Community *Political Cooperation*) A meeting was held in Luxembourg, during which the issue of imposing sanctions on the Republic of South Africa was discussed, and these sanctions included banning the export and import of weapons and semi-military equipment, stopping oil shipments, freezing cooperation in the nuclear field, and what amounted to ending cultural and sports relations⁽⁴⁰⁾.

And Discussions took place during the meeting Ben Rifkind, British Government Representative, and my representative Member States who were determined, Especially the Germans and the French, based on the adoption of a group of a for a course at⁽⁴¹⁾ The most important of these decisions is the summoning of military attaches, and freeze agreements in the cultural and scientific fields, stop the export of oil to the Republic of South Africa⁽⁴²⁾, and Refuse to sell sensitive equipment to the



South African Police and Armed Forces, He refused to cooperate in the development of the program South African nuclear, Not to import and export weapons and paramilitary equipment to and from South Africa, and to freeze contacts and official agreements in the sports and security fields.⁽⁴³⁾ M suggested. Boss is the Prime Minister of the European Commission, also Add banon Krogrand, and on Export credit guarantees, and the new investment⁽⁴⁴⁾.

After strong opposition by Rifkind He showed his acceptance of these penalties; Because she is the same To a large extent the measures that the British government was willing to take against the government Republic South Africa, Except for some severe penalties, Which is to call the military attachés, and the introduction of the visa regime, and freezing agreements in the cultural and scientific fields. After discussions that lasted for several hours, the members concluded that no action was taken "coercive measures" New against South Africa, except Withdraw military attachés, The reason for this is due to the British adherence in this matter. Despite Rifkind's best efforts around military attaches, However, member states warned against this, Which prompted H To submit a request to postpone the meeting for several hours, and he agreed T member states on demand, so Reveknid made contact with Thatcher which showed turn her own concern about the implications of imposing sanctions, and other potential ambiguities⁽⁴⁵⁾.

Accordingly, and at what a sixth that P meeting, Rifkind did not agree to withdraw the British military attache, Although That, except that The members decided to go on ahead in carrying out these measures without Britain's consent.⁽⁴⁶⁾, Which forced revikind to Accept the statement, except "restrictive measures"; pretext that his government needed further time to study it in detail. While the negotiations were going on, protests occurred in Bremen Important⁽⁴⁷⁾, Britain took it as an excuse to withdraw its delegate from the meeting⁽⁴⁸⁾.

Accordingly the British government saw the need to study its implications, in the event of sanctions against South Africa, so to request from the group the Weza Yeh (Misc 118) In September 1985, a review of the strategy of the British government long term towards the investments Financial and economic British In South Africa, in light of the increasing international pressure on it, and work to present proposals, to mobilize support against the economic measures on South Africa. Accordingly, the group a report In it, I explained how the political and economic situation in South Africa over the next five or twenty years could affect British commercial, financial and economic interests, and the policy options available to the British.⁽⁴⁹⁾

The committee explained in its report that the developments the depreciation of the rand, the loss of confidence in South Africa, and the attitude taken by its industrialists, you click on Government South Africa internally and externally, for a change, The committee stressed that the pressure on the government Republic South Africa for change has become sharp during that period, which makes it imperative for the government to go along with this new situation, and the committee believed that the international community's resort to sanctions at this stage will only lead to making the South African government more challenging and resistant to reform, and making the global economy more dangerous than it is. It really is, because South Africa is unable to pay its debts, if the economy collapses. There may be side effects Countries the money lender the other z⁽⁵⁰⁾.

In its report, the committee also emphasized the impact of sanctions on the interests of the British government's Western partners, so I explained that the depreciation of the rand, and decline in the



value of their interests in South Africa, It will get sharper with penalties, as well as The great impact that South Africa's economic collapse will have on neighboring countries. On top of this advanced position, The committee felt that a reserve position could be considered (substitute) that can the British government to be able to bear the effects of sanctions at the lowest possible cost, the Office of the Chief felt Yeh Ministers Thatcher the problem must be approached from the perspective of the interests of the British government, and not from the perspective of a principled position against sanctions.⁽⁵¹⁾.

As a result, the British government agreed on endorsement Raise a group "restrictive measures" against Republic South Africa agreed upon by the nine nations in 10 September 1985⁽⁵²⁾.

As for the foreign minister Howe He recommended that a step should be taken states On pulling out the attachments Military Yin from Republic South Africa; Because he sees that it If you do not support Britain The attitude of the entire international community will affect this in British position, And you will find Britain itself increasingly isolated in both the un and when Commonwealth heads of government. Powell was endorsed by the Secretary of State Howe in his opinion, so saw that tanyhand Britain A full statement of the European Community will strengthen the position of the British government there in resisting the worst measures that it takes pDr Haadvisor Politics external to head Ministers Percy Craddock (*Percy Craddock*) Good point, and it's worth making the sacrifice for it. The reason for that that government Britain You will get in trouble at the UN, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, And He made it clear that the withdrawal of the military attaches had nothing to do with the situation inside South Africa, It will not have any beneficial effect there. And It is in fact a measure to further isolate South Africa, And It is unlikely that the lack of value will result The British government to subscribe to each Point in society statement The Europeanto others simply abandoning it.⁽⁵³⁾. And according to That showed the British government its approval of the economic measures of the nine countries.⁽⁵⁴⁾. The countries of the European Community welcomed the decision of the British government to withdraw its military attachés from South Africa as part of the pressure campaign appreciated by the countries of the Group to force the South African government to abandon its apartheid policy.⁽⁵⁵⁾.

CONCLUSION :

It becomes clear to the researcher through the study that there is a contradiction in the official and popular position in Britain regarding the apartheid policy in the Republic of South Africa. Despite the opposition of the British government to impose sanctions against South Africa; Because of its racist policy, however, the organizations condemned that policy, and were calling for sanctions to be imposed against it. It also appears that there is a clear divergence in the views of some party leaders and British officials Regarding the issue of imposing sanctions on the Republic of South Africa, some of them supported the imposition of sanctions on the Republic of South Africa, and some of them opposed them, so it was not specified how to deal with the government of the Republic of South Africa. Perhaps this is due to the desire of some of them to take into account the higher interests of the British government, especially the economic ones. It also becomes clear that the British government's opposition to imposing sanctions against the South African government was not because it harmed black Africans, but rather it feared for its economic interests in South Africa.

MARGINS

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- (⁸)Extract from Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing St. on 25 July 1985 , Cited in: DBPO , Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No.42 , p.75 .Al-Dustour Newspaper, Issue 6443, July 26, 1985. ;Al-Ahram Newspaper, Issue 36023,26 July 1985.,
- (⁹)THE TIMES, 24 July 1985.
- (¹⁰)Margaret Thatcher :Born in 1925, in the Lincolnshire county of Grantham, which is located in eastern Britain, she is the first woman to become Prime Minister in Britain in 1979. Her opposition to communism caused the leaders of the Soviet Union to call her the "Iron Lady". I studied chemistry, then law, and in 1959 she was elected to the House of Commons. She became the Minister of Culture for the term (1970-1974), became the leader of the Conservative Party in 1975, and succeeded in the elections in 1979, becoming prime minister. She also won the 1983 and 1987 elections, but her increasing unpopularity within her party forced her to resign in 1990, and Thatcher returned as deputy for the city of Finchley for two years, after leaving the premiership. She retired from parliament after the 1991 elections at the age of 66, and after leaving parliament she became the first prime minister to establish a private foundation in his name. Thatcher became Honorary President of the University of Birmingham (1992-1999) and William Mary College in Virginia (1993-2000). years.
- Leonard Seeley m. Ed, Encyclopedia of the World of Knowledge, Famous Men and Women, Nobles Publishing House, Lebanon, 1997, Part 5, p. 479.; Arshad Hamza Hassan Abdullah Al-Fatlawi, The Internal Conditions of Britain during the Margaret Thatcher era 1979-1990, unpublished doctoral thesis, College of Education, Al-Qadisiyah University, 2016. Esraa Hamid Hanoun Hassan Al-Sayed Nour, British-Egyptian Political Relations 1979-1990, unpublished doctoral thesis, College of Education for Human Sciences, University of Basra,2021, pp. 73-79.
- (¹¹)Extract from Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing St. on 25 July 1985, Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 42, p.75 .
- (¹²)Ibid, p.75 .
- (¹³)Ibid , p.75.
- (¹⁴)Al-Dustour Newspaper, Issue 6443, 26 July 1985.
- (¹⁵) The African countries participating in the committee objected to the French draft resolution,Seeing that the situation in South Africa has deteriorated to the point where the international community must shoulder its responsibilities by imposing compulsory sanctions. Al-Ahram Newspaper, Issue 36023, 26 July 1985.
- (¹⁶)Al-Ahram Newspaper, Issue 36025, 28 July 1985.
- (¹⁷)Al-Ahram Newspaper, Issue 36023, 26 July 1985.
- (¹⁸)Al-Ahram newspaper, issue36025 , 28 July 1985.

- (¹⁹) After declaring a state of emergency in 1985, the Security Council adopted On the twenty-sixth of July Resolution No. 569, which called for the first time to take concrete economic measures against Republic of South Africa, Any termination of investments in Ha, in spite of that Consent to it was not mandatory.
- Luís Bernardo Nunes Mexia Castelo - A política externa sul-africana: do apartheid a Mandela, Dotoramento em Estudos Africanos Interdisciplinares em Ciências Sociais, INSTITUTO SUPERIOR DE CIÊNCIAS DO TRABALHO E DA EMPRESA, Lisboa, 2003,
- (²⁰) Mr Appleyard (Helsinki) to FCO, 1 August 1985, Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 44, pP.77-78. Al-Ahram newspaper, Cairo, Issue, 2 August 1985;
- (²¹) Good luck Hadi Salem Defensive, un positioned Policy Apartheid in South Africa (1946-1991), Unpublished PhD thesis, Institute of Arab History and Scientific Heritage for Postgraduate Studies, 2007, p. 294; Security Council, Fortieth Session, Letter dated August 26, 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Luxembourg to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Document No. (S/17419) (A/40/577), New York, 1985, pp. 1-2.
- (²²) Mr Appleyard (Helsinki) to FCO, 1 August 1985, Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 44, p.78.
- (²³) F.W De Klerk, Op. Cit., p.102.
- (²⁴) Letter from President Botha to the Prime Minister, 5 August 1985, Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 47, pP.80-81.
- (²⁵) Ibid, p.81.
- (²⁶) Al-Ahram Newspaper, Issue 36037, 9 August 1985.
- (²⁷) Letter from Mr Ricketts to Mr Flesher, 9 August 1985, Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 49, p.82. Note(2)
- (²⁸) Enclosure in No. 49 Meeting in Vienna with the South African Foreign Minister, pP.83-84.
- (²⁹) Enclosure in No. 49, Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, p. 85.
- (³⁰) Letter from Mr Ricketts to Mr Flesher 9 August 1985 Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 49, pP.82-83.
- (³¹) Congress passed duty series of penalties Commercial and Economic v. Government of South Africa provides for an immediate ban on the sale of gold extracted from South Africa in the United States, ban the export of nuclear technology, and the sale of computer materials, and expressed its opposition to granting new loans from banks to South Africa. Al-Ahram newspaper, issue, 2 August 1985.
- (³²) Australia and France withdrew their ambassadors from South Africa, After the United States of America and the rest of the European Common Market countries withdrew their ambassadors, Protesting the state of emergency and oppression in South Africa. Al-Ahram newspaper, issue, 3 August 1985.
- (³³) Teleletter from Mr Reeve to Mr Moberly (Pretoria), 9 August 1985, Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 50, p.87.
- (³⁴) Ibid, p.88.
- (³⁵) Ibid, p.89.
- (³⁶) Al-Ahram Newspaper, Issue 36043, 15 August 1985.
- (³⁷) Letter from Mr Barnett to Mr Flesher 15 August 1985, Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 51, p.90.
- (³⁸) Quoted from Al-Ahram newspaper, Issue 36056, 27 August 1985.
- (³⁹) Letter from Mr Powell to Mr Appleyard, 4 September 1985, Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 56, p.97.
- (⁴⁰) Al-Dustour newspaper, issue 36073, 12 September 1985.
- (⁴¹) The reason for the German government's insistence on imposing sanctions is due to the rise of eight Western Germans who are members of the Green Party, Six of them were members of the German parliament occupying Embassy building, They declared that they would sit with him for 48 hours, Protesting their government's refusal to take economic sanctions against the apartheid regime. Al-Ahram Newspaper, Issue 36071, 11 September 1985.
- (⁴²) Minute from Mr Rifkind to Sir G. Howe, 11 September 1985, Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 61, pP.104-105.
- (⁴³) Anna Konieczna, Rob Skinner (eds.), A Global History of Anti-Apartheid 'Forward to Freedom' in South Africa, First edition, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2019, pP 249-250.
- (⁴⁴) Minute from Mr Rifkind to Sir G. Howe, 11 September 1985, Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 61, p.105.
- (⁴⁵) Ibid, p.105.
- (⁴⁶) Minute from Mr Rifkind to Sir G. Howe, 11 September 1985, Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 61, p.106.

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- (⁴⁷) Unrest occurred in the city of Birmingham, Major British industrial cities that were inhabited by immigrants from India, Pakistan, Jamaica and a number of African countries, The cause of the unrest is due to the discontent of the people of Handsworth of procedures Police forces in the city towards immigrant citizens, As he expressed his displeasure for the campaigns Continuous attacks by the police on cafes, buildings, and places where blacks and colored people live, The sources pointed out that the disturbances erupted after a quarrel between an Asian citizen and a policeman who tried to issue a traffic ticket for him, As a result, the disturbances and riots that began on The tenth of September 1985.
- (⁴⁸) Minute from Mr Rifkind to Sir G. Howe, 11 September 1985, Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 61, p.106 .
- (⁴⁹) Minute from Mr Reeve to Mr Fergusson. 5 March 1986 , Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 165, p. 277 .
- (⁵⁰) Letter from Mr Christopher (Cabinet Office) to Mr Curran, 4 September 1985, Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 57, p.98-99 .
- (⁵¹) *ibid*, p.99 .
- (⁵²) Letter from Mr Powell to Mr Budd, 24 September 1985, Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 70, p.124 .
- (⁵³) Minute from Mr Powell (No. 10) to the Prime Minister, 24 September 1985 , Cited in: DBPO, Ser. 3, Vol. 9, No. 71, p. .
- (⁵⁴) *ibid*, p. .
- (⁵⁵) Sakhifah Al-Ahram, Issue 36084 , 24 September , 1985.